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Abstract 
 
South Africa as a water scarce country recognizes that it is no longer possible to augment existing water supplies. 
The country has therefore intensified efforts to implement its comprehensive National Water Act, which stipulates 
various Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) policies for better water management. However, water 
policy reforms continue to face challenges such as the lack of relevant supporting institutional frameworks and 
problems associated with water allocation continue to persist. The current study presumes that water management 
policies affect the efficiency, quantity, and quality of irrigation water use and have significant impacts on the 
welfare of irrigation water users. Additionally, the study posits that significant transaction costs characterize and 
could inhibit the water policy implementation and compliance processes. 
 
Firstly, we followed a framework by McCann & Easter, (2004) and McCann et al., (2005) to measure transaction 
costs and used OLS regression methods to assess the determinants of transaction costs. Findings from the study 
indicate that transaction costs accruing to water managers’ varied between 13 and 29 percent of total water budget 
costs. Water users’ transaction costs were 2 percent of other input costs, 1 percent of farm benefits and 27 percent of 
water purchase costs. Various factors such as compliance to water policy (water pricing, membership in WUAs) and 
use of ICT for water management significantly influenced transaction costs incurred by water users.  
Results from the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) show that on average, the water use efficiency for irrigation 
water users was as low as 31 percent. Among the policy factors of interest, compulsory licensing significantly 
influenced water use efficiency while water pricing and membership in WUAs influenced water use quantities. 
Water pricing, compulsory licensing and membership in WUAs on the other hand determined water use quality.  
Evidence from the mathematical programming approaches show that, rising water tariffs have a negative though 
minimal impact on farmers’ welfares. Smallscale farmers are more adversely affected by rising water tariffs and 
license fees increases compared to their largescale counterparts. The effect of price increases on irrigation water 
demanded for the two types of farmers investigated was somewhat inelastic; however, the large-scale farmers’ water 
demand was moderately elastic as there were slight reductions in quantities of water consumed due to water price 
increases. Compulsory licensing fees increases on the other hand resulted in smaller changes in welfare compared to 
water tariff increases.  
This study finds various relevant factors affecting transaction costs, water use-quantity, quality, and efficiency, 
which can act as policy indicators towards better water policy reform and management. The evidence of existing 
transaction costs is important feedback to guide water policy design and improvement in South Africa. The negative 
impact of water pricing on small-scale farmer welfare could suggest the need for different pricing strategies for 
different farmer groups, while an elastic water demand is a necessary condition for water pricing to effectively 
reduce water use and enhance conservation.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Südafrika, welches ein wasserarmes Land ist, erkennt, dass es nicht weiter möglich ist bestehende Wasservorräte 
weiterhin auszuschöpfen. Deshalb hat das Land die Bemühungen erhöht den umfangreichen National Water Act 
umzusetzen, der verschiedene Politiken für ein ganzheitliches Wasserresourcen Management (Integrated Water 
Resource Management - IWRM) für ein besseres Wassermanagement festsetzt. Diese Arbeit misst 
Transaktionskosten des Wandels im Massermanagement und deren bestimmende Faktoren im Olifants Basin, 
Südafrika. Außerdem werden die Effekte des Wassermanagements auf die NUtzung des Bewässerungswassers und 
der Einfluss der Politik auf die Wohlfahrt der Wassernutzer ermittelt. Die Arbeit benutzt ein Rahmenwerk von 
McCann & Easter, (2004) und McCann et al., (2005) um die Transaktionskosten zu messen und verwendet eine 
OLS Regressionsmethode um die Einflussfaktoren der Transaktionskosten zu bestimmen.  
Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit zeigen, dass die anfallenden Transaktionskosten der Wasserverwalter zwischen 13 und 29 
Prozent der gesamten Wasserkosten ausmachen. Die Transaktionskosten der Wassernutzer betragen 2 Prozent der 
Inputkosten, 1 Prozent des landwirtschaftlichen Gewinns und 27 Prozent der Kaufkosten des Wassers. 
Unterschiedliche Faktoren wie die Einhaltung der Wasserpolitik (Wasserpreisfestsetzung, Mitgliedschaft in 
Wassernutzerverbänden) und die Nutzung von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnik (ICT) für 
Wassermanagement beeinflussten die Transaktionskosten der Nutzer signifikant.  
Ergebnisse der Data Envelopment Analyse zeigen, dass die durchschnittliche Wassernutzungseffizienz bei nur 31 
Prozent lag. Verpflichtende Zulassungen verbesserten die Wassernutzungseffizienz signifikant, während eine 
Preisfestsetzng des Wasserpreises und die Mitgliedschaft in Wassernutzerverbänden die nachgefragte Menge des 
Wassers erklären. Andererseits bedeuten alle diese drei Faktoren auch die Nutzung einer unakzeptabler 
Wasserqualität.   
Mathematische Programmierungen zeigen auf, dass  steigende Wasserpreise einen negativen, jedoch minimalen, 
Einfluss auf die Wohlfahrt der Landwirte hat. Kleinbäuerliche Landwirte sind stärker nachteilig von steigenden 
Wassertarifen und Zulassungsgebühren betroffen als Großlandwirte. Der untersuchte Effekt eines Preisanstiegs von 
Bewässerungswasser für die zwei verschiedenen Landwirtschaftssysteme ist eine gering unelastische Nachfrage; 
trotzdem war der Wasserverbrauch der Großlandwirte gemäßigt elastisch, da der Wasserverbrauch durch einen 
Anstieg des Wasserpreises gering sinkt. Andereseits ergaben steigende verpflichtende Zulassungsgebühren eine 
kleinere Veränderung der Wohlfahrt verglichen mit einem Anstieg des Wasserpreises. 
Diese Studie findet verschiedene, relevante Faktoren, die die Transaktionskosten beeinflussen. Diese sind die 
Menge, die Qualität und die Effizienz des Wasserverbrauchs, die auch als politische Indikatoren für eine bessere 
Reform der Wasserpolitik und des Management dienen können. Der Nachweis der vorhandenen Transaktionskosten 
ist eine wichtige Rückmeldung für die Planung und Verbesserung der Wasserpolitik in Südafrika. Der negative 
Effekt von Wasserbepreisung auf die Wohlfahrt der kleinbäuerlichen Landwirte könnte eine unterschiedliche 
Preissetzung für unterschiedliche Landwirtschaftstypen empfehlen, wobei eine elastische Wassernachfrage eine 
notwendige Bedingung für eine Wasserpreisfestsetzung ist um den Wasserverbrauch effektiv zu reduzieren und 
Wassereinsparungen zu fördern.   
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Chapter One 
1. General Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research problem  
Water is critically important to the livelihoods of many populations all over the world yet it remains a 
scarce resource or of poor quality (Faysse, 2004). In many developing countries, water as an input to 
production majorly constrains output and population incomes (Namara et al., 2009). Its management and 
development is of prime importance (Ashraf et al., 2007). There is consensus on the need for a functional 
institutional framework to ensure sustainability and social optimum water use (Nagaraj, 1999). Irrigated 
agriculture is the single largest user of fresh water on the planet and the largest economic activity of rural 
populations; forty percent of the world’s food supply comes from irrigated agriculture (Jacomia, 2005). 
However, current water scarcity and deteriorating qualities, amid competitive allocation between different 
users and uses poses great challenges in continued water use and management (Nagaraj, 1999). 
 
South Africa is a water stressed country; with many areas facing water shortages as demand exceeds 
supply (Mallory, 2011). It is indeed rated among the 30 most water stressed countries in the world by 
UNESCO (Tsegai et al., 2009; Mwendera et al., 2003). The Olifants river basin ranks as the country's 
third most water stressed basin (Kloos, 2010; Walter, 2010; Mallory, 2011). It is also one of the most 
polluted with its basin ecosystem in a generally poor condition (Van Veelen, 2011). This arises from 
intensified demand for water from competing economic activities including mining, industry, and 
agriculture. Additionally, population growth, climate change, and increasing economic development 
further aggravate the water scarcity and quality situations (ibid). Therefore, there is a likelihood of a 
serious water crisis affecting both humans and wildlife if no comprehensive management interventions 
are put in place (Earle et al., 2005;  Van Veelen, 2011).  
 
It is widely recognized that an integrated approach to freshwater management offers the best means of 
reconciling competing demands with supply in the phase of water scarcity (Alfarra, 2004). Integrated 
water resource management (IWRM) offers a framework for actualization of effective operational actions 
such as water demand management (Alfarra, 2004; Earle et al., 2005). IWRM has received support and 
constant emphasis from scholars, agencies, and international declarations. However, it has not been easy 
for many developing countries especially due to lack of the relevant supporting institutional frameworks 
(Wang, 2012a). In South Africa, the IWRM approach has been highly prioritized (Kloos, 2010). The 
country is accredited to having one of the most comprehensive Water Acts in the world (Kapfudzaruwa & 
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Sowman, 2009), in attempts to move away from the long history of water provision to only a few favored 
minority (Lange et al., 2003). The National Water Act (NWA) No. 38 of 1998 recognizes water as a 
scarce resource belonging to the people. The Act therefore aims to protect, use, develop, conserve, 
manage, and control water resources as a whole. It addresses equity, efficiency, and sustainability in 
management of the water resource unlike the previous riparian rights system (Kloos, 2010). Numerous 
stipulated policies in the water Act are envisaged to attain these water Act goals. The policies are 
currently under implementation and are expected to highly impact water management (Hassan & 
Thurlow, 2011). This study will specifically examine different aspects of water trade, compulsory 
licensing, effluent discharge permits, water tariffs and participatory water management through Water 
User Associations (WUAs) / groups in water management. 
 
Firstly, this study considers the transaction costs (TCs) faced by water users/private agents and water 
managers/public agents in the water policy process. Transaction costs are important in influencing policy 
implementation and compliance as they can inhibit the process especially when they are a big percentage 
of the total policy costs (McCann et al, 2005b ; Blore et al., 2013; Coggan et al., 2010). Therefore, 
knowledge of all the associated transaction costs in a policy process is important. When transaction costs 
are explicit, it helps in making comparisons of the existing policy alternatives and foster effective design 
and implementation ex ante (McCann et al., 2005). It also allows evaluation of existing policies ex post 
for improvement purposes, and assessment of their budgetary impact to establish their sustainability and 
efficiency gains (McCann et al., 2005; McCann & Easter, 2004). Knowledge of transaction costs also  
guides and prioritizes the policy making process based on current needs and resources (Diao et al., 2005; 
McCann & Easter, 2004; McCann et al., 2005). On the flipside, this study further discusses the concept of 
transaction benefits in the same context of water management. 
 
Recent innovations in  Information and Communication Technology (ICT) provides a great potential  in 
reducing transaction costs (Singh, 2008; Okello, 2011;  Aker, 2010; Silva et al., n.d.;Jensen, 2007; Aker, 
2008). Specifically it makes easier the communication of knowledge and information, delivery of 
information and training at low costs, improving access to markets and credit, empowerment of farmers to 
negotiate better prices and facilitating and strengthening networking (Okello, 2011). Nevertheless, the 
ICT potential to reduce transaction costs in water management remains untapped. Lack of communication 
and feedback pertaining to water policies between stakeholders is indeed identified as one of the biggest 
drawbacks to water management (Kay, 2011; Lévite et al., 2003). In the agricultural sector, several 
studies have attributed benefits such as better prices, reduction in price dispersions and improvement in 
margins to ICT due to reduced transaction costs (Aker, 2008, 2010;Silva et al., n.d.;Jensen, 2007). Unlike 
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these studies that have mainly focused on small-scale farmer access to input and output market 
information, the current study attempts to fill a unique gap by assessing the potential role ICT (mobile 
phones use) could play in water management through a trial experiment between water users and water 
managers.  
 
Secondly, this study examines the effect of WUAs, compulsory licensing, and water pricing on irrigation 
water use in the Olifants basin among other socio economic factors. Participatory water management is an 
important component to achieving the goals of water resource management (Harpe, n.d.). Its importance 
is well documented by international agreements such as the Duplin principles and the 1992 Rio 
conference (Orne-Gliemann, 2007; Manzungu, 2004). However, participatory water management through 
WUAs in South Africa has not been entirely successful (Kloos, 2011; Muller & Schreiner, 2009). Little 
progress through establishment of Catchment Management Agencies (CMA) and WUAs is reported and 
the envisioned goals such as devolved water allocation have not been attained (Enright, 2011). Water 
rights on the other hand, are a first step towards IWRM. They promote growing water productivity and 
foster rural livelihoods (Speelman et al., 2010). As such, water rights determine the real value of water 
and encourage investment due to security of ownership. It would be interesting to examine the context 
specific effects of water rights on water use for the Olifants basin amid implementation of the NWA. 
Additionally, there exist mixed outcomes and arguments of the effects of water pricing as an instrument 
to minimize over abstraction of water and maintain water quality. Little, if any, quantitative assessments 
exist on the effect of these three aspects (WUAs, compulsory licensing, and water pricing) on irrigation 
water use especially in the Olifants basin.  
 
Thirdly, following Muller & Schreiner, (2009) we suggest that water management through different 
policies largely impacts on  a country's welfare and economic activities. The effects of selected water 
policies remain of key importance as they translate into the competitiveness of a region which further 
influences peoples' welfares (Diao et al., 2005). Water trade for example increases water use efficiency by 
directing water consumption to sectors where its use provides a higher marginal value (Dinar & 
Xepapadeas, 1998; Schoengold & Zilberman, 2007). Water prices on the other hand create the necessary 
awareness of water scarcity to stakeholders and induce the thinking of water allocation to higher value 
activities such as crops with higher returns, thus leading to efficient water use (Wang, 2011 ; Speelman et 
al., 2009). However, this is not always the case as water prices might not be viable for all stakeholders' 
especially resource poor farmers. It might lead to a reduction in farm production and profits which may in 
turn dampen the food security situation ( Speelman et al., 2009). Therefore, due to mixed results of policy 
interventions, and in order to attain sustainable management of water resources, knowledge and 
4 
 
understanding of context specific consequences of water policy interventions on human welfare is needed 
(Jogo & Hassan, 2010; Hassan & Farolfi, 2005).  
 
Against the above background and problem definition, this study aims at addressing the following 
research objectives: 
 
1.2 Objectives 
1. To estimate the transaction costs associated with implementation and compliance to different water 
policies  
2. To assess the effect of different water policies; (compulsory licensing, water tariffs and WUAs) on 
irrigation water use (quantity, quality, and efficiency) 
3. To assess the impact of water policies (compulsory licensing, and water tariffs) on the large scale and 
small scale holders’ welfares 
 
1.3 Research hypothesis and expected value added of the research  
The implementation of IWRM principles in South Africa, is expected to meet the water Act goals of 
efficiency, equity, social development, and sustainability. However, this has not been entirely successful 
as water allocation challenges such as poor water quality, poor services in water supply, water restrictions 
in dry periods, administrative delays, water distribution and storage difficulties still persist (Enright, 
2011). Therefore, this study aims at contributing towards policy in the water sector by equipping decision 
makers with evidence-based research on the effects, impacts, and transaction costs of selected water 
policies in South Africa. We hypothesize that water management policies affect irrigation water use 
(efficiency, quantity, and quality) and have significant welfare effects on irrigation water users’ welfares. 
In addition, significant transaction costs characterize the water policy implementation and compliance 
processes in the Olifants basin. The study will inform and guide water policy reform in South Africa, 
specifically the Olifants. The research fits into ZEF's thematic area on water resources with specific focus 
on water management aspects. It adds onto previous research conducted in the first phase of the Olifants 
project by widening the scope of the study area to incorporate all the three sub-basins unlike in the first 
phase, which considered only the middle Olifants sub basin. The current research further brings in the 
institutional and governance aspect by exploring the organization of actors in the Olifants basin and the 
roles they play in water governance. The study further considers the indirect costs of institutions by 
assessing the transaction costs of water policy implementation and compliance. This work further builds 
on previous Olifants research by considering a larger number of irrigation farmers both small scale and 
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large scale, growing a wider array of crops. The wider project scope develops a hydro-economic water 
allocation model that determines the real economic value of the water resource throughout the Olifants 
river basin. 
 
1.4 Study area  
1.4.1 Biophysical profile 
The Olifants Water Management Area (WMA) is divided into three management zones/sub basins 
namely upper, middle and the lower Olifants (Vogel, 2011). The whole Olifants WMA measures 
54570m
2
 in area  and cuts across three provinces namely Mpumalanga, Limpopo, and a small part of 
Gauteng (Baker, 2011). The basin is under the jurisdiction of several municipalities namely; Mopani, 
Ehlanzeni, Sekhukhune, Capricorn, Waterberg, Nkangala, Gert Sibande and Metsweding. The Olifants 
river is served by several tributaries; most importantly to the left bank are Wilge, Elands, and Ga-selati 
while to the right is Steelpoort, Blyde, Klaserie, and Timbavati. The river is 770 km long and flows  
northerly originating from the East of Gauteng province to Mozambique  where it joins the Limpopo river 
(Vogel, 2011; Lange et al., 2003). Figure 1.1 shows the Olifants basin within the bigger South Africa and 
Africa context. 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of the Olifants river catchment 
Source (Mallory, 2011) 
 
6 
 
Hard rock mainly comprises the geology of this catchment. In the upper Olifants, there are extensive coal 
reserves while large deposits of dolomite occur along the Blyde River.  Other minerals such as copper, 
chrome, and vanadium occur lower in the catchment (ibid). The area's topography is very varied 
comprising of undulating plains, hills and mountain terrain  (Baker, 2011). The Olifants WMA falls under 
four climatic conditions namely: 
(i) The Highveld characterized by moderate maximum temperatures with cold winter nights and 
regular severe frost  
(ii) The Bushveld significant of high maximum temperatures and cool winter nights without frost  
(iii) The Escarpment partially lying in the mist belt, maximum moderate temperatures and cool 
winter nights 
(iv) The Eastern Lowveld characterized by a hot sub-tropical climate (Baker, 2011).  
 
The whole Olifants experiences a summer rainfall regime and is highly varied e.g. dry areas with 325 
mm/annum to 550 mm/annum occur in parts of Sekhukhune and the northern parts of the eastern 
Lowveld. In the Highveld region and the southern part of the eastern Lowveld, rainfall varies between 
550 mm/annum to 750 mm/annum, the escarpment receives a higher rainfall of between 750 mm/annum 
to 1000 mm/annum and the Wolkberg area receives an annual rainfall exceeding 1 000mm/annum (ibid). 
 
1.4.2 Socio economic profile 
The Olifants is home to about 10 percent of south Africa’s total population (Lange et al., 2003). This is an 
estimated 8 million people according to the 2007 population data. Of the population, around 7 percent are 
whites scattered in the basin while majority of the black population live in the rural areas, and densely 
populated in the former homeland areas (Lange et al., 2003; Kloos & Tsegai, 2009). The former 
homelands are about a quarter of the total area but support about 60 percent of the total population (Kloos 
& Tsegai, 2009). Education levels in many of the districts remain low. Illiteracy levels are as high as 
above 50 percent; with this being highly pronounced in the middle Olifants (Lange et al., 2003). Due to 
the inequities of the apartheid regime, most of the population in this region lack access to basic needs and 
services such a good healthcare, sanitation, and clean water (Lange et al., 2003; Kloos & Tsegai, 2009).  
Majority of the population in the basin are youth under 24 years of age. Poverty levels are high in the 
region with majority of the population (88 percent of the economically active) earning approximately 
ZAR 1600 per month. 60 percent of these economically active people have zero income and lack 
alternative sources of revenue other than government support (Baker, 2011; Kloos & Tsegai, 2009). 45 
percent of population are unemployed, 43 percent formally employed and 12 percent in the informal 
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sector (Kloos, 2010). The public sector takes up 48 percent of those in formal employment  with mining 
and agriculture accounting for 21 and 19 percent respectively (Kloos, 2010). The land remains under 
communal system hence a poor incentive to conservation and appropriate land use (ibid). 
 
Approximately, 5 percent of South Africa's GDP comes from the Olifants region with economic activities 
ranging from mining, power generation, metallurgic industries, irrigation, eco-tourism, forestry, and 
subsistence agriculture (Vogel, 2011). The largest of these sectors are manufacturing, power generation, 
agriculture, and mining contributing 18.2, 15.6, 7, and 22.1 percent to Gross Geographical Product 
respectively (Kloos & Tsegai, 2009; Vogel, 2011).  Coal is the dominant mineral in the catchment (ibid). 
The upper Olifants sub catchment is highly urbanized, though parts of the north western and its central 
regions remain undeveloped. Land in the upper Olifants is under extensive mining for its rich coal 
deposits, which are for both export, and local use in the coal fired power stations. The transition from the 
upper to the middle Olifants on the other hand is predominantly used for agriculture and extensive 
irrigation especially around the Loskop dam (Walter, 2010). Vanadium, platinum, and chrome mining 
also occur in this area. The lower Olifants is characteristically rural. Eco tourism is the main industry with 
several game parks and the Kruger national park being a major tourist attraction site. Copper and 
phosphorous mining also take place here (Vogel, 2011). 
 
1.4.3 Overview of operations and water use 
Surface water in the Olifants WMA is highly developed comprising of several dams, independently run of 
each other. These have been built over time to meet increasing water demands from the various sectors  in 
the phase of droughts and varying rainfall in the region (Baker, 2011). Groundwater is also in use 
especially for rural water supply in the entire catchment for both domestic and irrigation uses (Kloos, 
2010). This maybe however threatened by over abstraction and traces of pollution from poor agricultural 
practices. Water users obtain water from the major dams, farm dams, surface river abstraction, and 
groundwater. In terms of water use, households, agriculture, mining, and industry are the main water use 
sectors. The catchment has experienced rising water requirements over the past few years and it is 
projected that population increase will raise the pressure further on existing water reserves. This is due to 
intensified water use activities of mining, power generation, urban development, improved service 
delivery to rural communities, and irrigation (Mallory, 2011). These affect the water quantity and quality 
situations and there are concerns of demand outstripping supply despite construction of newer dams 
(ibid). Table 1.1 below shows the water balance for the Olifants catchment in the year 2010 indicating a 
small surplus. However, this is not inclusive of the reserve requirement, which would bring it down to a 
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deficit. Projection from this  indicates that by the year 2035, the area will be experiencing a negative 
water balance (Mallory, 2011). The water requirements are summed up over all user sectors (urban, rural, 
industrial, mining, irrigation, and power generation) while the water resource is the yield from major 
dams and diffuse resources such as farm dams, run off river abstraction, and ground water. 
 
Table 1.1: Water balance for the Olifants basin in the year 2010: Million m
3
 /annum 
Sub 
catchment 
Water 
requirement 
Water 
resource 
losses Water balance 
Upper  609 630 0  21 
Middle  187 185 (19) (21) 
Lower 220 248 (5)  23 
Total 
 
1016 1063 (24)  23 
Source: (Mallory, 2011) 
 
1.4.4 Agricultural water use  
In South Africa, irrigation-farming accounts for approximately 57 percent of national water use making it 
the largest water-using sector. Agriculture remains the largest water user for the middle and lower 
Olifants sub basins while power generation takes up the big part of water use in the upper Olifants 
(Walter, 2010). Land under irrigation in the Olifants basin is approximately 100,000 ha (Masiyandima et 
al., 2000). Commercial irrigation is well developed and organized with sophisticated technology and 
produces a wide variety of crops such as maize, soya beans, citrus, cotton, vegetables, wheat, and tobacco 
(Kloos, 2010; Lange et al., 2003). Almost all irrigation farming occurs in the commercial sector with 
majority of land owners being whites who take up about 95 percent of total irrigated area (Tsegai et al., 
2009). Irrigated agriculture makes a great contribution to the national economy and employment through 
several backward and forward linkages created across and within sectors. Water for irrigation is accessed 
through WUAs, government water schemes and un associated farmers who withdraw water directly from 
the rivers in execution of the riparian principle (Lange et al., 2003).  
Small holder irrigation also referred to as the emerging farmers mainly fall under government managed 
irrigation infrastructure which are characterized by high inefficiency levels (Masiyandima et al., 2000; 
Lange et al., 2003). This could be due to the  dependency syndrome arising from over reliance on the 
government and the fact that the emerging farmers are highly heterogeneous (Masiyandima et al., 2000). 
Only a small part of the Olifants irrigated area is occupied by small holders, but most households at least 
derive some part of their livelihoods from the government schemes, individual, and communal vegetable 
gardens. The emerging farmers’ sector is the most disorganized and under represented among other water 
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use sectors in the Olifants; this is expected to be addressed with the rise of the CMAs (Lange et al., 2003). 
There exists little knowledge on exact water use amounts by the farmers as well as their total irrigated 
areas. The emerging farmers also use much less water than the recommended for full irrigation 
(Masiyandima et al., 2000). 
 
1.4.5 Mining water use 
Mining is an important sector in the Olifants through its contribution to employment and exports. Most 
mining activities in the Olifants are concentrated in the upper Olifants sub basin. The need for water in 
significant large quantities in the mines stiffens the competition for the scarce resource (Walter, 2010). 
However, the mines are trying to control this through newer technologies that utilize less water in 
producing the same output. A downside to the mining activities is the negative impact on water quality. 
This is especially through abandoned mines found in several parts of the basin. This problem is further 
aggravated by the fact that water quality control through the effluent discharge permit system is still non-
operational and in the trial stages (Walter, 2010 ; Calmeyer, 2014). Table 1.2 illustrates water use by 
sector for the year 2011. 
 
Table 1.2: Sectoral water requirements in the Olifants basin in million m
3
 /annum 
Sub-
catchment 
Power 
generation 
Industrial Urban Rural Mining Irrigation Total 
Upper 228 9 93 4 26 249 609 
Middle 0 0 56 22 28 81 187 
Lower 0 0 29 3 32 156 220 
Total 228 9 178 29 86 486 1016 
Source: (Mallory, 2011) 
 
1.4.6 Overview of the water quality situation 
Water quality is an important aspect to consider because if neglected, it jeopardizes the sustainability of 
agriculture among other sectors of the economy (Van Veelen, 2011). The general water quality of surface 
and ground water resources in South Africa is on the decline as competition for water use intensifies 
(Armour & Viljoen, 2000; Van Veelen, 2011b). In the upper Olifants for example, there is a lot of waste 
discharge especially from coal mining which leads to localized acidification and salinization of surface 
water leading to losses especially in the irrigation sector (Zyl & Maree, 2001). Some commercial farmers 
especially the exporters go to the extent of purifying irrigation water for themselves in order to curb any 
associated losses (van Stryp, 2014). The main water quality problems in irrigation are eutrophication, 
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turbidity, and salinization. These lead to sedimentation, irrigation clogging, soil salinity, high water 
treatment costs and algae growth (Van Veelen, 2011). Mine water use is as low as four percent of total 
water used in the catchment yet contributes to about 78 percent of total sulphates load (Zyl & Maree, 
2001). Further indications of water pollution are evident from fish and crocodile deaths in some parts of 
the catchment. Water quality has been of much concern but insufficient resources, lack of capacity on the 
ground, and difficulties in quantifying pollution due to its diffuse nature, limit its assessment and 
monitoring by the DWAF. DWAF hence relies on results of water quality assessment conducted 
independently by the mines, with occasional random audits of water samples just for verification purposes 
(Ashton et al., 2001; Lévite et al, 2003). The quality monitoring covers many determinants but is non-
comprehensive as it fails to monitor heavy metals concentration. Water users get zero feedback from 
quality assessments and therefore remain aware of only the visible water contamination. This results in 
lack of enough social pressure to conduct intense monitoring (Lévite et al., 2003). Wastewater treatment 
plants targeting domestic water use on the other hand exhibit poor performance due to an array of factors 
in regulation, management, and technology design. More than fifty percent of wastewater treatment 
plants, especially smaller ones, do not meet effluent standards and some do not even measure effluent 
quality. Insufficient or poor allocations of funds at municipalities lead to poor technology choices of 
treatment plants that often do not meet municipal demands in terms of physical loading or suitable 
treatment processes. Advanced technologies are not an option because of inhibitions arising from high 
maintenance costs, lack of skill, and the necessary capacity. Water treatment problems are further 
aggravated by the lack of by-laws and implementation to control effluent discharge (Merwe-botha & 
Quilling, 2012). The government of South Africa has come up with an incentive-based certification 
termed as the ‘Green Drop’ to address the existing water quality gaps and enhance the performance of 
municipal wastewater service providers. The Green Drop process involves measuring and comparing the 
outcomes of the performance of Water Service Institutions, and consequently rewarding (or penalizing) 
the institution upon evidence of their excellence (or failures) according to the minimum standards or 
requirements that has been defined. Nevertheless, recent audits indicate that the wastewater treatment 
services are below par in comparison to the required national standards and international best practices 
(DWAF, 2009). 
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1.4.7 Organization of dissertation 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter gives the introduction and background of the 
problem, objectives of the research, hypothesis, and an overview of the study area. Chapter 2 identifies 
and quantifies transaction costs of the water policy process and further examines the determinants of these 
transaction costs accruing to irrigation water users. The chapter further outlines suggestions of possible 
transaction benefits. The timeliness and cost of ICT (mobile phone) use on water management is also 
explored in this chapter through a trial experiment on communication of water management information 
between water users and public agents. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the current institutional 
organization of the water sector in South Africa and describes some of the investigated IWRM policies in 
the 1998 water Act. Additionally, chapter 3 examines the effects of different water policies on irrigation 
water use-quantity, quality, and efficiency. In chapter 4, we assess the impact of compulsory licensing, 
and water pricing on the large scale and small-scale holders’ welfares and irrigation water demand. 
Chapter 5 gives the major thesis conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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Chapter Two 
2. Transaction Costs associated with water policies in the Olifants basin of South Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
Water is a complex economic good (Garrick et al., 2013). This is due to existing interdependence between 
its private and collective values, mixed property regime for its governance and high externalities hence 
high transaction costs in its management (ibid). Recent management fronts have advocated for market 
based water policy reforms to solve the water scarcity and allocation problems (Rosegrant, & 
Binswanger, 1994; Earle et al., 2005). However, high transaction costs inhibit success of the proposed 
reforms, which so far portray a mixture of successes and failures from different parts of the world (ibid). 
In South Africa, little progress with the water reforms is reported; water users continue to face challenges 
of deteriorating water quality, poor water service/administration, water shortages, and poor water 
distribution. 
 
Transaction costs are important determinants of policy sustainability, economic efficiency, and equitable 
outcomes (McCann et al, 2005b ; Blore et al., 2013). Coggan et al., (2010) identifies transaction costs as 
the biggest hindrances to policy implementation and compliance when they constitute a large component 
of total policy costs. Several authors emphasize that transaction costs should be lower than the expected 
benefits, for market based water policy reforms to work (Easter et al., Rosegrant, & Dinar, 1999; 
Rosegrant & Binswanger, 1994; Honey-Rosés, 2009; Slaughter, 2009; Garrido, 2000; Carey, 2002; 
Coggan et al., 2010). To attain low transaction costs, proper institutional arrangements such as water 
rights and organizational settings have to be set up and running, in addition to good infrastructure and 
management (Easter et al., 1999). However, the institutional strains arising from the policy transition 
process, further aggravates transaction costs. Research in this regard is however not sufficient to explain 
the complete interplay of issues (Garrick et al., 2013).  
 
Given their significance, transaction costs should remain an important part of any policy analysis and 
design (McCann et al., 2005b). However, this is not possible to do when the said transaction costs are 
unknown (ibid). Identifying and measuring transaction costs  is thus a step towards incorporating the 
transaction costs in evaluation of policy alternatives (Ofei-Mensah & Bennett, 2013). There are 
intensified efforts geared towards transaction costs measurement but problems arise due to ambiguity in 
their definition, and especially for environmental resources since the 'good' is not so well defined. There 
are no measurement boundaries and explicit and implicit costs such as the cost of time are difficult to 
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measure (Carey, 2002;  McCann & Easter, 2004; McCann et al., 2005). This leads to lack of clear and 
location specific transaction costs quantification (Ofei-Mensah & Bennett, 2013). Transaction benefits on 
the other hand are rarely discussed in literature despite being the flipside to transaction costs (Blomqvist 
et al., 2002; Boudreau et al., 2007; Watson et al., 2005). Transaction benefits are benefits accruing to an 
individual or organization, in an economic exchange process over and above the anticipated direct 
benefits of a transaction (Boudreau et al., 2007; Watson et al., 2005). For example, in addition to expected 
financial returns, an employee might incur additional benefits of skill development, reputation, and 
improved self-esteem. A firm on the other hand might experience additional benefits such as cumulative 
learning, economies of scope and scale due to specialization and flexibility (ibid). In the case of a 
community at large, the transaction benefits are all that most community members gain in the event of an 
intervention or reform (Watson et al., 2005). To the best of our knowledge, no study has estimated the 
transaction costs and benefits of water policy in South Africa, specifically in the Olifants basin. This 
paper contributes to filling this literature gap by identifying and quantifying the transaction costs 
associated with implementation and compliance to water pricing, compulsory licensing, water trade, 
formation of WUAs and effluent discharge permits. Additionally, the study highlights the possible 
transaction benefits of water policy. A second step for the study was to explore the determinants of the 
identified transaction costs.  
 
Transaction costs measurement is not an easy task (McCann et al., 2005b). Nevertheless, several studies 
have so far attempted to measure transaction costs for environmental policies. Ofei-Mensah & Bennett., 
(2013) found that transaction costs existed and were sizeable for three greenhouse policy alternatives in 
Australia; the transaction costs ranged from 19 percent of compliance costs, 4 percent of total costs, and 
10 percent of program benefits for the 3 programs studied. Pannell et al., (2013) reported significant 
transaction costs (about 68 percent of total program costs) incurred by policy makers of a water salinity 
program in Australia. Falconer, (2000) on the other hand reported transaction costs ranging from 5-10 
percent of farmer compensation costs in agri-environmental schemes in the European Union; these 
transaction costs were significant barriers to farmer participation in the schemes hence reduced supply of 
conservation goods. Similarly, Falconer & Saunders, (2002) found transaction costs amounting to 21 
percent of farmers’ compensation costs in a study to examine agri environmental goods provision 
schemes in the North of England. Colby, (1990) examined transaction costs of policy in western water 
markets in the U.S and reported transaction costs of about 6 percent of prices paid for application to 
transfer water. McCann & Easter, (1999) examined transaction costs associated with agricultural nonpoint 
pollution reduction and found that lower transaction costs were associated with tax policies in comparison 
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to educational programs or conservation tillage. Other studies have reported high transaction costs 
incurred in natural resource management but fail to quantify the costs (Kuperan et al., 2008; Blore et al., 
2013; Garrick & Aylward 2012; Mburu, Birner, & Zeller, 2003).  
 
Few empirical studies have so far been undertaken to  assess the determinants of transaction costs in 
environmental policy (McCann & Easter, 1999; Coggan et al., 2010; Falconer, 2000; Falconer & 
Saunders, 2002; Rørstad et al., 2007). Coggan et al., (2010) summarizes determinants of transaction costs 
under three broad important categories;  i) nature of the transactor, ii) characteristics of the transaction 
and iii) current institutional environment. Transaction characteristic factors relate to asset specificity and 
timing or frequency of a transaction while transactor characteristics relate to opportunism, bounded 
rationality, common ideas, trustworthiness and social cohesion in addition to demographics. Coggan et 
al., (2010) further indicate that determinants of transaction costs are different between parties, and are 
affected by the nature of the policy and the interelationships between the parties to a policy. Coggan et al., 
(2013b), reported transaction costs drivers under the three broad categories for terrestial conservation 
development offset schemes in Australia; transaction characteristics factors included, asset specificity, 
biophysical uncertainty, and transaction frequency. Relevant transactor characteristics included, past 
experience, opportunism, trust in information and fellow actors, common preferences and community 
practices. Institutional environment factors included rules, institutional inconsistencies and means of 
exchange. McCann & Easter, (2004) reported physical determinants of transaction costs for water markets 
as infrastructure and technology, water scarcity and shortages, nature of water transfers, water rights, 
location and water characteristics such as quality and quantity. Institutional related determinants historical 
institution arrangements, legal system, social norms, and social capital. Additional studies that have 
investigated the determinants of transaction costs in environmental policy include, Mburu et al., ( 2003), 
and Garrick & Aylward (2012). Following literature reviewed, we posit that future policy choice and 
design stands to greatly benefit from more empirical examinations of factors affecting transaction costs. 
 
Section 2.2 gives the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, 2.3 highlights the emprical procedures, 2.4 
describes the data acquisition methods, 2.5 discusses the results while 2.6 gives the conclusion and 
recommendations. Box 2.1 at the end of the chapter gives the overview of a trial experiment implemented 
to assess the timeliness and cost of ICT (mobile phone) use for water management purposes. 
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2.2 Theoretical and conceptual framework 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) originates from the work of Coase, (1937) in his seminal article on 
'the nature of the firm' (Coase, 1960; Carey, 2002; Beare et al., 2003; Kuperan et al., 2008; McCann & 
Easter, 2004; McCann et al., 2005b; Rosegrant & Binswanger, 1994). TCE was initially applied for 
studying economics of industrial organisation but has since been applied in many other fields (Zhang et 
al., 2009). TCE theory posits that if individuals are confronted with choices, they will go for institutions 
and contracts that minimize transaction costs (Kuperan et al., 2008). It describes human agents on basis of 
two key attributes, namely; cognitive ability (bounded rationality) and self interestedness (opportunism). 
Bounded rationality occurs in the sense that all contracts are unavoidably incomplete with gaps, errors, 
and omissions; contracts are further complicated by opportunism in which agents make incomplete 
promises or withhold relevant information (Williamson, 1998). TCE is however criticized for its one 
sided economic view of human behavior as only rational (Watson et al., 2005). This view is invalid 
because human behavior is driven by both rational and social goals (Boudreau et al., 2007). The theory 
emphasizes only on transaction costs and overlooks transaction benefits, which brings in the social aspect 
of humans (ibid). Thus this study tries to extend the TCE theory by incorporating transaction benefits in 
our discussions albeit data limitations. 
 
No standard definition of  transaction costs exists in literature. However, several studies have termed 
them as costs of market exchange over and above the actual costs of goods and services (Singh, 2008; 
Silva, 2010; Coggan et al., 2010). They  include search costs, costs of negociation, monitoring costs and 
enforcement costs (McCann et al., 2005; Diao et al., 2005; Singh, 2008; Silva, 2010; Coggan et al., 2010). 
They are the costs incurred to overcome any form of uncertaity surrounding any contract or interaction 
(Singh, 2008; Silva, 2010;Coggan et al., 2010). In the context of environmental policy, transaction costs 
have been defined as the costs incurred  to define, establish, maintain and transfer property rights (Coggan 
et al., 2010;  McCann et al., 2005). An even broader definition is given by Marshall, (2013) as the costs 
related with the creation or change of an institution or organisation and the use of that institution; 
transaction costs give the allowance for change of institutions. 
 
In Figure 2.1, the dotted oval lines (touching on all the five boxes from water policy to welfare), indicate 
the transaction costs underlying the water policy process in the Olifants basin. We use dotted lines to 
reflect the fact that transaction costs are not entirely explicit but remain in the background along the entire 
policy process (McCann et al., 2005a). In this case, we see the interplay of transaction costs along the 
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entire policy process from policy formation, through water managers to the implementation process and 
compliance. Transaction costs indirectly impact on the expected water management outcomes of quality, 
quantity, and efficiency through the implementation and compliance processes. Transaction costs also 
affect the overall welfare of key players because they incur the transaction costs albeit unknowingly or 
inexplicitly. A dotted arrow line connects the transaction costs back to the policy formation process. This 
implies that knowledge of the the existing transaction costs is indeed important, and would be valueable 
feed back into the policy process to allow for better policy evaluation, decisions, and choice ex ante and 
ex post (McCann et al., 2005;  McCann & Easter, 2004). The bold line connecting water policy and 
welfare implies that water policy is expected to impact on welfare while the welfare status should inform 
policy choice. Socio economic, demographic and institutional factors are also expected to influence 
policy formation, implementation, compliance, and outcomes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Conceptualization of transaction costs 
Source: Own compilation 
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Coase, (1960) argued that market  transactions take place efficiently when there are well defined property 
rights and zero transaction costs. This, however, is not the case for water resources management 
transactions because the definition of water rights and policies is associated with high transaction costs. 
High transaction costs are barriers to cost free transactions (Garrick & Aylward, 2012; McCann et al., 
2005; Nieuwoudt & Armitage, 2004; Rosegrant & Binswanger, 1994a ; Williamson, 1979). Water 
management involves multiple actors with different and competing interests hence the need for 
coordination. Coordination of actors and operations however, leads to the occurance of transaction costs. 
The transaction costs arise from acts of information collection, policy design, policy enactment, policy 
establishment, policy implementation and contracting, administration, monitoring and enforcement 
(Coggan et al., 2010; McCann & Easter, 2004; McCann et al., 2005). The transaction costs impede the 
exchange process on both the public parties (water managers) and private parties (water users ). For 
example, Brill et al., (1997) and Easter et al., (1999) identifed assymetry in information flow between 
water supply managers and users as one of the major obstacles to water allocation and water markets. 
 
2.3 Empirical framework 
 
2.3.1 Measuring Transaction Costs  
Transaction costs measurement is not an easy task but "what gets measured gets managed"  (McCann et 
al., 2005b;  Marshall, 2013). There is no constant or uniform method for transaction costs measurement 
and this translates to lack of optimality in choice of policy instruments (Blore et al., 2013; McCann et al., 
2005b; Marshall, 2013; Pannell et al., 2013; Ofei-Mensah & Bennett, 2013). Consistency lacks in the 
measurement methods, i.e. definitions, precision, and treatment of time for transaction costs. Previously, 
transaction costs have failed to be included in any form of economic analysis due to these challenges in 
measurement (McCann et al., 2005b). Transaction costs occur ex ante (before) or ex post (after) of policy 
implementation. In the current study, we identify and quantify ex post transaction costs related to water 
policies in the Olifants basin, as incurred by water managers and users. 
 
We follow a transaction costs categorization framework by McCann & Easter, (2004) and McCann et al., 
(2005) as indicated in Table 2.1. The framework is comprehensive in outlining the different cost types, 
their time of occurrence, their best measurement approach, and the different parties to whom the 
transaction costs accrue. The transaction costs types considered for this study included, support and 
administration, contracting, monitoring/detection, and prosecution/enforcement costs – as outlined in the 
green section in Table 2.1. We further consider the relevant specific costs under each transaction costs 
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category i.e. travel cost, labor (opportunity cost of time), telephone costs, decision costs, negotiation, and 
conflict resolution costs as depicted in Table 2.2. Activities such as discussions, meetings, and follow-ups 
captured the opportunity cost of time. The transaction costs were identified chronologically through early 
implementation, full implementation, and establishment for each policy in order to capture transaction 
costs variation through time. 
 
Table 2.1: Typology of Transaction costs encountered in the public policy process 
Transaction type Incurred by Time of occurrence and 
measurement 
Recommended measurement 
methods 
Legisl
ature/c
ourts 
agen
cies 
stake
holde
rs 
base
line 
dev
elo
pm
ent 
Earl
y 
impl
eme
ntati
on 
Ful
l 
im
ple
me
ntat
ion 
Establ
ished 
progr
am 
Ex ante Ex post 
implic
it 
explici
t 
implici
t 
explicit 
Research and information * ** *      1,2 5 1 1,3,4,5 
Enactment or litigation ** * **      1,2 5 1 1,3,4,5 
Design and implementation  ** *      1,2 5 1 1,3,4,5 
Support and administration  ** *      1,2 5 1 1,3,4,5 
Contracting  * **      1,2 5 1 1,3,4,5 
Monitoring/detection  ** *      1,2 5 1 1,3,4,5 
Prosecution/enforcement * ** *      1,2 5 1 1,3,4,5 
Source: McCann & Easter, (2004) and McCann et al., (2005) 
*=low **=high .1= surveys/interviews of government personell and stakeholders. 2 = expost results from other studies. 3 = 
government reports. 4 = financial accounts. 5 = proposed budgets 
 Specific costs and activities under each TCs category in Table 2.1 
 Research and information: any analysis related to problem definition 
 Enactment or litigation: includes costs of lobbying, public participation, law modification 
 Design and implementation:costs of regulatory delay 
 Support and administration: mainly in creating awareness of policies through notices and hearings 
and oveseeing other processes of contracting, monitoring and prosecution. 
 Contracting: additional information costs, bargaining costs, decision cost, identifying profitable 
opportunities, negociating. 
 Monitoring/detection: of outcome/compliance, monitoring transfers, costs of monitoring and 
mitigating  third party effects, infastructure costs of conveyance. 
 Prosecution/enforcement: costs of conflict resolution 
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Activities under the different time periods given in Table 2.1 
 Baseline: starting point when there is realization and upcoming awareness of the need for policy. 
Information on costs collected here helps to evaluate alternative policies and guide the design process 
 Development: this is a time when there is lobbying, debate and negociations for and against proposed 
policies whereby they undergo modifications after which they are finally adopted 
 Early implementation: here rules of administration are crafted and adopted, public agents hired for 
administration, public notices and hearings 
 Full implementation: policies come into full effect 
 Established program: policy instruments are fully established and are part of the routine 
 
 
Table 2.2: Specific transaction cost activities considered for each transaction cost type and policy 
Policy Transaction 
cost type 
(ex-post) 
Specific transaction costs Early 
implement
ation 
Full 
implement
ation 
Establishe
d program 
Main 
paying 
entity 
e.g. 
compulsory 
licensing 
Support and 
administration  
 Notices and hearings 
 Discussions 
 Meetings 
 Follow ups 
 Travel costs 
 Telephone costs 
   Water 
managers 
 Contracting  Additional information  
 Decision cost 
 Arranging for finance 
 Negotiating 
 Travel costs 
 Telephone costs 
   Water 
users 
 Monitoring/dete
ction 
 Travel costs 
 Telephone costs 
 Time used(labor) 
 Transfer costs 
   Water 
managers 
 Prosecution/enfo
rcement 
 Discussions 
 Meetings 
 Follow ups 
 Travel costs 
 Telephone costs 
 Fines 
 
   Water 
managers 
Source: Own compilation 
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Following McCann et al., (2005b) and Ofei-Mensah & Bennett, (2013), the size or extent of transaction 
costs (T) for a policy program was quantified using the following reduced form equation; 
 
Tijt =Σ (Aijt+ Bijt +Cijt +Dijt)         (2.1) 
            
Where; 
T=Transaction cost 
i= policy 
j= the paying entity: water users (private agents)  and water managers (public agents) 
t=time period (early implementation, full implementation and establishment) 
A,B,C,D, are the transaction cost variables including; support and administration, contracting, 
monitoring/detection, and prosecution/enforcement. 
 
2.3.2 Factors influencing transaction costs 
Following recommendations by several previous studies, (Coggan et al., 2010; Falconer, 2000; Falconer 
& Saunders, 2002; Rørstad et al., 2007; Mburu et al., 2003), this study further identified the factors 
influencing the transaction costs incurred by irrigation farmers in the Olifants basin. We used an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression as guided by the continuous nature of the dependent variable (Verbeek, 
2012). 
 
An operational model takes the form: 
 jjjT                                                                                                             (2.2) 
Where;  
jT is the total transaction costs of an irrigation farming household j for all policies adhered to across the 
three time durations calculated using equation 2.1 
j  is a vector of observable factors likely to influence the transaction costs magnitudes 
j is the unobservable error term. 
 
The implicit functional form of the estimated model is given as; 
  3322110 xxxTotalTCs                                                                (2.3) 
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Where; 
TotalTCs= Total transaction costs in (ZAR), is the continous dependent variable  
1x = vector of transactor characteristics (geographic location, gender, main occupation, farming years, 
farm size, income, and schooling years) 
2x = vector of transaction characteristics (policy compliance, use of ICT tools for water management 
purposes, technical assistance source, water quality) 
3x = vector of institutional environment related factors (market distance, leadership position in formal 
and informal water use groups, tenure security) 
 = error term 
 
Table 2.3 gives the list of variables included in the regression analysis, their hypothesized signs and 
summary statistics. Since little empirical research exists on drivers of transaction costs for environmental 
policies and specifically water policy, some of the variables included are exploratory in nature but 
categorized under the three broad categories of determinants of transaction costs guided by economic 
theory. Firstly, we hypothesize that farmers compliant to any of the water policies are likely to incur 
transaction costs of water policy compliance. Farmer location would influence transaction costs 
negatively or positively depending on policy spread and nature of farming systems. Farmers holding 
leadership positions in water user groups are hypothesized to incur less transaction costs due to their 
exposure to the current policy operations and they do not  have to incur many additional information 
transaction costs. Gender could be positive or negative depending on levels of farm activity and 
compliance to water policy between male and female farmers. Farmers with more years of schooling are 
hypothesized to incur less transaction costs because they are better able to comprehend and avoid 
additional transaction costs such as costs of decision making and additional information. Coggan et al., 
(2010) suggest that education and past experience reduce bounded rationality and associated information 
related transaction costs. Small scale farmers and respondents involved in other main activities are 
expected to incur less transaction costs due to their minimal compliance to water policy. Farmers with 
bigger farm sizes on the other hand are expected to incur more transaction costs stemming from their 
increased number of farm activities including compliance to more water policies. Tenure  secure farmers 
are hypothesized to have more incentive  to invest in farm activities and comply to stipulated water 
policies thus incur more transaction costs. Farmers receiving their technical assistance from DWAF were 
expected to incur more transaction costs while those that used ICT to obtain policy information were 
expected to face lower transaction costs. Farmers receiving ideal water qualities are hypothesized to have 
the incentive to comply to more water policies hence incur higher transaction costs of water policy unlike 
the low water quality counteparts. Lastly, the influence of market distance could be positive or negative; 
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farmers in far away distances can marginally comply to water policy therefore zero or reduced transaction 
costs. They could also face high transactions costs of compliance due to large distances covered in their 
quest for policy information.  
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Table 2.3: List of the variables included in the OLS regression and their summary statistics 
 Variable 
Description Expected 
sign 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Total TCs Total transaction costs (ZAR) per farming household for all policies complied to Dependent 2738.13 4428.29 0 19960 
ICT tool 
ICT tools used for water management purposes (1=radio,TV,phone,email 
0=none) 
- 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Technical assistance Source of technical policy information (1=DWAF,0= other sources) + 0.47 0.89 0 5 
Region Farmer geographic location (upper,middle and lower Olifants) +/- 2.48      0.80 1 3 
WUA Farmer involvement in WUAs/groups + 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Compulsory licensing Compliance to water licensing + 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Water cost Natural log of total cost of irrigation water based on current tariffs paid + 0.40 0.23 0 0.44 
Market distance Distance to nearest input/output market in Kms +/- 50.10 54.98 0 300 
Leadership in WUA Leadership position held in WUAs/ groups - 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Gender Male or female farmer +/- 0.56 0.49 0 1 
Schooling years Total number of years of school attendance  - 8.66 5.52 0 24 
Occupation Main activity of respondent (1=largescale 2=smallscale 5=other) +/- 1.84 0.73 1 3 
Farming years Total number of years of farming - 19.42 13.26 1 55 
Farm size Natural log of farm size + 71.32 170.80 0.05 900 
Land claims Proxy for tenure security + 0.072 0.25 0 1 
Income Natural log of income +/- 11.46 2.81 0 20.7 
Water quality Water quality type (1=Ideal 2=acceptable 3=tolerable 4=unacceptable) +/- 2.03 0.88 1 4 
Source: Own compilation 
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2.4 Data  
A data base of water use/users and authorization in the Olifants Water Management Area was obtained 
from the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) regional office, which was the relevant 
authority for the Olifants. The data base was used to compute the numbers of all the water users of 
interest such as farmers, miners, and industry in the three sub basins. Stratified random sampling and 
Probability Proportionate to Size sampling (PPS) were used to obtain the suitable number of survey 
respondents by sector and region. Firstly, each sector of water users i.e. farmers, miners, and industry in 
the entire basin were chosen as the relevant strata and their actual representations identified. Probabilities 
proportionate to size calculations were then made to obtain the total number of survey respondents from 
each strata; 313, 6, and, 13 farmers, miners and industrial water users were identified respectively. 
Secondly, the sub basins were used as strata and Probabilities proportionate to size calculations were 
made to obtain totals of survey respondents by region. The research randomizer found at 
www.randomizer.org., helped to obtain the specific respondents for the survey. Farms with less than 10 
ha of cropland were regarded as small scale while those above 10 ha were taken as commercial farmers. 
Miners and industry were not included for the regression analysis due to lack of, and the personalized 
nature of demographic information required in the regressions. 
 
Data was then collected through a survey from a total of 183 irrigation farmers and 16 water managers in 
the Olifants basin. We used a semi-structured questionnaire to elicit data that was relevant for all the 
chapters in this study. The information collected from farmers included household socio economic 
characteristics, farm activities, water policy compliance, and individual estimates of relevant transaction 
costs. With regard to transaction costs, the first step was to find out how many of the five policies 
investigated a farmer was compliant. Under each policy, we outlined the transaction cost types i.e. 
support and administration costs, contracting costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs. Under these 
transaction cost types, we outlined the relevant activities through which a respondent would incur 
transaction costs; these were costs incurred in meetings, travel, communication, negotiation, giving 
notices and hearings, and financing as outlined in Table 2.2. Given that transaction costs are usually not 
recorded, the costs obtained were based on recall for past and present water policy phases. This was a 
difficult task and a limitation for our data collection process. In addition, irrigation water users were 
reluctant to attend to interviews while ministry staff hesitated to avail information. Nevertheless, focus 
group discussions conducted with leaders of water use groups, extension personnel, and farmers, 
substantiated the farmer interview responses.  
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Information collected from water managers included positions held in the water ministry, water issues of 
concern raised to them by users, level of involvement with water policy responsibilities, and personal 
estimations of transaction costs incurred following Table 2.2. Additionally, departmental budgets and 
reports for the past ten years were obtained from the DWAF to complement the data collected from the 
water managers. The budgets and reports indicated amounts of money budgeted for different water 
activities in the ministry such as administration, water sector regulation, regional implementation, 
international water cooperation, water services, forestry, and water infrastructure management. Each of 
these categories consisted of more specific water policy activities under which budgeted money was 
incurred. The reports further indicated staff numbers and their salaries at different levels of operation. 
Additional information was obtained through emails, phone calls and informal personal communication.  
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2.5 Results and Discussion 
2.5.1 Water users transaction costs across policies 
Firstly, we quantified and compared the total transaction costs incurred by water users for the different 
water policies (Table 2.4).   
 
Table 2.4: Total transaction costs of water policy incurred by water users (ZAR) 
Water policy Number of 
water users 
compliant 
Administr
ation 
Costs 
Contracting 
Costs 
Monitoring 
Costs 
Enforcem
ent Costs 
Total for 
each policy 
Water tariffs 81 _ 638495 _ _ 638495 
Water trade 16 _ _ _ _ _ 
WUAs 80 112770 112432 220613 _ 445815 
Compulsory licensing 39 _ 261099 _ _ 261099 
Effluent discharge 15 _ 341400 15187100 _ 15528500 
Total  231 112770 1353426 15407713 _ 16873909 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Results (Table 2.4) show that most of the reported transaction costs related to contracting costs for the 
policies complied to by irrigation water users. This was expected because administration, monitoring and 
enforcement costs were likely to be incurred by water managers (McCann et al., 2005) . Water tariffs was 
the most popular policy among water users in the study region  (81 users), followed by WUAs (80 users) 
and compulsory licensing (39 compliant users). Water trade was non operational and interviewed farmers 
were not able to document any transaction costs relating to this policy; however, the reported water 
exchanges were between relatives and friends. The effluent discharge transaction costs were highest 
among the policies and only reported by industries. The high costs of effluent-discharge policy 
(amounting to about ZAR 15.5 milion) were attributable to the different scales of operation between the 
farming water use and industrial water use. Because the official effluent discharge permit system was not 
yet operational in the Olifants, the reported effluent transaction costs were incurred in monitoring effluent 
at an individual industry capacity; i.e. industries procured external expert services for pollution 
monitoring purposes as required of them by the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) 
of South Africa. This information is sometimes also used by DWAF in their random pollution audits. 
Trials on the effluent discharge system by DWAF are, however, underway for its implementation. 
Monitoring costs were the highest across all water policies; totalling about ZAR 15.4 million. This may 
be attributed to the high monitoring costs reported by industrial water use. Contracting costs followed in 
magnitude then administration costs. Contracting transaction costs by water users were reported for 
majority of the policies while monitoring costs were reported for  effluent permits and WUAs only. 
Administrative transaction costs were  the lowest because the cost of policy implementation is a 
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responsibility of the water managers. WUAs however recorded some administration costs because they 
involved self administration by participating water users. Enforcement costs were not reported for any of 
the policies, probably because this is a responsibility of the water managers as well. 
 
Transaction costs were further compared to water users’ input costs, farm benefits, and water purchase 
costs on average (Figure 2.2). The results show that water users’ average transaction costs were 2 percent 
of other input costs, 1 percent of farm benefits and 27 percent of water purchase costs. Comparison of 
transactions costs incurred by water users to input costs and farm benefits seem negligible.  Following 
McCann et al., (2005), we posit that this is because water users only incur a small portion of total policy 
costs; these are usually the contracting costs of policy compliance. The bigger portion of transaction costs 
goes to the water managers/public agents as demonstrated in Figure 2.9. However, the reported 
transaction costs are substantial in comparison to the average total water costs (27%). 
 
 
 
Transaction costs versus 
input costs 
 
Transaction costs versus farm 
benefits 
 
 
Transaction costs versus 
water costs 
 
Figure 2.2: Transaction costs versus input costs, farm benefits, and total water costs 
Source: Own compilation 
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Contracting transaction costs were reported for most of the policies studied. Figure 2.3 demonstrates these 
contracting costs as percentages between the four policies. Water tariffs recorded the highest of all the 
contracting transaction costs at 47 percent probably because it was one of the widely adopted policies 
across the study region. Contracting transaction costs incurred for the effluent discharge were second 
highest at 25 percent while compulsory licensing followed at 19 percent. We attributed this to limited 
compliance and the fact that compulsory licensing was a once off payment per annum. Compulsory 
licensing was also not extensively known to many though partially beginning to spread out in the basin. 
Formation of water-user groups here in referred to as WUAs tagged last at 9 percent of reported 
contracting transaction costs. We attributed this to the already established WUAs  which had been in 
operation for many years dating as far back as 1930’s; this was especially so for the commercial farmers’ 
WUAs. This implied that their WUA systems were already in place and not much of operational 
contracting transaction costs would be incurred. Similar suggestions were reported by Falconer et al., 
(2001). Small scale water users on the other hand, were organized into informal water-user groups and 
reported minor contracting transaction costs. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Contracting costs across four policies 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Water tariffs policy recorded the highest contracting transaction costs, we therefore highlight the specific 
transaction costs elements (travel, telephone, additional information costs, finance and decision costs), 
and their magnitudes in Figure 2.4. All the transaction costs elements were high during the early 
implementation phase of the water tariffs and declined through time. However, transaction costs incurred 
to arrange for finances remained constant over the three time durations probably because water payment 
compulsory 
licensing 
19% 
water tariffs 
47% 
effluent 
discharge 
25% 
participation 
in WUAs 
9% 
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remained consistent throughout the three phases (early implementation, full implementation and 
establishment). 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Water tariff contracting transaction cost components over time 
Source: Own compilation 
 
We further compared water users’ transaction costs across policies over the three time durations 
considered in this study. Our findings as indicated in Figure 2.5 showed that transaction costs for all the 
policies were higher during early implementation and slightly decreased through to establishment. We 
attributed this to smoothing out of transaction costs, because experience is gained with continued policy 
implementation as observed by  Coggan et al., (2010); Falconer et al., (2001); Rørstad et al., (2007). 
Effluent-discharge transaction costs incurred  by industries are left out in Figure 2.5 due to the differences 
in scales of operation between the industries and irrigation farmers. The effluent costs were however high 
and followed a similar trend. 
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Figure2.5: Transaction costs incurred by water users across the three time durations 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
 
2.5.2 Water managers’ transaction costs 
We assessed transaction costs faced by water managers to understand the cost of policy implementation. 
The data was both primary and secondary – obtained from interviews with government personell, 
government budgets, financial accounts and reports. Findings from the primary data assessment showed 
that across the policies implemented, transaction costs incurred by water managers varied between 17 - 24 
percent as indicated in Figure 2.6. This pointed out to an almost similar transaction cost budget allocation 
for all the policies within the water ministry. Compulsory licensing policy recorded the highest 
transaction costs incurred (24 percent) probably signifying its level of prioritization amongst the water 
policies. Even though water trade and effluent-discharge policies are largely not in operation, high 
transaction costs were associated with them – about 21 percent of all transaction costs experienced by the 
water managers. This signified efforts made towards operationalizing water trade and the effluent permit 
systems. Transaction costs incurred for water tariffs and WUAs were the least (each at 17 percent) 
probably indicating less activities and effort from the water managers to implement the two policies. 
WUAs required involvement of water managers only at the inception stages while water tariffs were 
somewhat operational but lacking consistent follow ups. 
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Figure 2.6: Water managers’ transaction costs across policies 
Source: Own compilation 
 
The pie charts in Figure 2.7  depict an assesment into the specific policies from the water managers 
perspectives. They reveal that support and administration costs were the highest for all the targeted 
policies for implementation. The administration costs were 78, 58, 78, 80 and 64 percent for compulsory 
licensing, water tariffs, effluent permits, water trade and WUAs respectively. This was expected because 
similar indications are made in previous studies by McCann & Easter, (2004), McCann et al., (2005) and 
Falconer, (2000). Administration costs further tended to be fixed over time. Monitoring costs in water 
management closely followed in magnitude for all the policies. Contracting transaction costs by water 
managers were only reported for the WUAs. This was because of an initial level of involvement between 
the irrigation farmers and the government in formation of WUAs unlike for other policies (Jean de la 
Harpe, n.d.; Gazette, 1998). Enforcement costs on the other hand were minimally reported or lacking for 
the examined policies which could suggest failure in policy enforcement. However, examined budgets 
and financial accounts revealed provisions for enforcement costs. Additionally, reviewed documents from 
the water court of South Africa (water tribunal) showed the existence of water disputes and their 
execution. 
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Compulsory licensing transaction costs  
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WUAs transaction costs  
 
                                                Source: Own compilation 
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Figure 2.8 indicates water management transaction costs magnitudes over the three time periods studied. 
The figure shows that effluent discharge and water trade transaction costs are very high in the inception 
period and minimal in later durations of implementation. The early high implementation transaction costs 
could be good indicators of why these two policies are not yet steadily operational several years after the 
1998 water Act. The initial high transaction costs for water trade could point to the aborted 
implementation of the policy in the Olifants region while the minimal transaction costs in the later periods 
indicate the current policy stagnation. Similarly, the initial high transaction costs for the  effluent 
discharge system could explain the delayed kick off for this policy. Compulsory licensing and water 
tariffs management transaction costs show an almost uniform trend with minimal variation over the three 
time periods. The transaction costs do not smoothen out over time and we link  this to current flawed 
implementation. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Water management transaction costs across policy and time 
Source: Own compilation 
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The DWAF water budgets and financial accounts on the other hand were used to assess water policy 
transaction costs in relation to total water budget costs. The budgets did not indicate transaction costs for 
each individual policy but total costs for outlined activities of water management in the South African 
water sector. Therefore, the total policy transaction costs obtained from the budgets comprised of 
administration costs and water sector regulation costs. Water sector regulation costs consisted of 
compliance monitoring, enforcement costs and general resource regulation and support. The total 
transaction costs were compared to the total water budget costs as depicted in Figure 2.9. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Water policy transaction costs proportionate to the water budget over a 10-year period 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Figure 2.9 shows that the total transaction costs were considerable and varied between 13 and 29 percent 
of total water budget costs over the ten year period examined. Similar findings were reported by Ofei-
Mensah & Bennett., (2013), Pannell et al., (2013), Falconer., (2000), Falconer & Saunders., (2002), 
Colby, (1990) who all suggest that transaction costs formed a significant part of total environmental 
policy costs. 
 
2.5.3 Transaction Benefits of water Policy 
In an attempt to balance the TCE view on transactions, this study highlights the possible transaction 
benefits associated with water policy reform in South Africa (Table 2.5). Unfortunately, we envisaged the 
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13% 14% 16% 
16% 26% 17% 16% 
18% 19% 
15% 21% 29% 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14M
il
li
o
n
 Z
A
R
 a
n
d
 p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
 
Years 
total TCs(admin+regulation) totalwater budget
35 
 
this list of possible benefits could be a good starting point for broader future research on transaction 
benefits in water management.  
Table 2.5: Possible transaction benefits of water policy reform in the Olifants 
Private Benefits Social Benefits 
Water users Water managers Community Government body 
Skills development 
(negociation, 
bargaining) 
Skills 
development/knowledge 
Infrastructure 
development 
Cumulative learning 
Networking Reputation General policy 
awareness 
Efficient internal 
communication network 
Built capacity Intellectual challenge Information sharing Enhanced competence 
 Enhanced self esteem   
Adopted from (Blomqvist et al., 2002) 
Synonymous to transaction costs, Table 2.5 shows that transactions also have benefits (Boudreau et al., 
2007). The anticipated direct benefits of water policy in South Africa resonate with water use efficiency, 
equity, and sustainability. In addition, there are private and social transaction benefits stemming from the 
water policy implementation and compliance processes. In order for water policy reforms to work, there 
is prior establishment of certain investments in the form of human and physical capital to facilitate policy 
implementation and compliance. This results in additional hidden benefits to the relevant stakeholders and 
community at large. Water users become better negotiators to contracts; they network more in the 
transaction processes and build their capacity. Water managers develop their skills in their working 
environment, intellectual challenges and probably enhance their self-esteems. The community benefits 
from infrastructure development and rehabilitation such as roads and canals. The community also gains 
from public notices, hearings, information sharing and can be said to be more empowered. The 
government bodies responsible for water policy implementation on the other hand benefit from 
cumulative learning in the organizations, better internal communication, and improved competence in 
water service delivery. 
 
2.5.4 Determinats of Transaction Costs among irrigation water users: OLS results  
This section discusses results of the OLS regression presented in Table 2.6. The results showed that 
various factors significantly influenced the magnitude of transaction costs incurred by irrigation farmers. 
The model fitted the data well – with p-value = 0.0000 for the F statistic. We tested for multicollinearity 
using the vif test and from the correlation matrix, explanatory variables with correlation coefficients of 
greater than 0.5 were dropped. All variables included in the final model did not show evidence of 
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multicolinearity. In addition, the regression model was approximated using heteroskedastic-consistent-
standard error estimators. 
 
Table 2.6: Determinants of transaction costs in the Olifants basin: OLS results 
 Variable Coefficient Standard error P-value 
WUA-membership(1=yes,0=no) 3064.79*** 402.84 0.000 
Compulsory Licensing (1=yes,0=no) 363.33 1045.28 0.729 
Region- Middle Olifants 3031.50 1063.60 0.339 
Region- Lower Olifants -879.38*** 917.67 0.005 
Leadership in WUA(1=yes, 0=no) -1130.65 1046.46 0.282 
Gender(1=male, 0=female) 118.78 288.15 0.681 
Years of schooling -40.42 30.30 0.184 
Main occupation-small scale -2063.51*** 708.87 0.004 
Main occupation-other -2197.20** 872.09 0.013 
Farming years -9.242 12.75 0.470 
Farm size- natural log of farm size 2.29 1.94 0.246 
Land claims (1=yes,0=no) 84.04 754.77 0.911 
Income- ln income -56.32 68.46 0.412 
Technical assistance (1=DWAF,0=others) 602.42 469.92 0.202 
ICT tool  -900.57** 344.38 0.010 
Water cost- ln water cost 226.10*** 73.26 0.002 
Water quality-acceptable -824.49** 398.22 0.040 
Water quality-tolerable -633.87 436.62 0.149 
Water quality-unacceptable -39.75 603.02 0.949 
Market distance -5.34 4.16 0.201 
Constant  2560.05* 1313.85 0.053 
N=179 R
2       =
0.815   P=0.000 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Results from the OLS regression (Table 2.6) indicate that several factors significantly determine 
transaction costs incurred by irrigation water users. Firstly, the results show that irrigation water users 
involved in WUAs were likely to incur  higher transaction costs than non members. Farmers who 
complied to water pricing were also likely to incur higher transaction costs than those who did not. This 
suggested that compliance to water policy is indeed underlied by transcation costs. The results further 
showed that farmers from the lower Olifants region were likely to incur significantly lower transaction 
costs compared to farmers from the upper Olifants region. We posit that farmers in the lower Olifants 
region did not actively participate in the water policy process due to the subsistence nature of their 
farming. They, therefore, incurred lower transaction costs compared to their upper Olifants counterparts 
who were mainly largescale farmers. The results further suggest that small scale farmers and people with 
other occupations outside farming faced lower transaction costs compared to the large scale farmers. This 
result implied that this category of farmers was less likely to participate in irrigation water use activities 
therefore less transaction costs of policy compliance. 
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Results further show that irrigation water users who obtained their policy information via ICT related 
means such as radio, televisions, phones and emails incurred less transaction costs compared to non users. 
This was in line with recent developments which portray the potential of ICT in decreasing transaction 
costs (Singh, 2008; Okello, 2011;  Aker, 2010; Silva et al., n.d.;Jensen, 2007; Aker, 2008). ICT eases the 
communication of knowledge and information resulting in decreased bounded rationality and transaction 
costs. The water quality categories used in the regression were as perceived by farmers following the 
definitions by DWAF (i.e. ‘ideal(good)’, ‘acceptable (moderate)’, ‘tolerable (bad)’ and ‘unacceptable 
(very bad)’. The results indicate that irrigation farmers who used water of acceptable quality were likely 
to incur lower transaction costs compared to farmers who used water of ideal quality (base group). We 
argue that recipients (users) of acceptable water quality lacked the incentive to comply to water policies 
and therefore incurred lower transaction costs unlike the users of ideal water quality. A secure water 
supply with guaranteed quality would encourage irrigation investment and compliance to proposed water 
policies. We liken water rights to land rights and as Shah, (2002) suggests, insecure property rights are 
associated with less farm investments because they limit farmer incentives for development. More secure 
water rights such as guaranteed irrigation water of good quality (ideal) is therefore likely to spur more 
farm investment including proposed government water policies; this would act as a powerful instrument 
for fostering compliance to water policy. 
  
38 
 
2.6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Following McCann & Easter, (2004); and McCann et al., (2005), this study identified and quantified the 
ex post transaction costs related to the water policy process in the Olifants basin of South Africa. The 
study focussed on irrigation water users’ and public agents transaction costs. The results indicated that 
sizeable amounts of transaction costs were incurred by the two groups of stakeholders. Transaction costs 
formed between 13 to 29 percent of the total water policy budget. The public agents’ transaction costs 
remained higher than that of water users. This could be explained by the high support and administration 
costs which minimally varied over the three time phases of policy implementation. Transaction costs were 
high for the widely implemented policies but they fairly decreased in the course of policy implementation. 
The transaction costs incurred by irrigation water users mainly comprised of  travel, telephone, additional 
information costs, finance and decision costs .Very high start-up transaction costs were associated with 
the implementation of water trade; a policy that is currently not in operation in the Olifants. High start up 
transaction costs were also associated with the effluent discharge system; a policy which is also yet to 
kick off. We conclude that different levels of transaction costs for the different water policies existed and 
could be contributing factors to inefficient policy implementation and compliance. In addition, knowledge 
of the relevant and existing transaction costs prior to policy implementation ensures optimality in the 
choices made . Moreover, it helps to make comparisons between policy alternatives and nurture effective 
design and implementation ex ante. It further permits evaluation of existing policies ex post for 
improvement purposes, and assessment of their budgetary impact to establish their sustainability and 
efficiency. The study further highlights possible transaction benefits of the water policy reform and 
recommends a more empirical approach in order to gain a deeper understanding of transaction benefits. 
 
The study results further show that different factors significantly explained transaction costs. These can 
act as policy indicators towards better transaction costs management. Specifically, the significant negative 
effect of ICT tools used to acquire policy information for water management shows how ICT can save on 
information gathering costs. Additional empirical research would also deepen the understanding of 
determinants of transaction costs and help to establish a more general theory on the matter. It would 
further aid future predictions of the interactions between factors; especially on the direction, they 
influence transaction costs.   
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Box 2.1: Assessing the timeliness and cost of mobile phone use in water management 
Presence of transaction costs inhibits any policy process. Easter et al., (1999) suggest that transaction 
costs can be reduced through proper institutional and organizational arrangements in addition to flexible 
infrastructure and management. However, this process of institutional and organizational arrangements 
is associated with high transaction costs. This study postulates that Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) can reduce transaction costs experienced in water management. This is in line with 
recent innovations which indicate that ICT provides great potential  in reducing transaction costs in 
many different fields (Singh, 2008; Okello, 2011;  Aker, 2010; Silva et al., n.d.;Jensen, 2007; Aker, 
2008). Specifically ICT makes easier the communication of knowledge and information, delivery of 
information and training at low costs, improving access to markets and credit, empowerment of farmers 
to negotiate better prices and facilitating or strengthening networking (Okello, 2011). In the agricultural 
sector, several studies have attributed benefits such as better prices, reduction in price dispersions and 
improvement in margins due to reduction in transaction costs arising from ICT use (Aker, 2008, 2010; 
Silva et al., n.d.; Jensen, 2007). Nevertheless, the ICT potential to reduce transaction costs in water 
management remains untapped. Lack of communication and feedback pertaining to water management 
between stakeholders is indeed identified as one of the biggest drawbacks to water management (Kay, 
2011; Lévite et al., 2003). Unlike the previous studies which mainly focus on small-scale farmer access 
to input and output market information, the current work attempts to fill a unique gap by assessing the 
potential role ICT could play in water management and policy. 
 
ICT has been defined as a" wide range of computerized technologies that enable communication and 
electronic capturing, processing and transmission of information such as computers, mobile telephony, 
radio, television, teletext, internet and fax (Cohen-Blankshtain et al., 2004). ICTs have become more 
available, much cheaper, and more affordable even in rural areas. They have developed and become 
ubiquitous and relevant in agricultural innovation systems. Expanded telecommunications networks, 
have led to speedy, reliable, and accurate information exchange through both text and voice (Porcari, 
2009). Specifically, mobile phone penetration in the rural areas of developing countries creates 
opportunities for farmers to connect with extension workers, agribusiness, researchers, and each other 
(Ballantyne et al., 2010). ICTs can be tapped to effectively empower rural communities such as farmers 
“gain a voice” so that they can express their needs and demands, negotiate better deals with other actors 
in value chains, and generally get practical benefits from the services intended for them (Fara, 2009). 
Some of the ICTs integrated into rural advisory and information services are radio, television, video, 
internet, and mobile phone services (SMS and voice). 
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The information relayed through ICTs is increasingly becoming diverse from climate change mitigation 
and adaptation, disaster management, early warning of drought, floods and diseases, price information, 
political empowerment, natural resource management, production efficiency, and market access (ibid). 
ICTs also create an opportunity for farmers to relay their experiences with experts (IICD 2006). 
 
Narrowing down to mobile phone technology, recent indications show that phones have created 
opportunities for crowd sourcing among farmers. Instead of performing data collection through paper 
surveys, researchers can collect data through SMS or voice calls (Hoffmann, 2008). For example, data on 
pest outbreaks is obtainable by asking farmers to text information to a premium number. Crowd sourcing 
has eased monitoring of farming activities and local problems, and enhanced prediction of challenges 
with greater certainty at the local, national, regional, and global levels in cost effective way (Balaji, 
2009). Asking farmers to send information or relevant questions via mobile phone is an effective way of 
data collection and feedback communication at reduced costs and labor. It also allows increased 
participation from diverse stakeholders in areas where mobile phones are widespread. 
 
The previous chapter identified and quantified transaction costs related to water management incurred by 
both water managers and irrigation water users. We find a significant negative relationship between ICT 
tools (radio, TV, mobile phone and email) used for water management purposes and the incurred 
transaction costs. In this sub chapter, we conduct a trial experiment, and use mobile phones for crowd 
sourcing water management information. Specific focus was on transaction costs of communication. We 
set up a ‘local community-oriented experimental project’ that involved the use of mobile phones to 
communicate various aspects of water management between water managers and irrigation water users. 
Some of these aspects included problems of access to water, restricted water quantity, poor water quality, 
irregular water distribution, and administrative delays. Previously, many irrigation water users in the 
study area have had to wait for days, weeks, months, or years for assistance from extension workers, 
water managers, or other technical personnel. For example, water quality monitoring information rarely 
reaches the water users. Therefore, the ‘project experiment’ aimed at determining the timeliness and cost 
effectiveness of mobile phones use in communicating water management information.  
 
The ‘project experiment’ involved 38 randomly selected irrigation water users from the Olifants basin 
who were already using mobile phones but for other purposes. A shortcoming of this ‘project 
experiment’ was the short time period of implementation of two months attributable to shortage of 
resources. This limited observation of the full cycle of communication between irrigation water users and 
water managers. The experiment also lacked participants from the middle Olifants sub basin stemming 
from lack of cooperation. The next section outlines the steps followed for the experiment.  
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Steps:  
1. The local community and the water managers helped to develop a list of actual water management 
concerns.  
a. Water users enumerated the actual water management concerns that they experienced in the 
course of their water use activities. These included water access, quality, distribution, 
administrative delays, pollution, blockage of irrigation canals, et cetera.  
b. Water managers and other technical personnel itemized some of the common concerns they 
addressed regularly in the basin.  
2. The channel and cost of communication was then established: 
a. The water users enumerated ways in which they communicated their issues of concern to the 
managers and technical personnel. These included how they passed information, time taken to 
pass the information, the cost involved in communicating the water management concerns, as 
well as time taken to have the issue addressed/resolved 
b. Water managers and the relevant technical personnel indicated ways in which they responded to 
the information in 2 (a) above.   
3. A platform that enabled farmers to interact directly with distant water managers, technicians, and 
experts through mobile phones was established through the following steps:  
a. A direct line “hotline” to the water managers was available to the farmers; through which, they 
could reach the managers promptly in case of need (there were three different hotlines for the 
three sub basins).  
b. Additionally, farmers received airtime facilitation that enabled them to send/call the hotline in 
time of need.  
c. Water managers helped recruit an assistant who managed the “hotline” for the entire project trial 
period of two months. His responsibilities were to receive, record, and channel the 
information/questions/concerns raised by the water users to the respective water managers.  
d. The assistant would then monitor the duration of response/feedback to the water users, or time 
taken to address the concern, together with the respective costs.  
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Results  
Table 2.7 shows the issues of concern in irrigation water management as enumerated by water managers 
and irrigation farmers through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in three parts (upper, middle, and 
lower) of the Olifants basin. We observed that high water costs were a concern only in the lower Olifants 
while inadequate water supply was a concern in the upper and lower Olifants. Other issues of concern 
that were raised included poor water quality, water restrictions in dry periods, poor water distribution, 
expensive irrigation equipment and maintenance costs and limited canal capacities. The modes of 
communication of the identified issues to the responsible personnel included visits to DWAF offices, 
visits to the municipal offices, visits to WUA staff and limited mobile communication. The maximum 
number of days taken to get the water managers attention on an issue as indicated in Table 2.7 was 12 
days while the average number of days required to communicate an issue to the managers was 3 days. 
Communication costs in this regard ranged from ZAR 0 to ZAR 1000 and on average ZAR 297.  
 
On the other hand, using the mobile phone for communication between irrigation water users and 
managers as depicted in Table 2.8 shows that the minimum time required to pass information was 0.2 
minutes while the maximum was 5 minutes. Averagely, the time required passing information between 
water users and managers using the mobile phone was 1.75 minutes. With regard to costs of mobile 
phone communication, we find that the costs ranged from ZAR 0.8 to ZAR 11 while the average cost of 
communication was approximately ZAR 4. 
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Table 2.7: Water concerns outlined by water use stakeholders in the Olifants basin 
Region Concerns Reported to Communication channel Time 
taken 
How 
many 
Cost 
in 
ZAR 
Time to address 
issue 
Upper 
(Loskop) 
High water costs Not reported - - 0 0 0 
Inadequate water supply WUA Mobile phone voice, email Minutes 2 10 3 months 
Poor water quality Water manager Visit DWAF offices, email, meetings Days 2 1000 Many years 
Water restrictions WUA Mobile phone text/SMS Minutes 5 10 7 days 
Limited canal capacity, lack of 
treatment from municipalities 
Water manager Visit DWAF offices Days 1 1000 Not yet addressed 
Lower 
(Tzaneen) 
High water costs Water manager Visit DWAF offices Days 1 200 Many days 
Operation/maintenance costs Water manager Visit DWAF offices Days 12 600 Not yet addressed 
Inadequate water supply Water manager Visit DWAF offices Days 12 700 Many days 
Lower 
(Giyani) 
High water costs Municipality  Visit municipal Days 2 112 Not yet addressed 
Expensive equipment Municipality  Visit municipal Days 2 112 Not yet addressed 
Operation/maintenance costs Municipality  Visit municipal Days 2 112 Not yet addressed 
Inadequate water supply Municipality  Visit municipal Days 2 112 Not yet addressed 
Poor water quality Municipality Visit municipal Days 2 112 Not yet addressed 
Water restrictions Municipality  Visit municipal Days 2 112 Not yet addressed 
Lower 
(Nelspruit) 
High water costs WUA group 
committee 
Visit t WUA staff Days 7 1000 Many days 
Inadequate water supply WUA group 
committee 
Mobile phone voice, visit WUA staff Days 2 100 30 days 
Poor water distribution WUA group 
committee 
Mobile phone voice, visit WUA staff Days 3 150 Not yet addressed 
Poor water quality WUA group 
committee 
Mobile phone voice, visit WUA staff Days 1 80 1 year 
Water restrictions WUA group 
committee 
Mobile phone voice, visit WUA staff Days 2 120 3 months 
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 2.8: Duration and cost of different modes of communication of water management 
information 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Other means of communication  
Duration of communication (Days) 0 12 3.26 3.43 
Cost of communication  (ZAR) 0 1000 296.95 360.82 
 
Communication with mobile experiment  
Duration of communication (Minutes) 0.2 5.0 1.75 1.45 
Cost of communication  (ZAR) 0.8 11.0 3.99 3.03 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
 
  
Conclusions  
 
This study examined communication costs as part of transaction costs incurred in communicating 
water management concerns between irrigation water users and water managers. We elicited the water 
related issues of concern faced by water users through FGDs, the mode of communication to water 
managers, and the respective costs of communication incurred. Secondly, we conducted a trial 
experiment involving the use of mobile phones to create a platform for communication and interaction 
between water users and managers; this examined the timeliness and cost effectiveness of using 
mobile phones as ICT tools for water management. We found that, mobile phones were faster and 
cheaper, averaging at 1.75 minutes for time and ZAR 4 in terms of costs to communicate to water 
managers. This was in comparison to the usual communication channels farmers used which averaged 
to 3 days and ZAR 297 required for communication with water managers. We conclude that, ICTs and 
in particular, mobile phones stand a chance to play an important role in water management. We 
recommend upscaling of such an experiment in terms of duration and number of participants in order 
to draw basin wide recommendations. 
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Chapter Three 
3. The effects of water policy on irrigation water use in the Olifants  
3.1 Introduction  
Water is a critical resource for economic advancement, yet commitment to enforce the essential policy 
and institutional reforms for its management is lacking (Duda & El-Ashry, 2000). This translates into 
non-optimality and unsustainable use. Water management presently faces completely different challenges 
in comparison to five decades ago. These include acute water scarcities, changes in climate, 
environmental restoration, energy policy, rising populations, agricultural transformations, urbanization, 
migration, changes in dietary preferences, lack of institutions and improper water management (Duda & 
El-Ashry, 2000; Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003; Jaspers, 2003; de Fraiture et al., 2010). These challenges 
have led to agricultural water expansion which endangers the resource base upon which many other 
sectors are dependent (Duda & El-Ashry, 2000). Consequently, there is urgent need to take action in 
terms of better approaches to land, water, and ecosystem management in an integrated approach. 
 
In the presence of irrigation water management at the global level, land and water resources are sufficient 
to meet the world’s food demands for the next fifty years (Duda & El-Ashry, 2000). However, water 
scarcity at the regional levels will constrain increases in agricultural production in the food prime 
producing areas (ibid). At present, around 900 million people are living in water scarce basins, 700 
million in places where scarcity is almost evident while one billion others face economic challenges for 
water investments (Molden et al., 2007a; de Fraiture et al., 2010). Water scarcity is synonymous to Africa 
and a big barrier to development (Duda & El-Ashry, 2000). Some projections indicate that by the year 
2025, a third of Africa’s populations will be undergoing a water crisis. Therefore, effective water 
management policies are recommended (Bazzani, 2005). Research points to better institutions and policy 
reforms that consider the interconnectedness of land, water and ecosystem management over and above 
technological and infrastructural investments (Duda & El-Ashry, 2000; Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003; 
Jaspers, 2003). 
 
Internationally, the current approach to effective water management is Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM). The main objective of IWRM is sustainability in water resource management 
through multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to balance water demand between various 
users and uses (Bazzani, 2005; Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003). IWRM involves planning at a basin scale 
level, incorporating subsurface and surface water quantities and qualities, considering environmental 
integrity and the interactions between land use and water resources and not forgetting the natural 
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constraints, social, economic, legal, political and administrative processes and demands  (Jaspers, 2003). 
IWRM requires institutions to facilitate its multiple facets; for example, an administrative set up and a 
planning system for the river basin and their rules (Jaspers, 2003). In many countries, IWRM principles 
are usually implemented through some form of organization such as water shed authorities or cooperative 
coordination stemming from governments (Blomquist & Schlager, 2005). However, the IWRM concept is 
hard to attain and does not always result in successful management. In many instances, it results in social, 
economic and ecosystem compromises and tradeoffs between sectors, even for the developed nations  
(Duda & El-Ashry, 2000; Jønch-Clausen & Fugl, 2001). This is attributable to lack of coordination 
between sectors, disjointed approaches, political interference, and institutional obstacles in 
implementation (ibid). Jønch-Clausen & Fugl, (2001) suggests that, IWRM should be context specific 
following a country’s stage of social and economic development rather than a universal blueprint for 
water management. Its enactment should mirror differences in local conditions for different countries 
accordingly taking on different forms. In the Southern Africa region for example, IWRM institutions 
seem to operate parallel to the already existing institutions (van der Zaag, 2005); this brings in 
competition and wastes institutional resources. 
  
South Africa’s National Water Act (NWA) lays great emphasis on IWRM through its current water laws 
which are underway in implementation (Kloos, 2010). The NWA is regarded as highly comprehensive 
and ambitious following countries like Australia and USA (Kapfudzaruwa & Sowman, 2009). However, 
just like in many other countries, South Africa faces a knowledge gap between the theory and 
implementation of IWRM principles (Jewitt, 2002). This is evidenced by the persistent challenges in the 
water sector contrary to the envisioned water reform objectives of equity, efficiency and sustainability 
(Enright, 2011). Evidence from other African countries further suggests that IWRM principles have not 
been successful and water laws remain largely non-enforced, stagnant, or failed (ibid).  This could be due 
to failure of reforms to address current water priorities, limited spread in water basins, not being based on 
existing practices, having stakes among the elite, and a top down donor style approach (Shah & Koppen, 
2006). In countries with high levels of income inequalities like South Africa, IWRM only seems to work 
for the rich modernized sections of the economy while the poor continue to be worse off (ibid). However, 
little empirical evidence exists in this regard and the current study seeks to contribute to literature by 
examining the effects of the current water laws on irrigation water use – quantities, quality, and 
efficiency. Firstly, this study gives an overview of the current institutional organization of the water 
sector in South Africa in section 3.2, and describes some of the stipulated IWRM policies in the 1998 
Water Act in section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the conceptual and empirical frameworks while 3.5 gives 
the results and discussions. Section 3.6 presents the conclusions.  
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3.2 Current institutional organization in the South African water sector: an overview 
Prior to the year 1994, many policies in South Africa skewed towards provision and protection of only a 
few minorities, disregarding the needs of the majority black population. Accordingly, water use rights 
were based on the riparian system which linked use of water to ownership of adjacent riparian land 
(Kloos, 2010; Thompson et al., 2001; Backeberg, 2005). This was not equitable since 87 percent of South 
African land belonged to the white population who had unrestricted access to water (ibid). Discrimination 
reigned in water services provision as the administrators of water at irrigation boards remained biased 
towards the whites’ population needs (Perret, 2002). This became ground for protest against the apartheid 
regime during the 1980's (Kloos, 2010). With the political changes of 1994, democracy came into being 
with emphasis on social justice and fundamental human rights such as rights to water (Thompson et al., 
2001). The reform process in the water sector resulted in various changes such as; the water supply and 
sanitation policy (DWAF 1994), enactment of water services act (RSA,1997), white paper on national 
water policy (DWAF 1997b), the National Water Act (RSA 1998) and the pricing strategy for raw water 
use charges (DWAF 1999; Kloos, 2010 ; Backeberg, 2005). 
 
The 1998 National Water Act (NWA) recognizes water as a scarce resource belonging to the people and 
aims to protect, use, develop, conserve, manage, and control water resources as a whole. The four main 
objectives of the Act are social equity, ecological sustainability, financial sustainability and economic 
efficiency (Kloos, 2010). The Act puts emphasis on an integrated approach to water management by 
promoting participation in decision making from the relevant stakeholders (ibid). The Act further 
categorizes water management under different institutions at the national, regional and local levels 
(Perret, 2002). In terms of water allocation, the Act gives priority to the ecological reserve and the human 
basic water needs (Jean de la Harpe, n.d.;Gazette, 1998). Furthermore, the Act acknowledges the 
importance of IWRM strategies such as water licensing, water pricing, and water trade. 
 
The national, regional and local framework for water management outlines the responsible institutions 
and their respective roles targeted at fulfilling the goals of the water Act (Perret, 2002;Jean de la Harpe, 
n.d.;Gazette, 1998). At the national level as depicted in Figure 3.1, the minister in-charge of water affairs 
and forestry is recognized as the overall custodian of water resources on behalf of the country (Pienaar, 
2007). The minister has the responsibility of ensuring protection, use, development, conservation, and 
sustainable control of water resources. This is for the benefit of all while also ensuring equitable and 
beneficial allocation of water for the public interest and promoting environmental values. The Act further 
allows the minister to delegate his or her duties to departmental staffs, water management institutions, 
advisory committees, and water boards. The minister’s powers – as outlined in the Act – are delegation, 
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expropriation, he acts as a CMA where there is none and assigns powers to CMAs (Harpe & Ramsden, 
1999). Presently, the DWAF is responsible for overseeing all aspects of the water Act on the minister’s 
behalf (ibid). However, in the long run, the DWAF will delegate most roles to water management 
institutions such as CMAs as they continue to be formed while it retains the role of policy formation and 
general regulation over the smaller institutions (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). 
 
The government implements its functions through water management strategies. The National Water 
Resource Strategy (NWRS) of 2002 is the channel through which implementation of water reform 
currently takes place (Kloos, 2010). The NWRS provides a framework for water use and control for the 
entire country, and at the regional and local levels within the 19 Water Management Areas (WMA) in the 
country. It enables proper water management by classifying water related development opportunities, 
constraints and giving information on all aspects of water resource management (Harpe & Ramsden, 
1999). It is the responsibility of the minister of water affairs and forestry to ensure the existence of a 
functional NWRS. The NWRS is reviewed every 5 years and stems from public consultation; it contains 
objectives for institutions undertaking water resource management and the inter relationships between 
these institutions. The strategy is binding for all water users and institutions. 
 
At the regional level (Figure 3.1), the water governing bodies are the Catchment Management Agencies 
(CMAs) established in each of the 19 Water Management Areas (WMA) in the country. A CMA is a 
statutory body instituted by a government notice and has a governing board appointed by the minister. 
The board comprises of all the stakeholders; both current and potential and their stakes in the respective 
WMA (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). CMA’s are organs through which the minister acting through DWAF is 
supposed to delegate water management activities at the catchment level (ibid). CMAs have the 
responsibility of developing and implementing the Catchment Management Strategies (CMS) consistent 
with the NWRS. The CMAs are envisioned to set principles for water allocation to users, provide a 
framework for water management in a WMA and ensure sustainable use of water resources in line with 
the Act, CMS and NWRS (Perret, 2002). CMA's envisage the involvement of the local communities and 
emphasize on cooperation with enough representation among stakeholders especially the marginalized 
populations. The water Act stipulates that CMAs formation originate from the community or by the water 
minister depending on a region's needs. In regions where a CMA is nonexistent, the regional DWAF 
office acts as the CMA. The water Act tasks CMA's with the responsibility of water licensing if already in 
existence and if not; this remains a responsibility of DWAF. The minister has the power to assign 
additional functions to a CMA whereby, if fulfilled, the additional functions become the CMA’s 
permanent responsibility. These additional functions may include but not limited to being the responsible 
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authority over water use and allocation and general management of water resources in the WMA, (Harpe 
& Ramsden, 1999). 
 
At present, several years after the promulgation of the 1998 water Act, only two CMAs are so far in 
existence out of a possible 19 that were planned for the entire country (Bourblanc & Blanchon, 2013). 
The slow implementation is attributable to power struggles between DWAF and the CMAs, as well as 
construction of inter-basin transfers, which have been in existence since the apartheid regime. Inter basin 
transfers (IBT) inhibit cooperation of stakeholders due to different interests driven by differences in 
economic activities. Other possible challenges arise from poor administration, poor management, and lack 
of capacity for personnel, which leads to frustration, inadequacy, and poor cooperation between 
institutions. Currently, the CMAs have been reduced in number from the possible 19 to 9 for easier 
management especially in monitoring performance (Bourblanc & Blanchon, 2013). 
 
At the third and local level are Water User Associations (WUAs) (Figure 3.1). A WUA is defined as a 
statutory body established by the minister and comprises of individual water users coming together to 
carry out water related activities for mutual benefit (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999) . A WUA allows people to 
pool their resources together such as finances and expertise in performing their water related activities. 
Management Committees (MC), govern WUAs, which may represent a single sector or different sectors. 
A single sector WUA comprises of similar water users such as emerging farmers, and acts in their 
interests. A multi sector WUA comprises of different types of water users such as industry, miners, and 
farmers to act in their interests. The water Act envisages that all existing irrigation boards, boards for 
stock watering and control boards be converted to WUAs and probably extend areas of their authority 
(Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). 
 
WUAs provide a means through which implementation of CMS takes effect and have a role to play in 
poverty alleviation and food security issues. The functions of any WUA depend on the purpose for which 
it was established. This may range from maintenance of water works, prevention of water wastage and 
unlawful use, regulation of flow of the water course, investigation on water quality, general supervision of 
the water resources and management of water use in various activities such as irrigation, afforestation and 
recreation activities (Jean de la Harpe, n.d.;Gazette, 1998). The respective CMA or the minister 
supervises and regulates the activities of the WUAs, which is preferred than dealing with individual 
farmers. Presently, the water law is under review and WUAs face disbandment to form one regional body 
for water management (Marius Classen; Backerberg, 2014). We explain more on WUAs in the upcoming 
sections.  
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The water Act further makes several other provisions on various issues such as international water 
management, offences and remedies, government waterworks and advisories. The Act empowers the 
minister to set up advisory committees as he finds fit for different purposes and functions. For example, 
an advisory committee to determine the governing board of a CMA. The advisory committees remain 
answerable to the minister. The Act further allows establishment of bodies responsible for entering into 
international agreements for management of water resources shared with neighboring countries. The 
water minister is responsible for the powers of these bodies, their duties, and their governance in 
consultation with the cabinet. 
 
Additionally, besides water management, the Act provides for the government to construct, own, or 
purchase water works for public interest. Just as the government apportions water from the resource, it 
does the same from its dams at a certain cost in accordance with the national water pricing strategy for the 
purposes of cost recovery. Eventually, the aim of the DWAF is to focus on policymaking, supervisions, 
and handover any infrastructural works to water management institutions such as the WUAs. The Act 
further provides for safety measures of dams as a way to protect the environment and the people. The Act 
classifies dams that pose a safety risk and through the DWAF, monitors, controls and maintains dam 
establishment. The Act further requires that a monitoring and information base be set up with regard to all 
aspects of water resources such as quantity, quality, water use, rehabilitation of resources and aquatic 
health. The Act deems this information base necessary for the purposes of planning, disaster management, 
public safety, and ensuring people’s constitutional rights of access to state information. Importantly, the 
water Act provides for the creation of an independent water tribunal whereby water users can appeal 
against certain decisions of water management institutions such as CMAs. These decisions may regard 
water costs, water allocation schedules, license applications, verification of existing lawful use and 
compensation. The tribunal’s jurisdiction is countrywide and it receives its funding from the national 
treasury. However, the tribunal’s procedural rules require approval from the minister before publication in 
the government gazette. In case, a water user is not content with the tribunals ruling, they make an appeal 
at a high court. The water Act further lists all the water resource related offences and their penalties that a 
water user faces in case of contravention. The offences might be either activities or omissions, e.g. 
unlawfully interfering with a water work or failure to register lawful water use respectively. The Act 
further gives the courts and management institutions the powers to solve arising offences or omissions in 
addition to provision of compensation for damages to aggrieved parties (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). 
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Figure 3.1: Current institutional organization of the South Africa water sector 
Source: (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999) 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Overview of some IWRM policies in the South African National Water Act 
3.3.1 Water Pricing 
As one of the strategies for IWRM, many governments are now treating water as an economic good; 
opting for water pricing in an attempt to streamline water management (Jaspers, 2003). Water pricing as 
an economic instrument promotes sustainable water use and fosters water cost recovery in water 
management (Bazzani, 2005). This is by creating opportunity costs to water use and covering the costs of 
water provision by governments (ibid). There exist many proponents and opponents of water pricing as a 
water management policy. This is because water remains a complex good with many social attributes. For 
example, in some cultures such as Islam, payment for water is not well accepted (Jaspers, 2003). 
However, many stakeholders agree that water pricing is necessary to manage water demand and pollution 
control. It’s no doubt that water pricing introduces the aspect of water scarcity to users hence more 
efficient use (Shah & Koppen, 2006). Proponents of water pricing argue that it is no longer effective to 
depend on government budget allocations for river basin management due to political interference. 
Additionally, government allocations are less likely to encourage any development and efficient 
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accountability at the basin scale level (ibid). Water pricing, is therefore seen as an operative instrument to 
minimize over abstraction of water and maintain water quality. 
 
Though necessary for economic sustainability, water pricing is not popular or as successful for many 
countries due to the complexities of river basin management (Bazzani, 2005). For example, as much as 
water pricing is regarded a good instrument to foster water use efficiency,  Speelman et al., (2009) 
suggest that it’s not promising and suitable for the poor small scale farmers who cannot afford. Water 
charges reduce farm profits hence incomes and might affect overall rural development (Tardieu & Préfol, 
2002;  Speelman et al., 2009). Other problems that could arise include declined overall agricultural 
production for a country, higher prices for urban consumers and increased imports (ibid). Berbel & 
Gómez-Limón, (2000a) on the other hand note that water pricing, as a sole instrument is not appropriate 
to reduce irrigation water use. This is because irrigation water use in some instances only reduces at the 
water price level where farm income and agricultural employment are adversely affected. 
 
Presently in South Africa, water tariffs are founded on full water use rights held by a water user per the 
planned irrigable land rather than the actual water used (Pott et al., 2009). This method of pricing does not 
foster water use efficiency unlike charges based on actual water use (ibid). However, it is usually 
preferred because it does not require metering for each individual water user and guarantees water 
managers of a constant income unlike actual water use. Actual water use implies varied returns from 
water use. A combined charge is however suggested as an option by Pott et al., (2009). Since the 
abolishment of the riparian rights system for water allocation and use, the water Act requires registration 
of all water users, followed by compulsory licensing then payment for use. However, the 1998 water Act 
still makes provisions for continuation of lawful water use in such a manner until a time when the water is 
eventually licensed. 
 
The NWA stipulates that, the minister of water affairs through the minister of finance comes up with a 
water pricing strategy to calculate water use charges (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). He further makes 
changes to the pricing strategy from time to time. The objectives of the pricing strategy are social equity, 
ecological sustainability, financial sustainability, and economic efficiency. It stipulates the how, when, 
who, and how much to pay for water. For example, it categorizes different water areas, water use types 
and water users to ensure equity through variation in pricing, it provides for refunds and waivers on 
charges for given users in an equitable manner, it encourages beneficial use of water, minimizes water 
wastage and pollution, and support municipalities in developing tariffs for water service provision (Harpe 
& Ramsden, 1999). The pricing strategy differentiates between types of water use by means of the 
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technique of water abstraction, method of supply, how it is discharged, impact on the resource, water 
quality, and type of resource being utilized. Water users on the other hand, vary depending on the amount 
of water they use and that which they return to the resource plus their economic circumstances (ibid). The 
current water pricing strategy aims at cost recovery from water users and is planned at progressive 
increases over time (Backeberg, 2005). The recovery of costs targets the following:  
a) Expenditure for water resource management; i.e. monitoring, water allocation and control, protection 
and conservation.  
b) Expenditure for water resource development; these are the costs incurred in planning and design, 
constructions, and maintenance of water works.   
c)  Costs for efficient and equitable water distribution  (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999).  
 
The NWA envisions water pricing applied on actual volume of water used with the option of a combined 
fixed-variable charging system in consideration. The commercial farmers and government water schemes 
are foreseen to pay the full depreciation, operation and maintenance charges while emerging and 
subsistence farmers get subsidized for operation and maintenance (O&M) on a reducing scale over 5 
years, after which depreciation costs will be phased in ( Backeberg, 2006). Table 3.1 gives a summary of 
the different water costs applicable to different sectors as given in the 2007 water pricing strategy. 
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Table 3.1: Water costs and charges as proposed in the South African NWA 
Sector Resource management 
charges 
Resource development 
charges 
Phasing In on charges 
Domestic/Industrial Full cost 
recovery on 
abstraction and 
waste discharge 
related use 
On-budget GWS: 
Depreciation; ROA: 
O&M 
• Off-budget GWS: 
CUC, 
Refurbishment, 
WRD and O&M 
• WMI’s: Full cost 
recovery 
WRM charges introduced fully 
after registration of water use 
in WMA 
• Waste discharge related 
WRM charges implemented 
after registration of waste 
users. 
• Annual increase on 
development charge will be 
limited to PPI + 10% until 
target development charge 
achieves on state funded GWS. 
Stream flow 
reduction activities 
(commercial 
growers) 
Full recovery of allocated costs 
Note: Cost of Dam Safety 
Control and waste discharge 
related costs not allocated to the 
forestry sector. 
Not applicable, except 
where negotiated for 
new development. 
WRM charges introduced 
fully after registration but 
capped to R10 per ha plus 
PPI with 2002/03 as base year 
Stream flow 
reduction 
activities(resource 
poor growers) 
Full recovery of allocated costs, 
achievement in 5 years 
Note: Cost of Dam 
Safety Control and waste 
discharge related costs not 
allocated to the forestry sector. 
Not applicable, except where 
negotiated for new 
development 
As above, but subsidized for 5 
years from date of registration 
Subsidy starts at 100% and 
reduces by 20% annually. No 
charge for forest 
plantation that is <= 10 
hectares. 
Irrigation(commercial 
farmers) 
Full recovery of allocated costs 
• Waste discharge related costs 
not applicable 
GWS: 
• Full recovery of 
Depreciation plus O&M on 
existing schemes 
• Full financial cost recovery 
for new schemes 
WMI: 
• Full financial cost recovery 
• Depreciation charge capped 
to 1.5 c/m3 plus PPI from 
2007/08. 
• WRM charge introduced 
fully after registration of water 
use in WMA, but capped to 1.5 
c/m3 plus PPI from 2007/08. 
• O&M cost increases limited 
to 50% p.a. 
Irrigation(resource 
poor farmers)-
schedule 1 
As above, but subsidized for a 
5-year period 
• Waste discharge related costs 
not applicable 
GWS: 
• O&M subsidized for a 5-
year period on existing and 
new schemes. 
• Depreciation charges 
waived for a 5-year period. 
WMIs: 
• Subsidies available under 
certain conditions 
GWS: 
• O&M charges phased in over 
5 years after registration at 
20% per annum, 0% in the first 
year. 
• Depreciation charge applied 
from year 6 onwards and 
capped to 1.5 c/m3 plus PPI 
from 2007/08. 
• WRM charges phased in 
over 5 years @ 20% per 
Annum, 0% in year one 
Source: (Government Notices, DWAF, 2007). 
GWS: Government Water Schemes, ROA: Return on Asset O&M: Operations and Maintenance, CUC: Capital Unit Charge, 
WRD: Water Resource Development, WMI: Water Management Institutions, WRM: Water Resource Management, WMA: 
Water Management Area, WMI: Water Management Institutions, PPI: Producer Price Index 
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Current water pricing scenario in the Olifants 
Results from our focus group discussions indicated that there were discrepancies between what farmers 
were currently paying for water and the rates indicated by DWAF. The rates from DWAF seemed higher 
compared to what the farmers were currently paying. Large-scale farmers indicated that water prices were 
rising but they were not yet paying the increased DWAF tariffs.  For example, in the year 2012/2013 the 
stipulated irrigation tariffs for the Olifants river (Loskop dam) region in Mpumalanga, Mooi river in 
Gauteng and Groot Letaba river (Tzaneen dam) in Limpopo were ZAR 3.0/m
3
, ZAR 3.26/m
3
 and ZAR 
6.16/m
3
 respectively (DWAF 2013/2012). Yet at the time of this study, farmers were still paying as low 
as ZAR 0.2 cents per m
3
 of water used in irrigation in the respective areas. This suggested that the pricing 
policy lacked strictness and follow up in implementation. This could be due to weak 
structures/institutions and lack of capacity and resources as suggested by Coleman (2014). Water prices 
remained approved but not implemented; hence poor cost recovery. Additionally, there was evidence of a 
poor billing system, as some areas remained entirely unbilled.  
 
The water quotas for the large-scale farmers on the other hand indicated some uniformity with DWAF 
stipulated water quotas. The irrigation boards reporting unique water quotas for their member farmers in 
accordance with DWAF regulations evidenced this. Examples of these water quotas and their respective 
irrigation boards included, Loskop irrigation board – 7700m3 per ha per annum per farmer, Rust de winter 
irrigation board – 7000m3, Hereford irrigation board – 6200m3, Spekboom irrigation board – 10392m3, 
and Blyde river irrigation board – 9900m3. Currently, farmers in these boards paid for the entire allocated 
water quota whether one used the water quota or not; a cost that they indicated was not significantly high 
to influence their farm profits and production costs. The large-scale farmers paid their irrigation water 
costs on a six monthly basis. Table 3.2 indicates that all 46 commercial farmers interviewed were actively 
paying for their received water quotas. Twenty small-scale farmers were paying for their water use 
directly to DWAF while the remaining 117 of small-scale farmers incurred indirect costs of water 
abstraction. The small-scale water payments were inform of monthly payments for water pumping costs 
through generators, comprising of fuel costs and electricity costs used to draw water from the rivers and 
boreholes. The non-compliant category of water users in Table 3.2 represents interviewed irrigation and 
industrial water users that were not actively involved by way of (payment, participation) or using the 
stipulated water policies by DWAF.  
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Table 3.2: Farmer compliance to water policies in the Olifants 
Water policy Number of 
compliant water 
users  
Large scale 
farmers 
Small scale 
farmers 
Industry/ 
mines 
Non 
compliant 
Water tariffs 81 46 20 15 117 
Water Trade (non official) 16 12 4 0 - 
WUAs 80 40 39 1 118 
Compulsory Licensing 39 26 6 7 159 
Effluent discharge 15 0 0 15 - 
Source: Own compilation 
 
3.3.2 Water trade 
Water transfer and trade base on the premise that water transfers occur between users with low returns per 
unit of water used to users with much higher returns per unit of water used. In essence, water has an 
attached opportunity cost thus attracting conservation for both buyers and sellers (Gillitt et al., 2005). It is 
one way to re allocating scarce water resources (Nieuwoudt & Armitage, 2004). The pros of water 
transfer and trade include:   
 enhances efficiency by promoting use of water for the highest returns per unit of use 
 the transfer of water rights empowers water users by making them part of the decision with regard 
to any water re allocation and crop choices  
 it enables water users to consider their opportunity costs of water use given the output prices they 
receive, hence encourage water conservation  
 the properly defined and working water rights required for the proper functioning of a water 
market promotes investment due to security of water tenure (Nieuwoudt & Armitage, 2004; Pott 
et al., 2009). 
The existence of a water market on the other hand requires a certain number of conditions fulfilled in 
order to operate effectively. These are:  
 A very well defined and non-ambiguous rights system in terms of measurement, consistency, 
certainty and importance 
 the rights have to be fully enforceable to secure benefits of the holders   
 the rights  should be separate from land and transferable  
 the rights  have to be constitutionally viable with surety in title of ownership and legally sanction-
able water transfers  
 a working government or administration to maintain the flow of titles over water rights 
(Nieuwoudt & Armitage, 2004). 
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The South African water Act through the NWRS foresees water distribution via markets with the aim of 
attaining equity in water use and water use efficiency. Water transfers could be both temporary or 
permanent allowing access to those who did not previously have, and the use of water for the most high 
value crops  ( Backeberg, 2005). Temporary transfer is stipulated for a period of one year with possibility 
of extension while permanent transfer involves selling of all or part of water rights between users  (Gillitt 
et al., 2005). As outlined in literature, water trade requires rules in place such as prior water registration, 
licensing, or confirmation that existing water use is lawful to facilitate effective water exchanges. Existing 
lawful use implies that water has been in use for 2 years prior to initiation of the NWA. Water transfers in 
South Africa started taking place after the year 1994. Prior to this period, water transfers had failed due to 
high transaction costs arising from common property problems of the riparian system, lack of private 
decision makers due to institutional failures and bureaucratic procedures.  Past this period, water trade 
took place in various catchments due to increased institutional reforms, drought conditions, better returns 
to high value crops in the markets and decentralization which helped to reduce the macro level transaction 
costs (Backeberg, 2005). However, the water transfers were limited to large-scale farming only in few 
selected basins. This called for a review of water trade between subsistence and commercial farmers, and 
inter sector and inter basin transfers. Water trade seemed promising since no additional demands were 
made on the water resource but rather the transfer of already existing rights (Backeberg, 2005). 
 
The biggest problem with water trade is setting the rules and adhering to them to ensure a fully-fledged 
water market. Water trade in South Africa has remained limited to a few catchments due to inhibiting 
factors such as incomplete licensing. The compulsory licensing process is slowed by uncertainties of its 
outcomes, how to balance actual water use and reserve requirements, and the tension surrounding water 
and land reforms (Pott et al., 2009). South Africa stands a chance in using water trade to promote water 
use efficiency, when and if the bureaucratic nature of the process reduces while other water market 
requirements are in place (ibid). For example, Nieuwoudt & Armitage, (2004), studied two regions of 
South Africa and found that in the orange river basin, water trade was operational between farmers with 
low returns and those with highest returns per unit of water applied. On the other hand, water trade did 
not emerge for Nkwaleni valley of Kwa Zulu Natal despite it having similar water scarcity conditions. 
This was attributable to farmers (potential buyers and sellers) facing the same crop profitability in output 
markets hence, transaction costs of water trade outweighed the benefits for them. 
 
At the time of this study, there were not many cases of water trade reported in the study region as 
indicated in Table 3.2. In the upper Olifants region for example, many of the farmers preferred to keep 
water in the dams as security rather than take part in water trade. Large-scale farmers interviewed 
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regarded the trading process as bureaucratic, ambiguous, slow, and time consuming with many controls 
from the DWAF. Some termed the process as no longer existent and cited lack of cooperation from the 
DWAF. The few cases of water exchanges encountered were between family and friends. 
 
3.3.3 Compulsory Licensing 
There is increasing international recognition of the importance of water rights and the role they play in the 
effective management of scarce water resources (Speelman et al., 2010). This is because rights to property 
determine the value people attach to natural resources. For water resources, improperly designed water 
rights raises the transaction costs of water management decisions therefore inhibiting efficient water 
allocation and use. Clearly defined property rights result in people paying lower prices for their water use 
due to reduced transaction costs (Speelman et al., 2010). Water rights further foster government water 
cost recovery (ibid). Improving water rights is one way to address increasing water scarcity by fostering 
its productivity, increasing investments, and benefits from more investments in water supplies thus 
improving rural livelihoods (Speelman et al., 2010). 
 
Speelman et al., (2010) suggest that the current water problems in South Africa lean more towards limited 
institutional capacities such as inadequate water rights rather than water scarcity. This has prompted 
efforts towards the right decisions, investments, and innovations in good time to curb existing water 
scarcities, as is already seen taking shape through implementation of policies outlined in the Water Act. 
The NWA lays emphasis on water re-allocation and the first step is through compulsory licensing. This is 
in order to achieve envisaged equity to all populations by addressing past inequities in water resource 
allocation and use (McCartney & Arranz, 2007). Compulsory licensing is a way of giving entitlement to 
water use and users in an attempt to move away from the previous riparian water use system. Compulsory 
licensing aims at achieving fairness in water allocation, improving efficiency in water use in the public 
interest, efficiency in water management, and protecting water quality. Therefore, a license gives new or 
existing water users formal authorization to use water for productive purposes (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). 
 
A license is definite to a given user, property and usage, valid for a number of years not exceeding 40 and 
has to be reviewed as often as every five years (Backeberg, 2005). The water Act stipulates that the 
licensing process should focus especially on the historically disadvantaged groups in order to meet the set 
objectives of equity in water allocation (Backeberg, 2005). Currently, source directed controls are in place 
as a way to control water use and reduce negative impacts associated with human water use (McCartney 
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& Arranz, 2007). Together with compulsory licensing, the water Act stipulates several other types of 
water use authorizations, namely: 
 
  Schedule 1 
This is water use that has a small or minimal impact on the water resource and does not require 
licensing  or registration e.g. domestic use, small gardening and rain water storage (Perret, 2002) 
 General authorizations 
This is slightly larger withdrawal of water in comparison to schedule 1 type of water use; e.g., 
storing a limited amount of water in a dam.  It has a minor or inconsequential impact on the water 
resource and allowable in less stressed water situations. It does not require licensing unless in 
water stressed circumstances; registration of the water is however necessary. General 
authorizations are allowable under certain bounds and conditions, and are valid for three to five 
years. Review of general authorizations takes place at intervals of not less than two years and is 
applicable to new water use post promulgation of the water Act. 
  Water use licenses   
Water use licenses are required for much larger water use that does not fall under schedule 1 and 
general authorizations. Any license application usually undergoes evaluation for several factors 
such as existing lawful water use, past discrimination, time- frame for authorization, investments 
of the water user, foreseen impact on the water resource, and effect on other users. After 
successful evaluation, water users receive their water licenses outlining several conditions such as 
time for which the license is valid, which is usually up to 40 years. The authorities reserve the 
right to change license conditions in case of any changes in the water resource but in an equitable 
way: the time duration for the license however is not changed but can be reviewed and extended 
up to 5 additional years (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). If one violates the license conditions, they 
receive a notice to make amendments of which failure to do so results in withdrawal of the 
license or the user faces prosecution. Compulsory licensing stems from the water minister issuing 
a gazette notice requiring all existing and potential water users (general authorizations and 
existing lawful users) to apply for water licenses. This is especially in stressed catchments 
experiencing water shortages and pollution.  
 Continued lawful water use  
The water Act further provides for continued lawful water use without requiring one to obtain a 
license, as long as their water use is registered. Compulsory licensing in this case is only 
applicable in water stressed situations. This kind of water use corresponds to water use that was 
in existence exactly two years before promulgation of the 1998 water Act. 
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 Reserve requirement 
This is the only right to water in the water Act. It consists of the ecological reserve and the basic 
human needs reserve which comprises of drinking water, water for food preparation and personal 
hygiene. The reserve stipulates quantity and quality of water that must be retained in a given 
water resource given hydrological, ecological and demographic features. All other water use 
rights are subject to the reserve requirements. 
 
The compulsory licensing process in South Africa has previously been criticized on a number of issues 
such as; firstly, the five year review period is regarded as too short to allow proper farmer investments 
due to insecurities associated with changes that might come up at every review period (Backeberg, 2005). 
Secondly, the licenses are insecure due to lack of surety that quantities and qualities indicated for 
abstraction on licenses will be available for supply (Speelman et al., 2010). Thirdly, the current water 
rights are limited in terms of transferability from one user to the other as the transfer process is laden with 
a lot of administrative procedures for each individual transfer; this in return raises transaction costs of 
transfer and renders the process less efficient with minimal or no efficiency gains (Speelman et al., 2010).  
Currently, compulsory licensing is a once-off annual payment of ZAR 114 per water user at the time of 
application, regardless of type or quantity of water used. Table 3.2 shows that, compulsory licensing was 
not widespread in the study region and was reported by only a few water users i.e. 26, 6, and 7 large-scale 
farmers, small-scale farmers and industrial water users respectively. Additionally, in some regions such as 
Kaspersnek in the middle Olifants, we found out that some farmers still regarded themselves as entitled to 
water use, as long as it was adjacent to their land. This confirmed the limited compliance to compulsory 
licensing observed in the study area; it implied a lack of awareness in the current water reforms from the 
water users’ perspective. This also points to flawed implementation of the NWA. In this case, we also 
argue that the ‘continued allowable lawful water use’ stipulated in the NWA is apparently misunderstood; 
this could be due to the many provisions of the NWA that result to confusion among water users. 
 
3.3.4 WUAs/ Water use groups  
There has been considerable increased support for community involvement in management  of natural 
resources over centralized management in many parts of the world (Vollan & Ostrom, 2010; Adhikari, 
2005; Meinzen-Dick et al, 2002). This is because local users are seen to be in a better position to discern 
the local ecological, technical, economic, and social conditions out of their indigenous knowledge thus 
able to come up with well adapted rules, procedures, and sanction mechanisms easily supported by all 
resource users (Adhikari, 2005; Meinzen-Dick et al, 2002; Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003; Jaspers, 2003). 
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More so, their  consent in public decision making on issues that affect their welfare is important  
(Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003; Jaspers, 2003). For IWRM to work, van Ast & Boot, (2003) emphasize on 
the importance of stakeholder participation in any water policy process; this way, visualizations, concepts, 
patterns of actions, and possible answers to apparent problems of actors are identified and incorporated 
into the decision making process. This improves the quality of decisions made and allows exchange of 
information between stakeholders hence better understanding of issues. Better information flow 
encourages transparency between parties and fosters effective management with better conflict resolution 
(Jaspers, 2003). Full stakeholder representation in the working base is encouraged in order to foster 
environmental, social, institutional, technical, and financial sustainability (ibid). 
 
However, even with the many theoretical advantages attributed to participatory resource management 
world over, results from previous community involvement in management of natural resources indicate 
that these attempts are not always effective. Some have yielded desirable results with reports of better 
infrastructure upkeep and maintenance, efficiency in resource use, financial viability and overall 
sustainability (Kumar & Karande, 2000). In other instances, the targeted outcomes of resource 
productivity, equity, poverty alleviation, and environmental sustainability remain mixed or unrealized. 
(Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 2001; Srinivasan, 2006; Cardenas et al., 2009; Vandersypen & Bastiaens, 2008; 
Theesfeld, 2004; Place et al., 2004; Mukhopadhyay, 2004; Söderqvist, 2003; Gebremedhin et al., 2004; 
Marshall, 2004; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002; Gorton et al., 2009; Bodin & Crona, 2008;  White & Ford 
Runge, 1995;  Khalkheili & Zamani, 2009; McCarthy et al., 2004; Bandiera et al., 2005). 
 
The South African  NWA stipulates participatory water use management through formation of WUAs 
(Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). The water Act defines a WUA as a statutory body established by the minister  
to bring together water users willing to work together in water use activities at the local level towards 
attainment of a common goal (Backeberg, 2005; Harpe, n.d.). The WUAs might be multi sector or single 
sector WUAs. The main purpose of WUAs is to enable water users to combine forces financially, human 
resource wise and expertise for effective water management activities (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). 
Functions of WUAs may vary depending on the constitutional purposes for their formation. Some of the 
functions may include; preventing water wastage and unlawful use, supervision and regulation of water 
use and flow, monitoring water quality and maintenance of water works (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999). 
WUAs remain under the powers of the minister or CMA. The South African NWA targeted conversion of 
the existing irrigation boards to WUAs and formation of new WUAs for the small-scale farmers, a goal 
that is yet to be realized for majority of the basins. 
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Participatory water management has previously not been successful in South Africa due to lack of 
cooperation between stakeholders such as local governments, tribal authorities, farmers, and 
representatives of their associations (Backeberg, 2006). Failed cooperation stems from differences in 
cultures and backgrounds such as race, ethnicity, gender, language, and age. This heterogeneity has 
previously resulted in mistrust, bitterness, nervousness, fury, and accusations about the past (Backeberg, 
2006). At present, only a few WUAs are operational in South Africa and two CMAs are in existence. 
Additionally, Orne-Gliemann, (2007) points out that the existing WUAs in South Africa fail to resolve 
any community water issues or attend to water infrastructure. The WUAs operate in isolation of other 
farm activities and lack full integration in farming activities, which is a drawback to success. In the 
Olifants, WUAs implementation has been slow. Faysse, (2004) outlines factors that have led to the slow 
conversion of irrigation boards to WUAs as the following:  
 Resistance and conditional inclusion of small-scale water users by white commercial farmers in 
their irrigation boards thus WUAs   
 Lack of clear specification of WUAs roles especially due to ambiguity in definition of equity 
 The small scale farmers entitlement attitude to free water due to consequences of the past 
apartheid regime and drought 
 DWAF’s less strictness on water use for the emerging farmers; this gives rise to opposition by the 
commercial farmers who insist on proportionality in water allocation based on the level of 
investment in water works  
 Failure by white farmers to involve the emerging farmers in decision making when they include 
them in the WUAs   
 Confusion over who is best suited to represent the emerging farmers in the WUAs due to lack of 
capacity and gender balancing 
 Lack of access to information especially on compulsory water licensing  
 
Difficulties of new WUAs formation in small-scale irrigation schemes on the other hand, arise due to lack 
of management capacity, lack of land tenure security, small pieces of land, and lack of appropriate 
technologies, markets, and finances (Harpe & Ramsden, 1999).  
 
Focus group discussions with the heads of the irrigation boards in the Olifants indicated that the WUAs 
only existed by name; the organizations remained as irrigation boards with minimal attempts of 
conversion into WUAs (van Stryp, 2014). The membership of the boards largely comprised of white 
farmers with minimal or no black farmers’ representation. The reasons given for the slow and inexistent 
inclusion of emerging farmers into the irrigation boards included; emerging farmers inefficiency in 
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farming, and tension between the two farmer categories due to land re allocation. As a result, emerging 
farmers have informally organized themselves into smaller water use groups to pool their resources 
together for irrigation farming purposes. This was especially in the lower Olifants region of Limpopo. 
Table 3.2 indicates that 40 small-scale and 39 large-scale farmers were involved in participatory water 
management activities. At the time of the study, the NWA was undergoing reform in an attempt to 
eliminate the WUAs to form one overall umbrella body for governing water use (van Stryp, Claasen, 
2014). No multi-sector WUA existed in the Olifants at the time of the study. 
 
3.3.5 Payment for effluent discharge 
The current water quality situations in the world are far from adequate and sustainable water quality 
management remains a big challenge (Huang & Xia, 2001). This could be due to current forces of 
economic development and population increase (ibid). Policies for water quality management remain 
complex because there are many socio economic, environmental, and political factors to consider. 
Barriers to water quality management have been identified as lack of or poorly developed policies, poor 
legislation standards, poor monitoring, lack of finances, lack of capacity for stakeholders, and unclear 
institutional accountabilities (Huang & Xia, 2001; Serageldin, 1995). Further complicating water quality 
management, is the diffuse nature of some of the pollution especially from farming activities; therefore 
the need to distinguish between point source and non-point source pollution for any water quality 
management policy (Mattheiss, Mat, & Strosser, 2009). 
 
There are two main schools of thought when it comes to the debate on water pollution control in 
developing and transition countries (Blackman, 2009). These are namely command and control requiring 
polluters to use certain technology in order to minimize discharges and economic incentives (market-
based policies) that encourage polluters to minimize their pollution without stipulating on how they 
should do it. Examples of these economic incentives include effluent discharge permits which are tradable 
between polluters, and discharge fee programs which charge firms per unit of load emitted (Blackman, 
2009; Glazyrina et al., 2006). Proponents of the economic incentives argue that they are best suited for 
developing and transition countries because they cut on social costs as these countries lack the private and 
public resources required for pollution control (Blackman, 2009). However, arguments exist that 
economic incentive policies are less likely to work in developing countries due to lack of proper 
institutional frameworks and capacity to implement (ibid). Evidence in literature however indicates mixed 
results on performance of the economic incentives in different countries (Fischhendler, 2007). One case in 
point is Colombia’s wastewater discharge program, which has been widely reported as a success story. 
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Other advantages such as flexibility, efficiency, and income generation have been outlined in favor of the 
effluent discharge permits (Blackman, 2009). On the other hand, some of the cons outlined against the 
discharge permit system in literature include, weak implementation stemming from weak institutions and 
regulations, the fees are set too low below the abatement costs and don’t act as an incentive to cut 
pollution any more but rather a means to collect revenue. In cases where the discharge fees are two tiered 
to complement command and control policies, this beats efficiency as some polluters pay higher than 
others and the abatement costs are not equal at the margin (Blackman, 2009). 
 
Currently in the Olifants, mines and industries do not pay any effluent discharge fees; they only operate 
under environmental licenses from the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), which 
identify and evaluate their actual and potential impact on the environment in addition to options for 
mitigation activities, in order to minimize negative impacts and maximize benefits. The DWAF is in the 
process of implementing the effluent permit system in order to execute the polluter pays principle for 
wastewater discharge related uses. Trials are to take place in the year 2015/16 in selected catchments 
(Coleman, 2014). This system will levy a charge on the load of a specific constituent. The envisaged 
structure of the charges includes mitigation charge for water treatment, basic charge paid by all water 
users, and the incentive charge levied on the load. For the Olifants, focus will be on salinity and 
phosphates. Phosphates (eutrophication) remain high but within the acceptable range in the study region. 
This indicates contamination from the catchment activities such as improper fertilizer use and sewage 
discharge into the water; these have however no direct effect on water use (Van Veelen, 2011). Salinity 
levels as indicated by the Electrical Conductivity (EC) are also high but within acceptable and tolerable 
ranges. Trends analyses however show that EC levels are increasing for the entire Olifants and this could 
be detrimental for domestic and irrigation water use. Currently, users only pay the catchment management 
charge levied on all registered users and this applies to the water use described as taking water and not as 
waste discharge (van Veelen, ILISO 2014,). At present in South Africa, registration and licensing are 
ongoing for authorized and existing lawful waste discharge. Only registered waste discharge related to 
water use will be liable to water pollution charges, and this excludes non-point sources. The 
implementation of the waste charge will take effect once registration of licenses, general authorizations, 
and confirmation of existing lawful waste discharge is completed.  
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3.4 Effects of water policies on irrigation water use in the Olifants basin 
3.4.1 Conceptual framework 
Despite great emphasis on IWRM as the way forward to address water management issues of scarcity, the 
proposed IWRM principles continue to exhibit mixed outcomes while some of its effects on water use 
remain unknown (Dungumaro & Madulu, 2003). In South Africa, IWRM principles are embedded in the 
NWA, whereby better water saving and improved water quality are set to be attained through its 
implementation (Kloos, 2010). As a second step in this chapter, this study set out to examine how some of 
the water policies stipulated in the NWA have influenced the anticipated water management goals. 
Specifically, we examine the effects of WUAs, water pricing and compulsory licensing on irrigation 
water quality, quantity, and efficiency (Figure 3.2). The policy effects on water use could be positive 
thereby enhancing attainment of the desired water Act goals, have no effect (status quo), or the water 
users and water resource could be worse off (negative effects). 
In the succeeding sections, we outline the empirical approaches used to attain the given study objective 
for this chapter. The subsequent sections further present the chapter results and discussions.   
 
  
Actors 
Water managers 
(DWAF) 
Irrigation water 
users 
Water Use 
(Quantity, quality, efficiency) 
Water policy 
(Compulsory licensing, 
tariffs, WUAs) 
Other factors 
Demographic 
Institutional 
Economic 
Positive 
effects 
Status  
Quo 
Negative 
effects 
Water Act goals 
(Efficiency, Equity, sustainability) 
Figure 3.2: Conceptual framework on effects of water policies on irrigation water use 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Policy effects on water use 
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3.4.2 Empirical Framework 
We used various approaches to assess the effects of water policies on irrigation water use. Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Tobit and multinomial logit (MNL) 
methods; the choice of the models was informed by the nature of the assessment and the availability of 
data. 
 
3.4.3 Effects of water policy on quantities of water used for irrigation  
An empirical review of literature identifies institutional, socio-economic and demographic factors to 
affect quality, quantity, and efficiency of irrigation water use. Firstly, we run an OLS regression as guided 
by the nature of our first dependent variable being continuous (Irrigation water quantity used per annum 
in m
3
) (Verbeek, 2012). An operational model takes the form: 
 jjyjm                                                                                                             (3.1) 
Where;  
yjm is the total water used in m
3
 per year y, by an irrigation farming household j  
j  is a vector of observable factors likely to influence water use quantities 
j is the unobservable error term. 
 
Following Sadeghi et al., (2012) the implicit form of the structural model linking water quantity used and 
the set of hypothesized independent varibles is as follows:  
 443322110 xxxxWatQusedy                                                  (3.2) 
 
Where; 
yWatQused = quantity of water used in (m
3
 ) per annum  (y) per irrigation farming household  
1x = vector of the water policy interventions (compulsory licensing, water pricing (water costs) and 
WUAs) 
2x = vector of economic heterogeneity factors such as income, farm size, irrigation methods used, main 
occupation, crop choice 
3x = vector of household demographic characteristics such as geographic location, gender, farming 
experience, and schooling years 
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4x = vector of other institutional related factors such as, leadership positions in informal and formal water 
use groups, tenure security, use of ICT tools for water management purposes, technical assistance and 
water quality types 
 = error term 
 
However, we suspected endogeneity
1
 in the model due to reverse causality
2
 between the dependent 
variable (water quantity) and the water quality variable. This would mean that the endogeneous 
explanatory variable is correlated with the error term and OLS in such a case would produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates. This is corrected using an intrumentalvariables
3
 (IV) regression approach, which is 
an extension of OLS. A common way to estimate the IV regression is the two-stage-least-squares 
(2SLS) method. It is a two-step application of the instrumental variables (IV) technique to correct for the 
correlation of the suspected endogenous explanatory variable with the error term in the equation of 
interest. In the first step, the suspected endogenous variable is regressed on all the exogenous 
(predetermined) variables in the model. The values of the suspected explanatory variable predicted from 
the first step are then used as instruments for the suspected endogenous explanatory variable in the 
equation of interest (Wooldridge, 2008). Therefore, we instrumented for water quality with willingness to 
pay for water quality in our IV regression. However, the post estimation tests for endogeneity showed that 
the water quality variable was indeed exogenous and there was no need for IV estimation. Wooldridge 
(2008) suggests that if the suspected endogenous regressors are found to be exogenous, then the OLS 
estimator is more efficient and should be used instead. We retained the OLS estimation for this part of the 
study. 
 
3.4.4 Effects of water policy on irrigation water use efficiency  
Additionally, we examine how water policies amongst other socio economic factors, influence  water use 
efficiency (WUE) of irrigation farmers in the Olifants basin. We posit that WUE can better indicate the 
effects of water policy because it is one of the goals targetted by the South African water policy reform. 
Furthermore, efficiency measures usually indicate the relationship between all outputs and inputs in a 
production process (Díaz et al., 2004). Technical efficiency measures originate from the seminal work on 
technical efficiency by Farrell (1957). He defined it as the ability of a farm to produce the maximum 
                                                          
1 A parameter is said to be endogenous when there is a correlation between the parameter and the error term due to measurement 
errors, omitted variables and simultaneity/reverse causation 
2 Reverse causality arises when the dependent variable causes at least one of the covariates 
3 An instrument is a variable not belonging in the explanatory equation and is correlated with the endogenous explanatory 
variable, conditional on the other covariates. It should not be correlated with the error term in the explanatory equation 
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feasible output from a given bundle of inputs (output-oriented measure) or to use minimum feasible 
amounts of inputs to produce a given level of output (input-oriented measure) (Coelli et al., 2002; Dıaz et 
al., 2004a, b). Sub vector efficiency measures on the other hand generate technical efficiency measures 
for an individual input, in this case is water. The concept of sub vector efficiency examines the possibility 
of reducing a subset of inputs while holding other inputs and outputs constant. 
 
There are two main approaches in literature used for measuring technical efficiency. These are the 
parametric approach also known as the stochastic frontier analysis and the non-parametric approach also 
referred to as DEA (Speelman, et al.,2008;Frija, et al.,2009;Wang, 2010). The parametric approach 
estimates a parametric production function (or its dual cost or profit function) representing the best 
available technology. It also provides a convenient framework for hypothesis testing and the construction 
of confidence intervals. The non-parametric DEA on the other hand uses linear programming methods to 
construct a linear envelopment frontier over the data points. The DEA is considered to have several 
advantages over the parametric approach because firstly, it does not need to assume a functional form for 
the frontier technology (Speelman et al., 2008). Secondly, the constructed surface over the data allows 
comparing one production method with the others through a performance index. Therefore, DEA provides 
a straightforward approach to calculate the efficiency gap that separates each producer’s behavior from 
best productive practices, assessment of which can be from actual observations of the inputs and outputs 
of efficient firms (ibid). The most important advantage of DEA to this study is its flexibility, which 
permits the calculation of technical efficiency for an individual input in a production process (sub vector 
efficiency) (Oude-Lansink et al., 2002). This would otherwise be computationally problematic using the 
stochastic frontier approach as the production technology assumed can limit the efficiency results 
(Speelman et al., 2008; Frija et al., 2009). DEA considers a farm using less inputs as more efficient than 
another which uses more inputs to produce the same amount of output (Speelman et al., 2008). Therefore, 
it simultaneously constructs a production frontier and attains the efficiency measures. The frontier surface 
is a result of piece wise accumulation through solving sequences of linear programming problems, one for 
each farm and in relation to the frontier (ibid). The frontier forms an envelop over the observed input and 
output data points of each farm. 
 
Following Speelman et al., (2008), we give an example of a model where data is available on K inputs 
and M outputs for each of the N farms. Input and output data for the i
th
 farm, are given by the column 
vectors xi and yi, respectively. The K by N input matrix, X, and the M by N output matrix, Y, represent the 
data for all N farms in the sample. Equation 3.3 demonstrates the DEA model to calculate general 
technical efficiency 
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Min θλθ, 
Subject to -yi+Y λ ≥ 0, 
  θ xi –X λ ≥ 0,         (3.3) 
  N1’ λ = 1, 
  λ ≥ 0 
 
Where θ is a scalar, N1 is a vector of ones, and λ is a vector of constants. Using the variables λ and θ, the 
model solves once for each farm, aiming for the largest radial contraction of the input vector xi within the 
given technology. The value of θ corresponding with this contraction is the technical efficiency score for 
the i
th
 farm. This score always lies between zero and one, one showing that the farm lies on the frontier 
and is efficient. The first constraint ensures that output produced by the i
th
 farm is smaller than that on the 
frontier. The second constraint limits the proportional decrease in input use; when θ is minimized to the 
input use achieved with the best-observed technology. The third constraint is a convexity
4
 constraint that 
creates a variable returns to scale (VRS) specification of the model; it ensures a farm is benchmarked 
against farms of similar size. Without the convexity constraint, Equation 3.3 makes up the constant 
returns to scale (CRS) specification. CRS assumes that all farms are operating at an optimal scale, which 
is not possible in reality due to limitations such as finances and imperfect competition (Coelli et al., 
1998). Therefore, the VRS specification is more suitable especially in agriculture where increases in 
inputs do not proportionately result to increased outputs (ibid). 
Equation 3.4 shows the programming problem used to obtain the sub vector efficiency for the variable 
input k (water) for each farm i  
Min θλθ
k
 
Subject to -yi + Y λ ≥ 0, 
  θk xi
k
 -X
k λ ≥ 0, 
  xi
n-k – Xn-k λ ≥ 0,         (3.4) 
  N1’λ = 1, 
  λ ≥ 0 
 
Where, θk is the input k sub-vector technical efficiency score for farm i. The terms xi
n-k 
and X
n-k 
in the third 
constraint refer to xi and X with the k
th
 input (column) excluded, while, in the second constraint, the terms 
xi
k
 and X
k
 include only the k
th
 input. Other variables definitions remain as in Equation 3.3. Constraints 1, 
4, and 5 are the same as in model 1, while constraint 2 and 3 ascertain that a value of θk exists which 
represents a maximum reduction of the variable input k remaining within the technology set and holding 
outputs and all other inputs constant. 
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Figure 3.3 demonstrates the measurement of technical efficiency and sub vector efficiency using DEA. 
The problem takes the i
th
 farm R and radially contracts the input vector, xi, as much as possible, while 
maintaining the feasible input set. The inner boundary of this set is a piecewise linear isoquant (Y
F
) 
determined by the frontier data points. The radial contraction of the input vector xi produces a projected 
point on the frontier surface (R0). This projected point is a linear combination of the observed data points, 
with the constraints in Equation 3.3, which ensure that the projected point cannot lie outside the feasible 
set. The overall technical efficiency measure of farm R relative to the frontier is given by the ratio θ = 
0Ro/0R. The sub-vector efficiency for input X1 (water) is obtained by reducing X1 while holding X2 and 
output constant. This is a non radial concept of input efficiency measurement and it allows for a 
differential reduction of the inputs used (Reinhard,1999). Figure 3.3 shows that R is projected to R1 and 
sub-vector efficiency is given by the ratio θ1 = QR1/QR 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Measurement of technical and sub vector efficiency using DEA 
Source: Mulwa 2006 
 
After obtaining, the sub vector efficiency estimates as outlined above, the estimates were regressed on 
hypothesized correlates of water use efficiency through a second stage relationship using the Tobit model 
(Barnes, 2006; Chavas et al., 2005; Binam et al., 2003). Tobit regression, is an alternative to OLS for 
situations in which the dependent variable is bounded from below or above (or both) either by being 
Q 
O                 C             B                            D  Sub-vector input X1 
YF 
R R1 
Ro 
YF 
YR 
YR 
Conventional 
input X2 
Radial movement 
Non-radial movement 
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censored, or by corner solutions (Frija et al., 2009). The Tobit model was suitable because the efficiency 
parameters vary between zero and one thus termed as censored. The dependent variable lacks a normal 
distribution, since its value lies between zero and one. OLS in this case, would produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates even at asymptotic levels Gujarati (2004). OLS further underestimates the true 
effect of the parameters, and decreases the slope. Tobit analysis therefore uses the maximum likelihood 
estimation methods. The theoretical Tobit model takes the form: 
 
𝑦𝑖
∗ =  𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 ,     𝑖 = 1,2, … . . , 𝑁,           (3.5) 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖
∗      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0 
𝑦𝑖 = 0        𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 0, 
 
Where, 𝑦𝑖
∗ is the latent variable for the i
th
 farm,  𝑥 is the vector of independent variables hypothesized to 
affect efficiency. (𝛽 = 𝛽0, 𝛽1 … 𝛽𝑛) are the unknown parameter vectors related with the independent 
variables for the i
th
 farm. 𝜀𝑖 is the error term, assumed to be normally distributed, and independent of 𝑥𝑖 
(0,𝜎2) with zero mean and constant variance (Verbeek, 2012). This is a censored regression model 
whereby all the negative values map to zeros. The model assumes that there is an underlying stochastic 
term equal to, +𝜀 . The model describes the probability that 𝑦𝑖= zero given 𝑥𝑖 and the distribution of 𝑦𝑖 
given that it is positive; this is a truncated normal distribution. In this case, the efficiency values lie 
between zero and one hence the point of truncation is one and the dependent variable is not normally 
distributed. Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, the empirical model takes the form: 
 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝛽0 +  ∑  𝛽𝑛
𝑛
𝑛=1 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (3.6) 
 
Where, 
0 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 1, 
0 if 𝑦𝑖
∗ <0, and, 1 if 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 1 
 
𝑦𝑖
∗ is the DEA sub-vector efficiency index for water used as a dependent variable. 𝑥𝑖  is a vector of 
independent variables related to attributes of the farmers listed in Table 3.4. 
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3.4.5 Effects of water policy on irrigation water quality  
Technically, water quality is defined as the chemical, physical, biological, radiological, and aesthetic 
characteristics of water (UNESCO/WHO/UNEP, 1996). However, measurement and determination of 
water quality is relative to its intended purpose; hence, it is the ability of water to support all appropriate 
beneficial uses at a given point in time. In general, the parameters of measurement to describe water 
quality are: 
1. Biological: bacteria, algae  
2. Physical: temperature, turbidity and clarity, color, salinity, suspended solids, dissolved solids  
3. Chemical: pH, dissolved oxygen, biological oxygen demand, nutrients (including nitrogen and 
phosphorus), organic and inorganic compounds (including toxicants)  
4. Aesthetic: odors, taints, color, floating matter  
5. Radioactive: alpha, beta, and gamma radiation emitters 
Accordingly, the DWAF has categorized the fitness-for-use of water for various uses using six 
parameters, which give the discrete values that describe a specific effect due to a given set of conditions. 
These are namely: 
i. Electrical Conductivity (EC): This indicates salinization of water resources and serves as a proxy 
for total dissolved solids (dissolved inorganic salts). Salinization affects domestic and irrigation 
water use. Aquatic life is only affected in extreme high levels 
ii. Orthophosphate (PO4-P): Phosphate indicates the nutrient levels in water resources 
(eutrophication). Phosphate has no direct effect on water use but indicates contamination from 
activities in a catchment such as fertilizer use and wastewater discharge. 
iii. Sulphate (SO42): Sulphate is a naturally occurring substance found in mineral salts in the soil, 
decaying plant and animal matter. It is generally not toxic but affects human consumption at very 
high levels.  
iv. Chloride (Cl): It shows the nature of salinity i.e. salty taste and corrosiveness. Mainly affects 
aquatic life and irrigation 
v. Ammonia (NH3-N): indicates presence of ammonia, which is highly toxic to aquatic life even in 
low concentrations. It has no effect on human life and irrigation in the state it occurs in rivers and 
dams 
vi. pH (pH units): It is a measure of the acid-base equilibrium of various dissolved compounds and 
indicates the acidity/alkalinity of water. Water pH only affects water use at the extreme levels.  
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Based on the above values, the DWAF has come up with water quality guidelines or criteria used in 
conjunction with the statistical values to determine the fitness for use. The guidelines provide a 
description of the effect on a user if exposed to increasing concentration or changing values of quality 
components. The description consists of cut off values for each category of fitness for use in relation to 
the specific water use. Therefore, the guidelines show fitness for use of water in consideration of its 
biological, chemical, and physical characteristics. The guidelines have been set into four categories as: 
1. Ideal: the user of the water is not affected in any way 
2. Acceptable: slight to moderate problems are encountered 
3. Tolerable: moderate to severe problems are encountered 
4. Unacceptable: the water cannot be used under normal circumstances 
 
Table 3.3 shows the cut off values for fitness for use range in irrigation activities.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Cut off pollution values categorizing agricultural water use 
variable units Ideal Acceptable Tolerable Unacceptable 
EC mS/m ˂ 40 40-270 270-540 ˃ 540 
pH: upper range 
lower range 
pH units ˃ 6.50 
˂ 8.40 
  ˂ 6.50 
˃ 8.40 
Nitrate Mg/l N - - - - 
Ammonia Mg/l - - - - 
Chloride Mg/l ˂ 100 100-175 175-700 ˃ 700 
Phosphate Mg/l P - - - - 
Sulphate Mg/l - - - - 
Source (Van Veelen, 2011) 
 
Irrigation farmers might not be aware of the exact values attached to each of the guideline categories. 
However, the assumption made in this study is that they are aware of the adverse effects of the water they 
use on their farming activities; following these effects, farmers were therefore able to categorize the water 
they used into the four categories, as they perceived. 
 
Following the outlined categorization of water quality, we used the Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) for 
this section because it allows estimating choice probabilities for many categories (Maddala, 1983; 
Wooldridge, 2002). The dependent variable (water quality) is a multivariate variable with four possible 
categories as outlined by DWAF (Ideal, acceptable, tolerable, and unacceptable). The four categories 
enabled collection of water quality information from farmers, based on their perceptions. The multinomial 
logit model assumes all errors of the alternatives to be independent (independence of irrelevant 
alternatives-IIA) and this ensures the parameter estimates of the MNL model remain unbiased and 
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consistent .i.e. Pj/Pk is independent of the remaining probabilities. However, this is not always the case 
especially if alternatives are very similar (Verbeek, 2012). A test is usually relevant to compare estimates 
from the model with all alternatives to estimates using a subset of alternatives.  
The MNL model takes the form: 
                       𝑃 (𝑦 =
𝑗
𝑥⁄ ) = exp (𝑥𝛽𝑗) ⁄ [1 + ∑ exp(𝑥𝛽ℎ), 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽]
𝑗
ℎ=1
                                    (3.7) 
  
Where y denotes a random variable taking on the values {1, 2, …, J} for a positive integer J; and x denote 
a set of conditioning variables. x is a 1xK vector with first element unity and βj is a K×1 vector with j = 
1,2, …, J. In this study, y denotes water quality (category) status while x signifies hypothesized factors 
influencing farm water quality described in table 3.4. Equation 3.7 above shows the effect of changes in 
an element of x (holding other factors constant), on the response probabilities P(y = j/x), j = 1, 2, …, J. 
This indicates the direction of the effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. Following 
(Sadeghi et al., 2012) the implicit form of the structural model linking water quality  and the set of 
hypothesized independent varibles is as follows:  
 443322110 xxxxWatQlty j                                                          (3.8) 
 
Where; 
jWatQlty  quality of water, j (j=1,2,3,4) used and ranked by an irrigation farmer in the Olifants basin  
1x =  vector of the water policy interventions (compulsory licensing, water pricing (water costs) and 
WUAs 
2x = vector of economic heterogeneity factors such as income, farm size, crop choice, main occupation 
3x = vector of household demographic characteristics such as, geographic location, gender, farming 
experience, and schooling years 
4x = vector of other institutional related factors namely, leadership positions in informal and formal water 
use groups, tenure security, use of ICT tools for water management purposes, and technical assistance  
 = error term 
 
3.4.6 Choice of variables included in the regression models  
Several studies have investigated the relationship between efficient quantities of water use and various 
farm or farmer characteristics (Speelman et al., 2008; Binam et al., 2004; Lilienfeld & Asmild, 2007; 
Frija et al., 2009; Wang, 2010). The farm and farmer characteristics previously examined include age, 
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household size, gender, farming experience, education, involvement in WUAs, farm size, land tenure, 
farmer type, water costs, crop choice, income, farm location, and extension services. A few studies have 
assessed the effect of water pricing on water use efficiency (Wang, 2010), while others  (Speelman et al., 
2008; Frija et al., 2009) have recommended  such assessments between water price/costs and water use.  
Little or no evidence exists of the relationship between water rights and irrigation water use, a gap that the 
current study seeks to fill. 
 
To start with, Speelman et al., (2008), Wannasai & Shrestha, (2008) and Frija et al., (2009) reported that 
tenure secure farmers were more efficient in their water and land use decisions. This finding lays 
emphasis on land reforms in order to foster farm level investments and efficiency. Wang, (2010) found 
out that in China, secure water rights positively influenced water use efficiency; tenure security was 
important in fostering investment in irrigation farming and better water management. Water pricing on 
the other hand financially limits farmers’ water use thus discouraging inefficient use of the resource 
(Wang, 2010). Speelman et al., (2008) suggest that introduction of water charges could be a trigger for 
more efficient water use. Farm size, has been found to both negatively and positively influence water use 
efficiency in several studies; implying the need for more research in this aspect.  Speelman et al., (2008), 
Frija et al., (2009) and  Wang, (2010) reported a negative and significant correlation between farm size 
and water use efficiencies in South Africa, Tunisia and China respectively. Contrary to this, Lilienfeld & 
Asmild, (2007) found that farmers with bigger farm sizes in their study had less excesses of water used 
thus were more efficient. 
 
Farmer activity or occupation has previously influenced farm water use both positively and negatively 
depending on the occupation type. In  Speelman et al., (2008), food gardeners were found to use less 
water compared to other smallholder farm activities. Additionally, farmers who had highly subdivided 
their land used irrigation water less efficiently, due to difficulties experienced in managing such 
fragmented farms. Farmer Crop choice is as well an important determinant of farm water use and 
emphasis is laid on growing crops that have a higher profit per m
3
 of water used
 
(Njiraini & Guthiga, 
2013; Speelman et al., 2008). Irrigation technologies have significantly affected quantities of farm water 
use in the past.  Speelman et al., (2008) found that bucket and hose irrigation methods negatively 
influenced the quantity of water used in farming compared to sprinkler technology. Njiraini & Guthiga, 
(2013) , Frija et al., (2009) found that drip irrigation technique positively influenced water use efficiency. 
On the contrary, Lilienfeld & Asmild, (2007) found that irrigation technologies (center pivot and flood)  
in their study were not strong significant influencers of water use; suggesting that farm management and 
other field techniques mattered more in influencing efficient water use.  
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Age in some studies has been non-significant while it retains a mixed effect in others. For example, 
Lilienfeld and Asmild, (2007), Wadud and White, (2000), Bozoğlu & Ceyhan, (2007) and Binam et al., 
(2003) found that younger farmers in their studies were more water use efficient with less excesses of 
water used while Wang, (2010), and Dhungana et al., (2004) reported older farmers as more water use 
efficient. Locational differences in farming also play a role in  influencing water use quantities either 
positively or negatively; this is attributable to different management styles in in a river basin (Lilienfeld & 
Asmild, 2007; Wang, 2010). Further emphasis is put on the importance of technical assistance for 
farmers, which positively influences water use efficiency; this could be through better extension to create 
awareness on irrigation technology, better water management and timing of water applications (Frija et 
al., 2009). Additional factors positively influencing efficiency of water use are income and education 
(Wang, 2010;Bozoğlu & Ceyhan, 2007). 
 
Given this background of mixed effects of factors influencing water use efficiencies in literature, this 
study seeks to find out the context specific factors influencing water use and efficiency in the Olifants 
basin. In addition to the hypothesized demographic, institutional, and socio economic factors, we include 
selected water policy interventions factors currently undergoing implementation in the study region; this 
is in attempt to assess the effects of water policy on irrigation water use. Table 3.4 gives the list of 
hypothesized factors included in the regression models and their hypothesized effects on water use 
quantities, efficiencies and quality. 
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Table 3.4: List of the variables included in the OLS, Tobit, and MNL analysis 
 Variable 
Description Model and Expected signs 
OLS Tobit MNL 
Water quantity Natural log of Irrigation water quantity used per annum in m
3
 Dependent   
WUE The DEA sub vector water use efficiency measure.   Dependent  
Water quality Water quality type (1=Ideal, 2=acceptable, 3=tolerable, 4=unacceptable) +/-  Dependent 
WUA Farmer involvement in Water User Associations/groups  - + + 
Compulsory licensing Compliance to water licensing - + + 
Water cost/m
3
 Natural log of total cost of irrigation water used based on current paid tariffs  - + + 
Region Farmer geographic location (upper,middle and lower Olifants) +/- +/- +/- 
Leadership in WUA Leadership position held in water use groups/WUA - + + 
Gender Male or female farmer +/- +/- +/- 
Years of schooling Total number of years of school attendance  - + + 
Main occupation Main activity of a respondent (1=largescale, 2=smallscale, 5=other) +/- +/- +/- 
Farming years Total number of years of farming - + +/- 
Farm size Natural log of farm size +/- +/- +/- 
Land claims Proxy for tenure security  +/- + + 
Income Natural log of income +/- +/- +/- 
Technical assistance Source of technical policy information (1=DWAF,0=other sources) - + + 
ICT tool ICT tools used for water management purposes (1= radio,TV,phone,email 0=none) - + + 
Irrigation methods Irrigation technology used (1= center pivot, 2= drip, 3=flood, 4=other,5= sprinkler) +/- +/- +/- 
Perennial crops  Perennial crops grown (citrus, mangoes, grapes, cotton) +/- +/- +/- 
Cereal crops  Cereal crops grown (maize and wheat) +/- +/- +/- 
Vegetables and other Vegetables and other crops (leafy vegetables, peas, potatoes, onions, beans) +/- +/- +/- 
Source: Own compilation
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3.5 Results and Discussion 
 
3.5.1 Effects of water policy on quantities of water used in irrigation: OLS results  
This section discusses the results of the OLS regression given in Table 3.5. The results indicate that 
various factors significantly influence water quantities used by farmers in irrigation farming in the 
Olifants basin. The model fitted the data well and the F statistic (p-value < 0.0000) showed that the model 
was highly significant.  
 
Results indicate that among the three policy variables of interest, water costs and involvement in WUAs 
were significant in explaining irrigation water use. Farmers involved in WUAs were likely to use less 
water quantities for their irrigation activities compared to non-members of WUAs. This finding was in 
line with several other studies which suggested that collective management of natural resources yields 
better management outcomes (White & Runge, 1995; Balooni et al., 2008; Gebremedhin et al., 2004; 
Gorton et al., 2009; Mushtaq et al., 2007 ; van Ast & Boot, 2003; Bekkari, 2008). This is an important 
finding for the South Africa water reform process because the law on formation of WUAs is already 
under review even before its full implementation and effects are realized (Claasen, 2014).   
 
The results further show that farmers who used more water, readily paid the higher costs associated with 
larger quantities of water used. This is contrary to the expectation that a water price induces farmers to 
reduce their irrigation water consumption as suggested by Speelman et al., (2008). Following Frija et al., 
(2011) and  Speelman et al., (2009), we attribute this to very low water tariffs that do not comprise a 
significant percentage of farmer production costs. This further validated the focus group discussions held 
with large-scale farmers who claimed that the current water tariffs were negligible and failed to count as 
part of farm production costs. Reports from the DWAF on the other hand indicated that water tariffs were 
higher but our findings showed that farmers were not currently paying the stipulated higher water tariffs.  
 
The small-scale farmers in this study used less water for their farming activities compared to their large-
scale counterparts. This was due to the subsistence nature of their farming practices.  Income on the other 
hand was positive and significantly influencing quantity of water used. We posit that, farmers with higher 
incomes have an economic upper hand in access to farm inputs hence wider scopes in their farming 
activities and enterprises, which translates to probable higher quantities of water used. Farm size was also 
highly significant in explaining water use quantities; farmers with bigger farm sizes were likely to use 
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more water for their farming activities. Results further showed that perennial crop growers (citrus, 
mangoes, and cotton) were likely to use more water for their farming activities. This could be due to the 
perennial nature of the crops requiring more irrigation per annum unlike the seasonal crops. However, 
careful interpretation of results from this section is necessary because quantities of water used for 
irrigation do not necessarily indicate efficiency or inefficiency. The next section explores water use 
efficiency. 
 
Table 3.5: Effects of water policy on quantities of water used in irrigation: OLS results 
Variable Coefficient Standard error P value 
WUA-membership(1=yes,0=no) -0.506** 0.255 0.049 
Compulsory Licensing compliance(1=yes,0=no) -0.503 0.396 0.206 
Region- Middle Olifants 0.067 0.418 0.873 
Region- Lower Olifants -0.188 0.484 0.699 
Leadership in WUA(1=yes, 0=no) -0.458 0.464 0.325 
Gender(1=male, 0=female) 0.216 0.236 0.361 
Years of schooling 0.023 0.021 0.268 
Main occupation-small scale -1.417*** 0.437 0.001 
Main occupation-other 0.059 0.646 0.928 
Farming years 0.012 0.008 0.159 
Farm size- natural log of farm size 0.003*** 0.001 0.000 
Landclaims (1=yes,0=no) -0.266 0.502 0.597 
Income- ln income 0.077* 0.044 0.082 
Water quality-acceptable 0.121 0.269 0.652 
Water quality-tolerable -0.453 0.309 0.144 
Water quality-unacceptable -0.289 0.392 0.463 
Water cost- ln water cost 0.137*** 0.047 0.004 
Technical assistance (1=DWAF,0=others) 0.376 0.294 0.203 
ICT tool  -0.045 0.236 0.850 
Perenial crop growers (1=yes,0=no) 1.082*** 0.280 0.000 
Cereal crop growers (1=yes,0=no) 0.345 0.295 0.245 
Vegetable crop growers (1=yes,0=no) -0.037 0.232 0.875 
Irrigation method- drip -0.745 0.452 0.102 
Irrigation method-flood -0.445 0.426 0.298 
Irrigation method-other -0.067 0.661 0.919 
Irrigation method-sprinkler -0.341 0.331 0.305 
_cons 7.128*** 0.854 0.000 
N=179 R
2  
=0.797  P=0.000  
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3.5.2 Effects of water policy on irrigation water use efficiency: DEA and Tobit results  
 
3.5.2.1 Water use efficiency results 
Table 3.6 gives a summary of the inputs and output used for the efficiency analysis. It shows a wide 
variation between inputs used and output produced from irrigation farming. This can be explained by the 
subsistence and commercial nature of small scale and large scale farmers studied. 
 
Table 3.6: Summary statistics of inputs and outputs used in the efficiency analysis 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Land(Ha) 39,40 106,43 0,04 690 
Water(m
3
) 70978,14 215345,63 11,25 1408200 
Seeds(ZAR) 6089,78 14462,21 0 91000 
fertilizer(ZAR) 49182,68 331305,18 0 3000000 
pesticides(ZAR) 4912,74 21813,64 0 201500 
Labour(mandays) 93 291,40 4 2412 
Crop output(ZAR) 6806472,13 32936266,52 0 299970000 
Source: own compilation 
 
 
Figure 3.4 indicates the frequency distribution categorized in classes of water use efficiencies obtained 
from the DEA estimation methods. A large percentage of the farmers had low water use efficiency scores; 
17 percent of farmers had efficiency scores below 1 percent, while 35 percent of farmers had their 
efficiency scores between 1 and 10 percent. 21 percent of the irrigation farmers were water use efficient. 
The average overall water use efficiency was 0.31 (31 percent) indicating large inefficiencies in irrigation 
water use.  Accordingly these findings suggested that, if all other inputs were held constant, it would still 
be possible to attain the current outputs using averagely 69 percent less irrigation water. This is in line 
with findings of  Frija et al., (2011) and  Speelman et al., (2009). Following Speelman et al., (2009), the 
results further suggested that, if efficiency was to improve, it would be possible to re  allocate the excess 
water used into other water demands without negatively affecting farm production. The results showed 
that irrigation water use efficiency was low and barely reflected efforts of the current water policy 
reforms. We argue that water policy implementation is still a ‘work in progress’ yet to attain its goals for 
the Olifants basin among many other basins of South Africa. 
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Figure 3.4: Sub vector water use efficiencies 
Source: own compilation 
 
3.5.2.2 Tobit results  
The tobit regression results in Table 3.7 indicate that compulsory licensing positively influenced irrigation 
water use efficiency. This was an interesting result for water policy reform in South Africa, indicating a 
positive step towards attainment of the water reform objectives. This finding implies a call towards more 
widespread implementation of compulsory licensing in order to foster irrigation water use efficiency. The 
positive significance of compulsory licensing on WUE was attributable to the incentive it gives to farmers 
as an entitlement to water hence more efficient water use (Burness & Quirk, 1979). Compulsory licensing 
is a water right and just like any other property right, it fosters security of ownership and encourages farm 
level investments and efficiency (Wang, 2010; Frija et al., 2009; Speelman et al., 2008). 
 
The results further show that farmers with more years of schooling were likely to be more water use 
efficient. This was in line with the findings of Dhungana et al., (2004), Binam et al., (2004) ,Wang, 
(2010), who found that farmers above a certain threshold of schooling years were more likely to be 
efficient in their farming activities. Our findings thus support Schultz (1964) hypothesis that, education 
improves the ability to perceive, understand, and react to new endeavors and nurtures farmers managerial 
skills. Schooling improves access to information from a variety of sources such as newspapers and 
instruction manuals (Rosenzweig, 1995) 
 
Technical assistance has in the past been regarded as a positive driver of water use efficiency (Frija et al., 
2009); Binam et al., 2004; Bozoğlu & Ceyhan, 2007). This study examined technical assistance received 
by farmers and in reference to the sources of such assistance. A surprising result was that, farmers who 
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obtained their technical assistance from the DWAF were less efficient in water use compared to farmers 
who obtained their technical assistance from private companies, WUAs and their fellow farmers. This 
could mean that DWAF is not as efficient as the private companies and WUAs in disseminating technical 
information to irrigation farmers. This was in line with the findings of Binam et al., (2004) who attributed 
it to bureaucratic inefficiency, poor program design and generic inherent weaknesses in public operated 
systems. More so, the top down approach used by government systems is ineffective in improving farmer 
knowledge and more participatory approaches are preffered. 
 
Crop choice significantly affects water use efficiency and previous studies recommend growing crops that 
have higher profit returns per unit (m
3
) of water used (Speelman et al., 2008; Njiraini & Guthiga, 2013). 
The findings from this study indicate that vegetable and cereal crop growers were less water use efficient. 
However, comparison of crops in terms of profit per unit (m
3
) of water used was beyond the scope of this 
study. 
 
Table 3.7: Effects of water policy on irrigation water use efficiency: Tobit results 
Variable Coefficient Standard error P value 
WUA-membership(1=yes,0=no) 0.073 0.064 0.258 
Compulsory Licensing compliance(1=yes,0=no) 0.389*** 0.133 0.004 
Region- Middle Olifants 0.002 0.118 0.921 
Region- Lower Olifants -0.116 0.129 0.370 
Leadership in WUA(1=yes, 0=no) 0.048 0.164 0.770 
Gender(1=male, 0=female) -0.035 0.064 0.587 
Years of schooling 0.011* 0.006 0.057 
Main occupation-small scale 0.098 0.131 0.457 
Main occupation-other -0.010 0.175 0.955 
Farming years 0.002 0.002 0.449 
Farm size- ln farm size 0.000 0.000 0.266 
Landclaims (1=yes,0=no) 0.012 0.117 0.916 
Income- ln income -0.002 0.016 0.921 
Water cost- ln water cost -0.021 0.013 0.118 
Technical assistance (1=DWAF,0=others) -0.246** 0.100 0.015 
ICT tool  0.020 0.058 0.732 
Perenial crop growers (1=yes,0=no) 0.006 0.123 0.963 
Cereal crop growers (1=yes,0=no) -0.169* 0.087 0.054 
Vegetable crop growers (1=yes,0=no) -0.282** 0.113 0.014 
Irrigation method- drip -0.085 0.157 0.588 
Irrigation method-flood -0.084 0.171 0.623 
Irrigation method-other -0.025 0.249 0.922 
Irrigation method-sprinkler -0.016 0.162 0.922 
_cons 0.717** 0.333 0.033 
N=179 R
2  
=0.216  P=0.0001  
Source: Own compilation 
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3.5.3 Effects of water policy on irrigation water quality: Multinomial Logit (MNL) results 
We estimated a multinomial logit model (MNL) to assess the factors influencing water quality used in 
irrigation farming in the Olifants basin. Among them, we included water policy factors to assess their 
effectiveness on water quality status amid the NWA implementation process. Table 3.8 gives the results 
of the MNL regression. The dependent variable (water quality) was a multivariate variable with four 
possible quality categories as outlined by DWAF and perceived by the farmers in this study. These are 
namely: (Ideal (good) - the water has no effect on the user in any way, acceptable (moderate)-slight to 
moderate problems exist, tolerable (bad)-moderate to severe problems encountered and unacceptable 
(very bad) - highly unusable water). The acceptable (moderate) category is used as a base category hence 
we describe the results for the remaining three categories. Estimation of the MNL regression model used 
maximum likelihood procedures. The chi statistic (p-value < 0.0000), suggests that the model fit the data 
well and is highly explanatory. 
 
Ideal water quality 
For the ideal water quality category, the number of farming years, occupation and farming of cereals 
significantly explain water quality. More farming years negatively affected good water quality while 
involvement in activities other than farming and growing of cereal crops also negatively related to good 
water quality. 
 
Tolerable water quality 
Farmer location, occupation, cereal, and perennial crop farming significantly influenced tolerable water 
quality. Results indicate that, irrigators from the middle and lower Olifants were less likely to use water 
of tolerable quality compared to their upper Olifants counterparts. Respondents who were engaged in 
other nonfarm activities were more likely to use water of tolerable quality compared to the commercial 
irrigation farmers. Farmers growing perennial crops were less likely to use water of tolerable quality in 
comparison to those who did not engage in perennial crops farming. Cereal crop farmers on the other 
hand were more likely to use water of tolerable quality unlike none cereal growers. 
 
Bad water quality  
The results indicate that farmers compliant to compulsory licensing, those involved in WUAs/informal 
water use groups, and the leaders in these groups were less likely to use very bad quality water. This was 
in line with Shah, (2002) who reported positive and significant effects on water use, under cooperative 
irrigation management in WUAs. The study results further indicate that farmers who paid high costs for 
their water were less likely to use bad quality water; we suggest that given their ability to pay higher costs 
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for higher water quantities used, these farmers could be in a position to treat their water for farming 
activities before use. The exporting farmers in the study region were indeed observed to treat their water 
beforehand for their farming activities. The results further show that, small-scale farmers and individuals 
involved in other non-farm activities were more likely to use water of bad quality compared to their large 
scale counterparts. Additionally, the results indicate that farmers with large farm sizes were less likely to 
use bad quality water; these were mainly the commercial scale farmers.  Khalkheili & Zamani, (2009) 
suggested that large-scale landholders have more stakes to loose hence the incentive to find alternative 
coping strategies. 
 
Farmers with more schooling years and farming experience were less likely use bad quality water 
probably because they had discerned ways of differentiating and coping with different water qualities for 
their farm activities given their knowledge and experience. We further found that farmers faced with 
tenure insecurities were less likely to use bad quality water and this could be due to their minimal 
investments in farming activities thus not much water used in agriculture. Shah, (2002), and Adger & 
Luttrell, (2000) suggest that insecure property rights limit farmers from making any major investments in 
their farming activities. Our results also indicate that recipients of technical assistance information about 
water policy from DWAF and extension agents were more likely to use water of bad quality, which was a 
surprising result from this study. However, this could point out to weak extension services or the fact that, 
the policy process has not yet attained full implementation and desirable results. Farmers in the middle 
and lower Olifants were more likely to use water of very bad quality compared to those in the upper 
Olifants region. This was attributed to their location in the downstream part of the basin; Cardenas, (2009) 
suggested that location of water users along a river basin is a determining factor in the appropriation of 
the resource.  Lastly, our results show that cereal growers were less likely to use bad quality water. 
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Table 3.8: Effects of water policy on irrigation water quality: MNL results 
Source: Own compilation 
 Ideal quality 
 
Tolerable quality 
 
Unacceptable quality 
 
Variable Coeff Se P Coeff Se P Coeff Se P 
Region-middle Olifants 1.142 1.181 0.334 -2.368* 1.270 0.062 6.780*** 2.594 0.008 
Region-lower Olifants 0.135 1.297 0.917 -1.612* 0.958 0.092 7.422*** 2.732 0.007 
WUA-membership (1=yes,0=no) -0.807 0.514 0.116 -0.238 0.694 0.731 -4.953*** 1.862 0.008 
Compulsory Licensing compliance (1=yes,0=no) 0.971 1.201 0.419 1.795 1.215 0.140 -7.625*** 1.820 0.000 
Leadership in WUA (1=yes,0=no) 0.742 0.914 0.417 -0.297 0.828 0.720 -3.915** 1.554 0.012 
Gender (1=male,0=female) 0.232 0.457 0.613 0.896 0.574 0.119 -0.732 1.148 0.524 
Years of schooling -0.041 0.045 0.367 0.019 0.053 0.725 -0.168* 0.107 0.096 
Main occupation-small scale -0.683 0.819 0.405 0.457 1.593 0.774 10.738*** 2.936 0.000 
Main occupation-other -0.094* 1.201 0.058 2.974* 1.645 0.071 17.951*** 4.428 0.000 
Farming years -0.050** 0.022 0.022 0.012 0.020 0.571 -0.082** 0.039 0.039 
Land claims (1=yes,0=no) 0.885 0.836 0.284 -0.465 1.298 0.720 -18.504*** 1.455 0.000 
Technical assistance (1=DWAF,0=others) -0.096 0.869 0.912 1.281 0.864 0.138 3.245** 1.504 0.031 
 ICT tool for water management (1=yes,0=no) 0.285 0.461 0.536 0.145 0.589 0.805 -0.530 0.999 0.596 
Water cost-ln water cost 0.000 0.000 0.405 -0.000 0.001 0.882 -0.923*** 0.190 0.000 
Perennial crops grown (1=yes,0=no) -1.013 1.140 0.374 -1.508* 0.879 0.086 -0.226 1.698 0.894 
Cereal crops grown (1=yes,0=no) -0.972* 0.514 0.058 1.879** 0.911 0.039 -2.268** 1.009 0.025 
Vegetable crops grown (1=yes,0=no) 0.911 0.925 0.325 1.102 0.844 0.192 5.617* 3.124 0.072 
Farm size-ln farm size 0.003 0.002 0.185 0.001 0.002 0.516 -0.211*** 0.057 0.000 
Income-ln income -0.025 0.125 0.860 -0.053 0.099 0.592 -0.161 0.120 0.179 
_cons 1.228 2.355 0.602 -3.004 2.453 0.221 -23.803*** 7.855 0.002 
N=179 R2       = 0.263 P = 0.0000  
N by water category: Acceptable=60 Ideal=52 Tolerable=31 Unacceptable=36 
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3.6 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
IWRM is now a popular approach to address issues of water management given rising water scarcity. 
However, literature lacks enough evidence of the effect of the proposed water principles on water use and 
its management. Some mixed outcomes exist while the effects of some of the associated policies remain 
unknown. In the beginning of this chapter, we examined the organizational structure of institutions 
involved in management and implementation of the 1998 South African water Act. This was in effort to 
shed light on who influences the activities of the water policy process, the governance structure for the 
actors, rules setting procedures, institutional interactions, and possible challenges of water policy 
implementation. The South African government has set up three main tiers of water management at the 
national, regional, and local levels. The water management tiers are under the jurisdiction of the water 
minister through DWAF, CMAs, and WUAs respectively. However, despite the stipulated roles for each 
of the bodies, so much power was still vested with the minister of water affairs who had authority over 
most water activities at all the three levels (Bourblanc & Blanchon, 2013). Power struggles, among other 
factors remained adamant and seemed to be the obstacle in the way of the NWA implementation (ibid). 
We recommend streamlining of the organizational structures involved in water management in order to 
address challenges facing the current water reforms. 
 
Secondly, we reviewed several of the stipulated water policies in the Act and highlighted on their past, 
present, benefits, costs, and possible challenges to implementation. Apparently, none of the investigated 
water policies was in full operation in the Olifants basin at the time of this study. We found that some 
progress was manifest for water pricing and compulsory licensing while formation of WUAs seemed 
partial in operation. However, some discrepancies in water pricing existed between water users and the 
water authorities that indicated flawed implementation. Water trade was non-operational for the Olifants’ 
basin farmers while payment for effluent discharges by industry and mining is yet to kick off.  
 
Thirdly, the study used regression methods to examine the effects of water policies among other factors’, 
on water use quantities, quality and water use efficiency in irrigation farming in the Olifants basin. Water 
use efficiency was assessed using DEA methods and the results indicated that irrigation farmers in the 
Olifants were water use inefficient; the average water use efficiency was only 31 percent suggesting 
major room for improvement and water re allocation. Various demographic, socio economic and 
institutional factors influenced water use quantities, efficiency, and quality. The OLS results showed that, 
involvement in WUAs, occupation, farm size, level of income, water costs and crop choice significantly 
influenced water use quantities of farmers. The Tobit results showed that compulsory licensing, schooling 
87 
 
years, technical assistance, and crop choice influenced water use efficiency. The MNL results on the other 
hand indicated that, compulsory licensing, involvement in WUA, and water costs among other factors 
negatively influenced the use of bad quality water. Use of ideal water quality was explained by farming 
experience and cereal farming while tolerable water quality, was significantly explained by farmer 
location, main occupation and crop choice. 
 
We conclude that the array of factors influencing the various aspects of irrigation water use, should guide 
policy towards better water management; this is especially so for the examined water policy reform 
factors of compulsory licensing, WUAs and water pricing. For example, the highly significant positive 
effect of compulsory licensing on water use efficiency highlights the importance of water rights and lays 
emphasis on water reforms. The water rights ensure farmers have entitlement to the water they use and 
promote water use efficiency. Current water prices on the other hand do not seem to encourage water 
saving as farmers comfortably pay the corresponding costs for higher quantities of water used. We 
recommend a review of the current tariffs and strict implementation of the same. Other factors such as 
technical assistance point to the needed improvement in extension service and alternatives of information 
dissemination. Schooling points to the importance of capacity building though it is a difficult target for 
policy in the short run. In the short term, farmers can best learn from the practices of their efficient 
counterparts, possibly through extension tools such as farmer field days.  
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Chapter Four 
4. Impacts of water pricing and water rights on farmers’ welfare 
4.1 Introduction 
In many parts of the world, irrigated agriculture is a pathway into developing competitiveness in the 
agricultural sector and encouraging rural development (Bazzani et al., 2005). However, conflicts arise due 
to water scarcity and existing competition between sectors and users. The increased worldwide water 
scarcity and its associated negative impact on agricultural production has therefore been the center of 
attention among policy makers and scholars (Yanget al., 2003). Various Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) policies have in return been suggested to address the water scarcity situation  and 
streamline irrigation water use (Yang et al., 2003;  Speelman et al., 2009). IWRM strategies are envisaged 
to bring major changes in water resource management and more so, in irrigation farming. Water rights 
and water pricing are such policies under IWRM, highly prioritized in the policy agenda of many water-
scarce countries such as South Africa. The policies are envisioned to regulate water scarcity in various 
ways and eventually improve water use efficiency and conservation (Yang et al., 2003; Varela-Ortega, 
1998). South Africa, having been ranked among the World’s water scarce countries by UNESCO-
WWAP, has made attempts to control the existing and foreseen water shortages through implementation 
of the country’s Water Act (Muller & Schreiner, 2009). The implementation process has however been 
slow and laden with numerous challenges (Muller & Schreiner, 2009). Nevertheless, the stipulated  
reforms in the water Act are expected to have major impacts on water management, welfare of resource 
users and other aspects of the South African economy (Hassan & Thurlow, 2011; Muller & Schreiner, 
2009; Diao et al., 2005;  Speelman et al., 2009).  
 
Appropriate water pricing tariff structures would be a way forward to meeting the social, political, and 
economic water goals amid scarcity, competing uses, and rising populations (Rogers, Silva, & Bhatia, 
2002). Proponents of water pricing policy argue that it creates awareness of water scarcity to farmers and 
creates incentives for them to move towards more efficient water use (Frija et al., 2011). It results in 
reduced quantities of water demanded and efficient water reallocation to populations previously not 
served hence nurturing equity (Molle et a., 2008). When the water price reflects the true cost of water, it 
fosters sustainability in water use because users assign it to the most valuable uses and this reduces 
demands on the resource base (Rogers et al., 2002). Increases in water prices also lead some farmers to 
lease out their land to better investors while others  invest in better water-saving technologies (Frija et al., 
2011; Molle et al., 2008). Additionally, water pricing fosters managerial efficiency through increased 
revenues which can be used for improvement of water infrastructure and capacity building of stakeholders 
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(Molle et a., 2008). Despite the many benefits accruing to water pricing, this policy tool is unlikely to be 
feasible for all stakeholders especially resource poor farmers (Speelman et al., 2009). Water pricing may 
lead to reduced yields and food insecurity due to abandoned production, which results in lost revenues, 
financial vulnerability and risk associated with possible alternatives (Molle et al., 2008 ; Speelman et al., 
2009; Gomez-Limon., 2004 ; Speelman et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2003). These mixed results of water 
pricing in literature give room for more context specific analysis to inform policy and decision-making 
especially in countries undergoing water reforms such as South Africa. 
  
Water rights, on the other hand, have increasingly received recognition for their importance in water 
management. This is because properly defined water rights enhance the value of the water resource 
through fostering water productivity, equity in water allocation, optimization of benefits from investments 
in water supply, and improvement in rural livelihoods thus poverty alleviation (Speelman et al., 2010). On 
the contrary, non-clear water rights result in high transaction costs of water use decisions and inhibits 
water use efficiency (Speelman et al., 2010). In South Africa, water rights instituted through compulsory 
licensing act as strategies towards efficiency, equity, and sustainability in water use. Despite the 
envisioned benefits, research on the possible impact of compulsory licensing on water users welfares is 
lacking. Previous studies have mainly focused on the inequities of the compulsory licensing process such 
as insecurity of water licenses and limited transferability ( Backeberg, 2006; Gillitt et al., 2005).  
It is evident that water pricing and water rights policies/principles play important roles as instruments to 
address water scarcity issues. Knowledge and understanding of their contribution and impact on water 
savings and on people’s incomes is important for present and future policy analysis and decision making 
(Varela-Ortega, 1998). Therefore, following Roibás et al., (2007), we argue that the suitability of any 
policy for natural resource management depends on the gains or losses in welfare it generates to the target 
populations. 
 
Current literature from different parts of the world contains a mixture of varying impacts of different 
water policies on people’s welfare. In Italy, for example, Bartolini et al. (2007) found that water pricing 
had a lower effect on welfare compared to policies of agricultural market scenarios such as world and 
regional markets. Water prices only worked to reduce water use for the annual less water intensive crops. 
Berbel & Gómez-Limón (2000) found a negative impact of water pricing on farm income, crops grown, 
and employment in the short run for Spanish irrigation farmers. Similar findings were reported by Riesgo 
& Gómez-Limón (2006) for the Douro basin of Spain where a water pricing policy reduced farmers' 
incomes. In northern china, water pricing had failed to incentivize water conservation due to a shift 
towards high value yet water intensive crops (Yang et al., 2003).  Frija et al., (2011) reported endangered 
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small-scale farmer livelihoods due to increases in water prices in Tunisia. The small-scale farmers 
resulted to using more land and less water while their technically efficient large-scale counterparts could 
easily afford higher water prices. Similarly, water price increases adversely affected smallholder farmers 
in Limpopo, South Africa which in turn affected their ability to pay for water rights reforms (Speelman et 
al., 2010). In the Northwest province of South Africa, small-scale farmers responded to water price 
increases by reducing quantities of water used in farming. However, the price increases were not 
sustainable because the farmers could not afford thus negatively affecting their farm profits (Speelman et 
al., 2009). In the Jordan valley, Molle et al., (2008) reported that water pricing was only effective in 
recovering the operation and maintenance costs incurred for water management. Moreover, findings from 
Seville, Spain indicated that water price increases resulted in less welfare losses compared to supply cuts. 
Nevertheless, water prices still caused welfare losses (Roibás et al., 2007). Irrespective of the mixed water 
pricing outcomes, most of these studies recommended a favorable water price applied in combination 
with wider agricultural policies in order to reduce adverse effects on small-scale farmers. Rogers et al., 
(2002) suggest that water pricing can only attain its foreseen goals if water resources management takes 
place in an integrated approach whereby the legal, economics, and environmental facets complement each 
other. Research on the impact of water rights on water users’ welfare is however lacking in literature. 
 
Previous studies assessing the relationship between water policies and water users’ welfares focus on 
either single policies, one type of farming, or use case study approaches which make it difficult to 
generalize policy recommendations for wider areas. The current study seeks to broaden the scope by 
simultaneously assessing the impacts of water rights and water pricing on the welfare of both large-scale 
and small-scale farmers’ in the Olifants basin, using a representative farm approach. The current study 
bases on the Expected Utility Theory (EUT), which incorporates uncertainty in farmer decisions rather 
than pure profit maximization like in previous studies. Additionally more crops are considered for the 
analysis and differentiated between large scale and small scale farmer crops. Section 4.2 outlines the 
empirical framework ,4.3 describes the data used, 4.4 discusses the results while section 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2. Empirical Framework 
 
4.2.1 Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
Two major approaches have previously been used to assess welfare impacts of policy: econometric 
models that rely on time series data, and mathematical programming models  that are based on cross 
sectional data (Sadiddin, 2009). The former are advantageous because the supply and demand functions 
indicating market equilibriums and prices help to understand the overall behavior of the agricultural 
sector and its sub sectors. However, difficulties associated with econometric methods lie in data 
problems. Firstly, there is usually need to obtain own and cross price elasticities of supply functions 
estimated. Secondly, the process requires sufficient degrees of freedom in the time series data used – this 
is difficult to obtain especially for developing countries (Hazell and Norton, 1986 quoted in Sadiddin, 
2009). Thirdly, using econometric models to analyze current and alternative policies is troublesome due 
to economic structural changes such as policy or external shocks. This implies that it is usually almost 
impossible to base the policy analysis on extrapolations from historical data when considering newer 
policies (Hazell and Norton,1986). Fourthly, econometric models require assumptions of competitive 
markets which does not necessarily apply for many commodities especially in the developing world 
(Sadiddin, 2009). Lastly, the case of household modelling is not applicable to the commercial farming 
sector which does not consume its own output  (Taylor & Adelman, 2003). 
 
Mathematical programming models overcome these problems because they are based on cross sectional 
data with a high level of detail. The supply functions provide the necessary information to estimate 
derived demand functions of inputs; therefore allowing tracing impacts of policy on both outputs and 
derived demand of agricultural inputs such as water and labor (Hazell & Norton, 1986). However, it is 
important to carefully choose the objective function and the constraints since they greatly impact on the 
results of mathematical programming (Sadiddin, 2009). To represent the cross effects present in the 
agricultural sector, which is usually hard to capture with econometric models, mathematical programming 
models are combined with a representative farm approach, which allows reducing the amount of data 
needed. A representative farm approach is important because outcomes of a policy are dependent on 
reactions of individual actors which are in turn influenced by farm structure in terms of resource 
endowments, technology, geographical location, and many other forms of classification (Hazell & 
Norton, 1986; Sadiddin, 2009; Walter, 2010). The representative farm approach further increases ability 
of the mathematical programming to measure aggregate impact of policy for specific regions depending 
on their characteristics such as location and resource endowments. 
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Mathematical programming models have previously been used to address problems in the irrigation sector 
whereby assumptions are usually made with regard to farmers’ objectives (Bazzani et al., 2005; Berbel & 
Gómez-Limón, 2000a; Bartolini et al., 2007). Previous studies have maximized farm profit – captured as 
the farm gross margins – subject to constraints such as land, labor, and water use in attempt to derive the 
impact of agricultural related policies on farm incomes and welfare (Berbel & Gómez-Limón, 2000a; 
Bazzani et al., 2005). However, maximising farm profit fails to incorporate risk and uncertainty faced by 
farmers. This study incorporates uncertainty of farmer decisions by  maximizing farmers’ utility of 
expected income subject to production constraints. Physical and financial constraints, uncertainties arising 
from variations in yields, prices, and policy, are all important in a farm's decision-making process 
(Sadiddin, 2009). Farmers try to balance the possibility of negative outcomes rather than maximize profits 
due to uncertainty (ibid). It is therefore important to include risk and/or uncertainty in farm modeling to 
match farmer behavior. 
 
The Expected Utility Theory (EUT) developed by Von Neuman and Morgestern (1944) is one of the most 
established decision theories in economics. This theory predicts that risky or uncertain prospects are 
ranked by their expected utility (Hazell & Norton, 1986; Sadiddin, 2009). It is based on four axioms 
fulfillment of which does not restrict the utility function of the decision maker to a particular functional 
form but rather leaves it open  to suit choice of that which best describes farmer behavior or 
computational ease when dealing with a large number of farmers. The four axioms are:  
(i) Ordering - whereby a decision maker faced with two risky prospects a and b, chooses one of them 
or remains indifferent between the two  
(ii)  Transitivity whereby if there is a third option c and the decision maker prefers b to c, then it's 
likely that they prefer a to c or indifferent between the two choices  
(iii) Continuity which states that if there exists three lotteries a, b and c and a is preferred to b while b 
is preferred to c, then there should be a possible combination of a and c such that a decision 
maker is indifferent between this mix and b 
(iv) Independence which states that if an individual prefers a to b and there exists a third risky 
outcome c, a lottery giving a and c is preferred to b and c (Harderker et al., 2004 cited in 
Sadiddin, 2009). 
 
The mean variance analysis approach, which presumes that farmers base their choices on expected 
incomes and the associated variances, is widely used for the execution of the expected utility theory 
(Hazell & Norton, 1986; Sadiddin, 2009). It assumes that expected utility of farm income is measureable 
through certainty equivalence. Certainty equivalence is equal to the expected farm income (Gross Margin) 
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less income variation. Previous studies (Backeberg, 2006; Gillitt et al., 2005) in South Africa indicate 
that, less investment in irrigated agriculture is associated with uncertainty stemming from insecure water 
licenses and prices. Therefore, following Sadiddin, (2009), the current study employed the mean variance 
analysis approach to approximate the EUT. Other alternative theories such as prospect theory and 
cumulative prospect theory criticize the EUT on basis of choice behaviours that may violate either of the 
four axioms giving rise to unpredictable preferences. However, these alternative theories combine 
perceptions and preferences which both affect behavior under risk or uncertainty through a mean 
variance; which is what the EUT does. This then implies that non of the alternative theories are 
empirically superior to the EUT. 
 
4.2.2 The Mathematical Programming Model 
This study used farm-level models (taking into consideration farm characteristics) to simulate farmer 
reactions towards different water prices and compulsory licensing fees. Scenarios help to depict what is 
feasible at the farm level rather than for prediction purposes, i.e. the scenarios give insights about the 
future. The mathematical programming techniques result in optimal cropping mixes and farm activity 
combinations for the two types of representative farms studied (small scale and large scale). Models set 
up signify each of the representative farms. Characterization of farmers into representative homogenous 
farms allows to reduce bias found in fully aggregated models (Gómez-Limón & Riesgo, 2004). This is 
because the two categories of farmers are dissimilar with regard to farm sizes, level of investments, crops 
grown, farm technologies, and income. Each farm type maximized the expected utility of agricultural 
income subject to constraints of land, labor, and water. The year 2013 is the reference year for the data in 
this study and acts as the baseline. Water tariffs and compulsory license fees simulations are therefore 
conducted, and compared to baseline results 
 
A representative farm maximizes the expected utility of farm income 𝐶𝐸 in the objective function 4.1, 
subject to land (4.13), labor (4.14), and water (4.15) constraints. 𝐶𝐸 is the certainty equivalence of the 
corresponding expected farm income (GM) measured in South African Rand (ZAR). 𝐺𝑀 is the Gross 
Margin and the measure of expected farm income in ZAR. 𝑅𝐴𝐶 is the absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient 
incorporated to estimate the uncertainty in making farm decisions. It is assumed to take a value for which 
the optimal solution gives cropping mixes as close as possible to the observed data.  𝑉𝑎𝑟 is the variance 
of farm income in ZAR, which is a product of farm output(𝑄𝑗𝑄𝑘) and the covariance of prices  (𝜎𝑗𝑘 ) 
calculated in equation 4.3.  
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐶𝐸 = 𝐺𝑀 − 𝑅𝐴𝐶 ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑟       (4.1) 
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Equation 4.2 calculates the farm gross margin as the total farm revenue (𝑅) in ZAR less the farm variable 
costs (𝑉𝐶)            
𝐺𝑀 = 𝑅 − 𝑉𝐶          (4.2) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟 = ∑𝑗  ∑𝑘  𝑄𝑗𝑄𝑘𝜎𝑗𝑘        (4.3) 
The farm output of the j-th product (𝑄𝑗) in Kgs was estimated as: 
𝑄𝑗 =  ∑𝑦 ∑𝑐  𝑋𝑐 ∗ 𝑌𝑐,𝑗,𝑦         (4.4) 
Where, 𝑋𝑐 is the level of cropping activity chosen in the optimal solution to represent the cultivated area 
of the c-th crop in Ha.  𝑌𝑐,𝑗,𝑦 is the unit yield coefficient representing the amount of j-th product 
obtainable from one unit of the c-th cropping activity in Kgs/Ha in year y. Therefore, equation 4.4 gives 
the total output produced for each product in year 2013. 
The farm revenue given in equation 4.5, was estimated as a product of the j-th farm output and the 
expected price (𝐸𝑝𝑗) of the j-th product in ZAR. The expected price (𝐸𝑝𝑗) on the other hand is estimated 
by multiplying the price (𝑃𝑠𝑗,𝑛) of the j-th product (ZAR /Kg) when the n-th state of nature takes place, 
by the probability of the n-th state of nature taking place (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑛). Ten states of nature(𝑠𝑛), were assumed 
(each with a probability of occurrence) in order to generate a matrix of prices for each product output as a 
way to introduce uncertainty into the model. Equation 4.6 gives the expected price for each product useful 
in calculating farm revenue. 
𝑅 =  ∑𝑗 𝑄𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑝𝑗         (4.5) 
𝐸𝑝𝑗 =  ∑𝑛 𝑃𝑠𝑗,𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑛        (4.6) 
The covariance of prices(𝜎𝑗𝑘 ) of the k-th and j-th products in ZAR was calculated by the variance –
covariance matrix of the product prices given in equation (4.7); the obtained covariance of prices was 
used to calculate the variance of the total farms’ income earlier in equation 4.3. 
𝜎𝑗𝑘 =  ∑𝑛 (𝑃𝑠𝑗,𝑛−𝐸𝑝𝑗) ∗ (𝑃𝑠𝑘,𝑛−𝐸𝑝𝑘) ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑛      (4.7) 
The total variable costs are given as:  
𝑉𝐶 = 𝐹𝑐1 + 𝐼𝑐 + 𝐿𝑐 + 𝑊𝑓        (4.8) 
Where 𝐹𝑐1 is the cost of seeds, fertilizers, and other chemicals in ZAR, 𝐼𝑐 is the total cost of water in 
ZAR, 𝐿𝑐 is the cost of hired labor in ZAR and  𝑊𝑓  is the licensing fee in ZAR  per farming household. 
Equations 4.9 through to 4.12 are the variable cost components. 
𝐹𝑐1 =  ∑𝑐   ∑𝑓 𝑋𝑐 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑓,𝑐 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑓,𝑐           (4.9) 
𝐼𝑐 = ∑𝑡  ∑𝑐  𝑋𝑐 ∗ 𝐷𝑞𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑝          (4.10)  
𝐿𝑐 = ∑𝑡  ∑𝑐  𝑋𝑐,𝑡𝐻𝑙𝑎𝑏 ∗ 𝑊ℎ        (4.11) 
𝑊𝑓 = 𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒        (4.12) 
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Where, 𝑋𝑐 is the level of cropping activity chosen in the optimal solution to represent the cultivated area 
of the c-th crop in Ha.  𝐼𝑛𝑓,𝑐 are the physical inputs unit requirements (seeds, fertilizers, chemicals) for 
the f-th input of the c-th cropping activity in Kg/Ha. 𝑃𝑟𝑓,𝑐 are the input prices defining price of the f-th 
input used for the c-th cropping activity in ZAR /kg. 𝐷𝑞𝑐𝑡 are unit requirements of water for the c-th 
cropping activity in the t
th
 month in M
3
. 𝐷𝑝 is the price of water in ZAR / M3, 𝐻𝑙𝑎𝑏 is the amount of hired 
labor (workers) while 𝑊ℎ is the wage rate for hired labor in ZAR /worker. 
 
The inequality constraints for the model are given in equation 4.13 through to 4.15.The land constraint is 
given as:  
 ∑𝑐  𝑋𝑐 ∗ 𝐿𝑟𝑐 ≤ 𝐿         (4.13) 
Where, 𝐿𝑟𝑐 is the unit requirement of land for the c-th cropping activity in Ha, and 𝐿 is the total farm size 
in Ha. It means that the total cropped land must not exceed the total farm size. The labor constraint is 
given as: 
 ∑𝑐  𝑋𝑐 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑐,𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑡 + 𝐻𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑡       (4.14) 
Where, 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑐𝑡 is the unit requirement of labor for the c-th cropping activity in the t
th
 month, and 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑡 is 
the family labor available in the t
th
 month. This implies that the total labor use per month must not exceed 
family labor and additional hired labor available. Lastly, the water quantity constraint is estimated as: 
 ∑𝑐  𝑋𝑐 ∗ 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑐,𝑡 ≤ 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑡        (4.15) 
Where 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑐,𝑡 is the unit requirement of water for the c-th cropping activity in the t
th
 month, in m
3
 per 
Ha. 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑡 is the irrigation water available in the t
th
 month in M
3
. The equation indicates that the amount of 
water used in a month must not exceed that which is available for use in that given time period.  
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4.3 Data 
A field survey of the Olifants elicited data from large-scale/commercial and small scale irrigation farmers 
in the basin. We define small scale as farms operating on less than ten hectares while the large-scale 
farms were operating on land areas above ten hectares (Kloos, 2010). Chapter two of the thesis outlines 
the sampling procedure. Data used included physical inputs quantities, input prices, output quantities, 
output prices, land requirements for crops, wage rates, water licensing fees, water tariffs, and the risk 
aversion coefficient. We identified the crops grown by the two farming typologies and for each, 
calculated averages for all the data required. Large-scale farmers' crops included citrus, maize, grapes, 
onions, peas, wheat, summer vegetables, and winter vegetables. Small-scale farmer crops on the other 
hand included maize, mangoes, onions, peas, potatoes, and vegetables grown in summer and winter. 
Small-scale water use estimations based on capacities of pumps used to draw water from the rivers and 
the frequency of irrigation in non-metered cases. Local experts and extension agents further verified the 
small-scale water used quantities. Since some small-scale farmers do not pay the normal water tariff price 
to DWAF, we used the cost of fuel and electricity incurred for pumping water; we divided this by the 
cubic meters of water used to obtain price per cubic meter of water used by the small-scale farmers. 
Large-scale farmers reported their water use quantities and prices, with further verification from the 
respective irrigation boards. Labor was expressed in terms of man-days used per cropping activity while 
wage rates were averages of money paid per employee per month.  
 
Yields and their prices were the averages of yields and prices respectively given by farms. Variability in 
prices of outputs introduced uncertainty in the model. We used the gauss-hermite quadrature method to 
generate a matrix of prices for each output assuming ten states of nature, each having an attached 
probability of occurrence. The assumption on prices is a lognormal distribution to ensure that they take 
non-negative values. The result is a set of ten prices for each product and their associated probability. We 
assumed land and machinery costs as fixed costs.  
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4.4 Results and discussion 
4.4.1 Model Validation  
Model validation is important in any empirical analysis as it improves model performance and problem 
insight (McCarl & Spreen, 2011). A model can either be validated by construct or by results; construct 
validation assumes that the model is properly built based on previous research and theory but does not 
involve any testing. Validation by results compares model solutions to the real observed outcomes. 
Therefore, in any validation process, construct precedes results validation. However, both remain 
subjective as it remains the modeler’s decision on the validity of tests, criteria for the tests, what outputs 
to validate and data choice. Nevertheless, a validated model reveals its strengths and weaknesses which 
are important to users (McCarl & Spreen, 2011). Sadiddin, (2009) suggests that a mathematical 
programming model is only suitable for prediction purposes once validated to ensure that it replicates the 
observed data as close as possible. The validation process targets at getting the results of the optimal 
solution as close as possible to their observed equivalents for the variables chosen. In this study, we 
compared the quantities of outputs produced by farms, to the optimal level quantities attained by the 
model farms for the two farming typologies. We used the risk aversion coefficient for this purpose. Our 
model incorporated uncertainty into farmer behavior by assuming that the expected utility of farm income 
incorporates absolute risk aversion to portray farmers’ behaviors towards uncertainty. Thus, a higher risk 
aversion coefficient indicates a more risk averse farmer. 
 
McCarl & Spreen, (2011), show numerous ways to estimate the risk aversion coefficient. For this study, 
we estimated the risk aversion coefficient such that the difference between the optimal model solution and 
observed farmer behavior was minimized (Hazell & Norton, 1986; McCarl & Spreen, 2011; Sadiddin, 
2009). Therefore, we solved the model for the two farm types using an iterative process and selecting 
numerous values of risk aversion coefficients (0.05,0.01,0.001,0.005,0.0001) until we arrived at values 
that gave the optimal solutions closest to the observed data as indicated in Table 4.1 below. 
 
Table 4.1: Mathematical programming model validation 
Smallscale crops Risk aversion coefficient_0.0001   
crop name observed output data optimal solution percent change 
Maize 2442,32 2342,32 -4,09 
Mangoes 2468,80 2468,80 0,00 
Onions 2887,60 3287,60 13,71 
Peas 800,00 800,00 0,00 
Potatoes 343,77 343,77 0,00 
VegS 2315,93 2315,93 0,00 
vegW 1104,92 1104,92 0,00 
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 Risk aversion coefficient _0.0001   
Largescale crops observed output data optimal solution percent change 
Citrus 25000,00 24316 -2,74 
Grapes 21298 20307 -4,65 
Maize 2500,00 2531  1,24 
Onions 18500,00 18033 -2,52 
Peas 3137,21 3049 -2,81 
Wheat 3219,38 3016 -6,32 
VegS 12500,00 12158 -2,74 
VegW 36022,50 35273 -2,08 
Source: Own compilation 
 
4.4.2 Impact of increasing water Tariffs on farmers’ welfare 
The effect of water pricing on welfare and other resource use is expected to differ by region given spatial 
diversity between regions and types of cropping patterns (Berrittella & Rehdanz, 2005 ; Diao et al., 2005). 
In this section we discuss the impact of water pricing and compulsory licensing on farmers welfares and 
water demand in the Olifants basin. Farm gross margins and certainty equivalents are used to show the 
changes in farmers’ incomes due to changes in water prices and compulsory licensing fees. The year 2013 
was our baseline year solved using the currently incurred water prices. Subsequent water price and license 
fees simulations were then performed in comparison with the baseline results to assess their impact on 
farm welfare and irrigation water demand. We calibrated our model starting at intervals of 50 percent 
price increases following the envisaged DWAF water prices. 
 
The results (Table 4.2) indicate that gross margins of a small scale farmer declined by about 2.7 percent 
due to a 3000 percent increase in water price. This was equivalent to about 3 percent decline in the 
expected utility of income for small scale farmers. The increase in water tariffs further increased small 
scale farmers total farm production costs from 0.6 to 39.8 percent. The results show that similar increases 
in water tariffs for the largescale farmers resulted in lower impacts on their farm welfares and gross 
margins compared to their small scale counterparts. The decline in largescale farmers’ expected utility of 
income and gross margins ranged from 0.02 -1.57 percent. The rise in water tariff costs for the largescale 
farmers accounted for about 2.25 percent of increase in total farm production costs which was far less 
compared to the 39 percent increase in production costs for the small scale farmers. This gave the 
impression that existing water tariff costs were insignificant for largescale farmers production costs, a 
finding that was corroborated by our expert interviews and FGD’s results.  
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Table 4.2: Impact of water pricing on farmers' welfares 
Smallscale farmers 
Tariff_ZAR %increase 
in tariff 
Certainty 
equivalence 
Change 
in 
welfare 
%change 
in 
welfare 
Grossmargin 
(GM) 
Change 
in GM 
%change 
in GM 
Total 
prodn’ 
costs 
Change 
in total 
costs 
%change 
in total 
costs 
0,44 Baseline 332072   373988   25277   
0,66 50 331920 -152 -0,05 373836 -152 -0,04 25429 152 0,6 
0,88 100 331768 -304 -0,09 373684 -304 -0,08 25581 304 1,2 
1,1 150 331616 -456 -0,14 373532 -456 -0,12 25733 456 1,8 
1,32 200 331464 -608 -0,18 373381 -608 -0,16 25885 608 2,4 
1,54 250 331312 -760 -0,23 373229 -760 -0,20 26037 760 3,0 
1,76 300 331160 -911 -0,27 373077 -911 -0,24 26188 911 3,6 
2,2 400 330857 -1215 -0,37 372773 -1215 -0,32 26492 1215 4,8 
2,64 500 330553 -1519 -0,46 372469 -1519 -0,41 26796 1519 6,0 
5 1036 328923 -3149 -0,95 370839 -3149 -0,84 28426 3149 12,5 
10 2173 325471 -6601 -1,99 367387 -6601 -1,77 31878 6601 26,1 
15 3309 322018 -10054 -3,03 363934 -10054 -2,69 35331 10054 39,8 
Largescale farmers 
Tariff_ZAR %increase 
in tariff 
Certainty 
equivalence 
Change 
in 
welfare 
%change 
in 
welfare 
Grossmargin 
(GM) 
Change 
in GM 
%change 
in GM 
Total 
prodn’ 
costs 
Change 
in total 
costs 
%change 
in total 
costs 
0,36 Baseline 997647   1995409   512504   
0,54 50 997454 -193 -0,02 1995023 -386 -0,02 512647 143 0,03 
0,72 100 997261 -386 -0,04 1994637 -772 -0,04 512791 287 0,06 
0,9 150 997068 -579 -0,06 1994251 -1158 -0,06 512934 430 0,08 
1,08 200 996875 -772 -0,08 1993865 -1544 -0,08 513078 574 0,11 
1,26 250 996682 -965 -0,10 1993479 -1930 -0,10 513221 717 0,14 
1,44 300 996489 -1158 -0,12 1993093 -2316 -0,12 513364 860 0,17 
1,8 400 996103 -1544 -0,15 1992321 -3088 -0,15 513651 1147 0,22 
2,16 500 995717 -1930 -0,19 1991549 -3860 -0,19 513937 1433 0,28 
5 1285 992676 -4971 -0,50 1985467 -9942 -0,50 516191 3687 0,72 
10 2663 987333 -10314 -1,03 1974781 -20628 -1,03 520136 7632 1,49 
15 4034 982005 -15642 -1,57 1964124 -31285 -1,57 524052 11548 2,25 
Source: Own compilation
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Figure 4.1 depicts the impact of rising water tariffs on the expected utility of income. It is evident that 
though the change in welfare is minimal, the smallscale farmers are more adversely affected by a rise in 
water tariffs compared to their largescale counterparts. This result is in line with the findings of   
Speelman et al., (2010) Speelman et al., (2009)  and Frija et al., (2011) who reported adverse effects on 
small scale farmers’ welfares and livelihoods due to increase in water prices.  
 
Figure 4.1: Impact of rising water tariffs on farmers welfares 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
4.4.3 Impact of increasing water Tariffs on irrigation water demand 
The results indicate that water demanded for irrigation is somewhat inelastic for the two types of farmers 
investigated (Figure 4.2). Specifically, the small-scale farmers, water demand remains unchanged given 
tariff price rises. We attribute this to the nature of the less water intensive crops they grow and tendency 
to shift to rain fed crops as suggested by (Gómez-Limón & Riesgo, 2004; Berrittella & Rehdanz, 2005). 
The responsiveness of farmers’ water demands to changes in irrigation water prices is a function of many 
factors as suggested by Yang et al., (2003). Some of these include prevailing market conditions, lack of 
enforceable water rights, availability of substitute crops, possibility of opportunities outside agriculture, 
farmer self-sufficiency, freedom of decision making in production, and rural-urban economic 
development. For example, involvement of farmers in water management and decision making, results in 
higher responsiveness to price changes (Yang et al., 2003). Theoretically, increasing the price of a 
resource is expected to create incentives for better management and improve economic efficiency and 
welfare by triggering demand (Yang et al., 2003).  However as observed in our study findings, this does 
not always apply for agricultural water use (Yang et al., 2003). Previous studies have indicated that water 
pricing results in economic, environmental, and social impacts but only when the elasticity of water 
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demand is reactive to water price changes (Berrittella & Rehdanz, 2005). Inelastic water demand curves 
as observed for the small-scale farmers in this study have little impact on water use behavior. However, 
the price changes affect farmers’ incomes (ibid). In cases of very inelastic water demand curves, water 
pricing would only be suitable for ensuring full water cost recovery rather than water conservation 
(Bartolini et al., 2007). Nevertheless, the prices should not be too high to be met by the system (ibid).  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Small scale and large-scale water demand with increase in prices 
Source: Own compilation 
 
The results further indicate that the large-scale farmers’ water demand is moderately elastic (Figure 4.2 
and 4.3). We observe slight reductions in quantities of water demanded by the large-scale farmers albeit at 
very high prices. This implies that farm income would have to decline significantly higher before 
affecting water demand and consequently conservation. Following Schoengold et al., (2006) we argue 
that this could be as a result of overly subsidized water prices which do not give rise to much significant 
responses in water demanded due to price changes. Additionally, Frija et al., (2011) and  Speelman et al., 
(2009) suggest that when water costs are insignificant in relation to total farm production costs like for the 
case of largescale farmers in this study, the quantity of water demanded remains less responsive to price 
changes. Gómez-Limón & Riesgo, (2004) and Berrittella & Rehdanz, (2005) suggest that the small 
changes in the quantity of water demanded can be attributed to a shift in crop choices to less water 
intensive ones which are less profitable, adoption of improved irrigation technologies that save on water 
and less land put into production.  
 
The results further indicated a reduction in the quantities of outputs produced by the largescale farmers, at 
higher water prices as water use declined. In such a scenario, the resulting lost incomes due to reduced 
output production in the agricultural sector may be seen as a transfer of revenue to other sectors since the 
water saved maybe put into productive use in other sectors such as industry, recreation, and urban uses 
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(Gómez-Limón & Riesgo, 2004 ; Berrittella & Rehdanz, 2005). However, if the water saved is put into 
less valuable uses, this would imply less efficient allocation of resources due to water pricing. Figure 4.4 
indicates the resulting individual fall in quantities of output produced by crop as water tariff prices 
increase. Figure 4.5 indicates the average reduction in quantities of outputs over all crops as water tariff 
prices increase. Results further indicated a slight gradual decline in labor and land allocated to the 
cropping activities as water prices increased and water use declined.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Large-scale water demand with increased prices 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Reduced output quantities due to increased water prices 
Source: Own compilation 
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Figure 4.5: Percent reduction in average output quantities due to increased water prices 
Source: Own compilation 
 
4.4.4 Impact of compulsory licensing fee increases on farmer welfare 
Current compulsory license fees in the Olifants basin are a constant charge of R 114 per farm per annum. 
Using this as our baseline, we vary the licensing fee by percent increases at intervals of 10 and 50 percent. 
Figure 4.6 shows that compulsory licensing fees increases result in smaller changes in welfare compared 
to water tariff increases (Figure 4.1). This is so despite the compulsory license fees being higher amounts 
than water tariff charges.  This is due to the nature of the compulsory licensing charge being a single lump 
sum payment per annum unlike water tariffs, which are applicable per unit of each cubic meter of water 
used by farms. Specifically, the adverse effect of compulsory license fee increases is more severe on 
small-scale farmers’ welfares, which reduce by 0.18 percent at 500 percent increase in compulsory license 
fees. On the other hand, large-scale farmers’ welfare declines only by 0.006 percent at 500 percent 
increase in license fees (Figure 4.6). This implies that small-scale farmers would be harder hit by license 
fee increases than the large-scale farmers would. We further compare increases in compulsory license 
fees to total costs incurred in production activities. We report that for both categories of farmers, the 
compulsory licensing fees increases comprise a small percentage of the total costs of production (less than 
one percent). However, the compulsory license fees increases comprise a bigger part of the small-scale 
farmers’ total production costs in comparison to the large-scale farmers’ production costs (Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.6: Impact of compulsory license fee increases on farmers' welfares 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Percent changes in total production costs due to changes in license fees 
Source: Own compilation 
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4.5. Conclusions and policy Recommendations 
Welfare effects remain the basis of policy analysis (Slesnick, 1998). Reactivity of farms to changes in 
water prices determines if pricing policy can be used to improve water management (Bazzani et al., 
2005). Findings from this study indicate a very low elasticity of water demand for the largescale farmers 
and an inelastic demand for small scale farmers. If the reactivity of farms is very low like in this study, 
the use of pricing instruments would only lead to loss of incomes without major changes in water 
consumption (Bazzani et al., 2005). This is because, as it is observed in this study, the change in water 
demanded occured only at very high prices (ibid). According to Berbel & Gómez-Limón, (2000a), this 
implies that water pricing single handedly applied as an instrument to reduce irrigation water use would 
not be effective. The impact of this would be unfavorable especially for small scale farmers in areas that 
are heavily reliant on irrigated agriculture for their livelihoods (Berbel & Gómez-Limón, 2000a). Water 
pricing therefore, would work but only if water demand is elastic and other policies are in place to support 
the resource poor farmers to adopt to changing water prices (Frija et al., 2011). 
 
Economically, this study finds a moderate reduction in farmers’ incomes thus welfare due to water pricing 
and compulsory licensing for both categories of farmers investigated. The negative impact on welfare is 
more adverse for the small-scale farmers than the large-scale farmers. We recommend additional policies 
to complement the existing water policies and support especially the small-scale farmers. Given the small 
elasticity of water demanded for the large-scale farmers, and the small percentage of production costs 
represented by water costs, we suggest a tiered pricing strategy for this category of farmers where water 
rates vary when amount of water used exceed certain thresholds. However, caution should be taken to 
avoid very high declines in farmer incomes which would reduce competitiveness of the agricultural sector 
thus economic sustainability (Gómez-Limón & Riesgo, 2004).  
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Chapter Five 
5. Conclusions 
5.1 Synopsis  
South Africa as a water scarce country recognizes the fact that it is no longer possible to augment existing 
water supplies. The country has therefore intensified efforts to come up with and implement more 
efficient water management practices to meet growing demand from competing users and uses. The 
country’s National water Act targets to revolutionize water management in the country through 
devolution from the central government to the community by establishment of catchment management 
areas and water user associations. It stipulates economic instruments such as compulsory licensing, 
effluent discharge permits, water pricing, and water trade for better water management. However, 
implementation of the envisaged policies continues to face challenges. Water users continue to encounter 
water allocation and services related problems such as poor quality and distribution. Therefore, in order to 
inform and guide the water policy reform in South Africa, this study found it important to examine the 
effects, impacts, and transaction costs of selected water policies in South Africa, specifically the Olifants 
basin. We presume that water management policies affect the efficiency, quantity, and quality of 
irrigation water use and have significant effects on the welfare of irrigation water users. Additionally, we 
argue that significant transaction costs characterize and could inhibit the water policy implementation and 
compliance processes. 
 
Chapter two of this study followed a framework by McCann & Easter, (2004) and McCann et al., (2005) 
to measure transaction costs and further used OLS regression methods to assess the determinants of 
transaction costs. Findings indicate that sizeable transaction costs accrued to both water users and water 
managers (varying between 13 and 29 percent of total water budget costs over the ten year period 
examined). Transaction costs were high for the widely implemented policies but they fairly decreased in 
the course of policy implementation. Very high start-up transaction costs were associated with the non 
operational policies such as water trade and effluent discharge permits. We conclude that different levels 
of transaction costs for the different water policies existed and could be contributing factors to inefficient 
policy implementation and compliance. Various determinants such as water pricing, membership in 
WUAs and use of ICT for water management significantly influenced transaction costs incurred by water 
users. The study further highlighted possible transaction benefits of the water policies and recommends a 
more empirical approach in order to gain a deeper understanding of transaction benefits. 
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In chapter three, we used various regression techniques (OLS, Tobit, and Multinomial Logit) to assess the 
effects of water policy and other socioeconomic factors on irrigation water use. Water use efficiency was 
assessed using DEA methods and the results indicated that irrigation farmers in the Olifants were water 
use inefficient; the average water use efficiency was only 31 percent suggesting major room for 
improvement and water re allocation. Among the various assessed factors, we find that compulsory 
licensing positively and significantly influenced water use efficiency while farmers involved in WUAs 
were likely to consume less water for irrigation. Water pricing on the other hand did not limit irrigation 
water consumption because farmers were likely to pay higher prices for their continued water use. Results 
further indicated that farmers compliant to water pricing, compulsory licensing and membership in 
WUAs, were less likely to use bad quality water, suggesting that these water policies could actually foster 
use of good quality water. The beginning of the chapter examined the organizational structure of 
institutions involved in management and implementation of the South Africa water Act, in effort to shed 
light on who influences the activities of the water policy process, the governance structure for the actors, 
rules setting procedures, institutional interactions, and possible challenges of water policy 
implementation. Findings indicate that despite having attained some level of decentralization, so much 
power remained in the hands of the minister of water affairs to authorize most water activities at all the 
management levels. 
 
Chapter four presents the results of the mathematical programming approaches based on the Expected 
Utility Theory, which was used to assess the impact of compulsory licensing and water tariffs on the 
welfare of irrigation water users. Rising water tariffs had a negative though minimal impact on farmers’ 
welfares. Small scale farmers were however more adversely affected by rising water tariffs and license 
fees compared to their largescale counterparts. Water demanded for irrigation was somewhat inelastic to 
price increases for the two types of farmers investigated; the large-scale farmers’ water demand was 
however moderately elastic as there were slight reductions in quantities of water consumed due to water 
price increases. An inelastic demand to price changes implies that the use of pricing instruments would 
only lead to loss of incomes without major changes in water consumption. Compulsory licensing fees 
increases on the other hand resulted in smaller changes in welfare compared to water tariff increases. 
 
The study findings inform water policy and equip decision makers with evidence-based ideas in water 
management for the Olifants basin and beyond. Firstly, the various relevant factors affecting transaction 
costs, water use-quantity, quality, and efficiency can act as policy indicators towards better water policy 
reform and management. The existence of different levels of transaction costs for the different water 
policies is important feedback to guide water policy design in South Africa. In terms of the organizational 
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structures, power struggles seemed to be an obstacle in the way of the NWA implementation and required 
streamlining. Farmers’ welfares on the other hand moderately reduced due to rising water tariffs and 
compulsory license fees. The negative impact on welfare was however more adverse for the small-scale 
farmers than the large-scale farmers; this study recommends a tiered pricing strategy where water rates 
vary when amount of water used exceeds certain thresholds. Additionally, we conclude that elasticity of 
water demand is necessary for water pricing to be effective in reducing water use and enhance 
conservation. 
 
5.2 Study limitations, and suggestions for future research 
Limitations to this study mainly lay in the data collection process due to the sensitivity of the water and 
land reforms in South Africa. It was difficult to obtain responses to survey questions as irrigation water 
users were reluctant to attend to survey questions while ministry staff hesitated to avail information. 
Although focus group discussions conducted with leaders of water use groups, extension personnel, and 
farmers, substantiated the farmer interview responses; it would be interesting to see future research based 
on larger sample sizes. In the second chapter, we quantify transaction costs of the water policy process 
but only highlight on the possible transaction benefits. This could be a good starting point for future 
research on transaction benefits in water management. 
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7. Appendix 
7.1 The GAMS model 
$title waterpolicyc2 model for the Olifants 
$OFFUPPER 
 
Sets 
x fixed factors of the farming systems /land, rac / 
*rac is the risk aversion coefficient 
 
t month 
*Months of the year, many parameters are given by month 
 
 / jan, feb, mar, apr, may, jun, jul, aug, sep, oct, nov, dec / 
 
c the set of crops that are cultivated 
/ maize2, mangoes2, onions2, peas2, potatoes2, vegs2, vegw2 / 
 
* c1 (c)  crops for commercial farmers 
*/citrus1, maize1, grapes1, onions1, peas1, wheat1, vegs1, vegw1 / 
c2 (c) crops for smallscale farmers 
 / maize2, mangoes2, onions2, peas2, potatoes2, vegs2, vegw2 / 
 
sn the set of states of nature /1*10 / 
*assumption is that farmers face ten states of nature as a way to introduce 
*uncertainty in their farming activities 
 
p products: each product is composed of one crop 
/ maize2, mangoes2, onions2, peas2, potatoes2, vegs2, vegw2 / 
 
ty   year /2013 / 
 
in input 
/ seeds, fertilizer, insecticides / 
 
* This set is just to allow repeating the set of products 
alias (p,pp) ; 
 
$ontext these parameters and the following equations aim to allow: 
1- the calculation of the mean prices of all products 
2- the calculation of variance-covariance matrix of the prices of all products 
3- the above two will allow to calculate the total revenue variance of a farm 
type,which will be used in calculating the certainty equivalent which is the 
objective function to be maximised in our model. 
$offtext 
 
parameter 
mean(p) average prices of products 
covar(p,pp)  variance-covariance matrix of prices of various products ; 
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*matrix of prices calculated assuming a lognormal distribution 
*these are the prices of products in different states of nature 
table price(p,sn); 
 
Parameter prob (sn) probability of each state of nature for prices (they sum up to one) 
/   1    0.0000043107 
    2    0.0007580709 
    3    0.0191115805 
    4    0.1354837029 
    5    0.3446423349 
    6    0.3446423349 
    7    0.1354837029 
    8    0.0191115805 
    9    0.0007580709 
    10    0.0000043107  / ; 
 
mean(p) = sum(sn, price(p,sn)*prob(sn)); 
covar(p,pp) = sum(sn,(price(p,sn)-mean(p))*(price(pp,sn)-mean(pp))*prob(sn)); 
 
display mean, covar ; 
 
* parameters which will be connected to their equivalents at the farm type level 
parameter 
 
famlab(c,t)  family labour availability by month 
yield(p,ty)  yields of different crops 
watereq(c,t) water requirements per month for different crops 
laboureq(c,t) labour requirements per month for different crops 
iinputs(in,c) physical inputs requirements for different crops 
hlab (c,t)    hired labor per month 
landreq (c,t) land requirements per month for different crops 
priceinp(in,c) prices of various inputs 
 
*land1 farm size per hectare for commercial farmers 
land2 farm size per hectare for smallscale farmers 
rac the risk aversion coefficient 
f water license fee 
qlt willingness to pay for quality 
*waterav1 average irrigation water available per month for commercial farmers 
waterav2 average irrigation water available per month for smallscale farmers 
*hwage1 hired labor wage rate for commercial farmers 
hwage2 hired labor wage rate for smallscale farmers 
*watprce1 price of water by cubic meter for commercial farmers 
watprce2 price of water by cubic meter for smallscale farmers 
*mchineryc1 machinery maintenance and additional costs per annum for commercial farmers 
*mchineryc2 machinery maintenance and additional costs per annum for smallscale farmers ; 
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*model variables 
variables 
xcrop(c) cropping activity                 (hectares) 
quantity(p) quantity produced by product   (kg) 
revenue  total average revenue             (R) 
labcost labour cost                                (R) 
water water consumption                    (cubic meter) 
labour total labour employed               (workers) 
hlabour hired labour employed            (workers) 
flabour family labour used                  (workers) 
inputcost inputs variable costs             (R) 
*mchinerycost  machinery maintenance cost   (R) 
irrcost the costs of irrigation water      (R) 
waterfee licensing fee                          (R) 
totcost total variable costs                    (R) 
totvariance total income variance        (R) 
grossmargin gross margin                    (R) 
certequiv certainty equivalent              (R) ; 
 
positive variables xcrop(c); 
 
equations 
*landbal1(t)   land balance commercial              (hectares) 
landbal2(t)     land balance smallscale                 (hectares) 
laborbal(c,t)   labour balance                               (workers) 
*watercon1(t)  water constraint commercial       (cubic meter) 
watercon2(t)    water constraint smallscale          (cubic meter) 
 
output(p)       quantity accounting by product       (kg) 
arev              average revenue accounting             (R) 
inpcosts        input cost accounting                        (R) 
*watercost1  water cost accounting commercial    (R) 
watercost2    water cost accounting smallscale       (R) 
*alab1          labour cost accounting commercial    (R) 
alab2           labour cost accounting smallscale       (R) 
 
cost            total costs accounting                           (R) 
totvar         total income variance accounting         (R) 
GM           gross margin accounting                        (R) 
CE            certainty equivalent accounting              (R)    ; 
 
* the equations are classified in three main groups 
* the first includes the constraints equations 
* the second includes the objective functions equations 
* the third includes results equations 
* the constraints equations 
 
* land constraint: total cultivated area by month must not exceed the farm size 
*landbal1(t)..sum(c, xcrop(c)*landreq(c,t)) =l= land1 ; 
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landbal2(t)..sum(c, xcrop(c)*landreq(c,t)) =l= land2 ; 
 
* the sum of total labour used by month must not exceed the available family 
* labour plus hired labour in the same month 
alias (c,cc); 
laborbal(c,t)..sum(cc, xcrop(cc)*laboureq(c,t)) =l= famlab(c,t) + hlab(c,t); 
* the sum of irrigation water used by month must not exceed the available water 
* in the same month 
*watercon1(t)..sum(c, xcrop(c)*watereq(c,t)) =l= waterav1 ; 
watercon2(t)..sum(c, xcrop(c)*watereq(c,t)) =l= waterav2 ; 
 
*accounting equations to form the elements of the objective function 
* this equation is to calculate the quantity produced by product 
output(p)..quantity(p) =e=  sum(ty, sum(c, xcrop(c)* yield(p,ty))); 
 
* this is to calculate the total revenue taking into account price variation 
* and probability parameter 
arev..revenue =e= sum(p,quantity(p)*mean(p)) ; 
 
* this is to calucalate physical input costs (fertilizers, seeds, insecticides) 
inpcosts..inputcost =e=  sum(in, sum(c, xcrop(c)* iinputs(in,c) *priceinp(in,c))); 
 
* this is to calculate water costs (water) 
*watercost1..irrcost =e= sum(t, sum(c, xcrop(c)* watereq(c,t) *watprce1)) ; 
 
watercost2..irrcost =e= sum(t, sum(c, xcrop(c)* watereq(c,t) *watprce2)) ; 
 
* this is to calculate the cost of hired labour 
*alab1..labcost =e= sum(t, sum(c, xcrop(c)*hlab(c,t)*hwage1)); 
 
alab2..labcost =e= sum(t, sum(c, xcrop(c)*hlab(c,t)*hwage2)); 
 
* this is to calculate total costs 
cost..totcost =e= inputcost + irrcost + labcost + f + qlt; 
 
* this is to calculate the variance of the total farm revenue 
totvar..totvariance =e= (sum(pp,sum(p,quantity(pp)* covar(p,pp)*quantity(p)))) ; 
 
* this is to calculate the total gross margin 
GM..grossmargin =e= revenue - totcost ; 
 
* this is the objective function: it is the certainty equivalent 
CE..certequiv =e= grossmargin - rac*totvariance ; 
 
*landrequirements by farm type ,crop, month in ha 
table landreq (c,t); 
 
*prices of inputs by farm type,crops,inputs in R/ha 
*machinery maintenance with additional costs are given in R/annum 
 
table priceinp (in,c); 
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scalars 
f water license fee in Rands per farm per annum /114/ 
qlt willingness to pay for quality in Rands per cubic meter /0.6/ ; 
 
parameter 
*   hwage1      / 3196.81 / 
   hwage2       / 666.19 / 
*   watprce1    / 0.36 / 
   watprce2     / 50.0/ 
*   waterav1   / 16490 / 
   waterav2     /  2500 / 
*   land1        /  218.3 / 
   land2         / 3.8 / 
*mchineryc1 / 6229314.97 / 
*mchineryc2  / 4108.61 /   
*yields of crops in kgs/ha by farm type, crop, product 
table yield (p,ty); 
 
* irrigation requirements by farm type, crop,and month (cubic meters/hectare per month) 
table watereq(c,t); 
 
*labour requirements by farm type, crop,and month(workers/ha) 
table laboureq (c,t) ; 
 
*family labor availability by farm type, crop,and month(workers/ha) 
table famlab (c,t) ; 
 
*hired labor available by farm type, crop,and month(workers/ha) 
table hlab(c,t); 
  
*input requirements (quantities of inputs in kgs/ha) by farm type, crop 
*citrus, mangoes and grapes seeds are given in seedlings 
 
table iinputs(in,c) ; 
 
Model waterpolicy farm level model /all/; 
 
 rac = 0.0001 
 
 solve waterpolicy using nlp maximizing certequiv; 
 
display landbal2.l, laborbal.l, watercon2.l, quantity.l, revenue.l, inputcost.l, irrcost.l, labcost.l, totcost.l, 
totvariance.l, grossmargin.l, certequiv.l ;   
execute_unload 'sstariff16.gdx',landbal2.l, laborbal.l, watercon2.l, quantity.l, revenue.l, inputcost.l, 
irrcost.l, labcost.l, totcost.l, totvariance.l, grossmargin.l, certequiv.l ;   
execute '=gdxviewer sstariff16.gdx'; 
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7.2 Survey Questionnaire 
 
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS, POLICY, AND ICT IN WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE OLIFANTS BASIN 
February 2014  
Confidentially 
This survey collects detailed information on water use in the Olifants WMA from Large scale and small-scale farmers, industry and miners. The 
data will not only be important for the project but it will also comprise a PhD thesis from the University of Bonn, Germany in collaboration with 
University of Pretoria . The survey seeks to examine the role of different water policies and community involvement in water conservation, 
evaluating the impact of the different water policies on commercial and small-scale holders' welfares, examining TCs and the potential role of ICT 
in water management. Results from this study will be used to inform and guide water policy reform in South Africa. Herewith it is guaranteed that 
any information obtained from this survey that relates to any identifiable business will not be revealed. The data will be used for research 
purposes only! 
 
Q1 Enumerator names  
Q2 Date of interview (dd. mm. yyyy)  
Q3 Interview start time (hh. mm)  
Q4 Interview end time (hh. mm)  
 
  Codes  
 Province 1= Gauteng, 2= Mpumalanga, 3= Limpopo 
 Region 1= Upper  2= Middle 3= Lower 
 
MODULE A- RESPONDENT AND SITE IDENTIFICATIONNB: the respondent should be the household head/spouse or the firm manager/owner. They 
should also engage in water use activities in their farm/firm operations 
A1 Name of respondent   
A2 Position held (A2 codes)  
A3 Telephone number (with dialing code)  
A4 Email address  
 
A2 Codes; 1-household head, 2- spouse, 3-firm owner ,4-firm/farm manager, 5-other(specify) 
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A5. What is the distance to the nearest market center from your farm (km) (i)where you buy inputs.......................(ii)where you sell outputs............. 
 
A5a. Name of market…………………………………………………………………………………… 
A5b. Transport cost to market by public transport(a) to and fro……………………(b) by private means…………………… 
A5c. Distance to the nearest internet facility (i) outside the firm/farm(estimate in km)………………………………(ii) within farm……………….. 
A5d. Distance to nearest electricity hook up (estimate in km)…………………………………………………….... 
A6. Are you a member of any Water User Association (WUA) or group? 1=Yes…………..0=No……………… (If No, proceed to A8) 
A6a. If yes, what is the name of the WUA/group……………………………. 
A6b. When did you join? (Year)........................................................................  
A6c. When was the WUA established?.........................years of operation since establishment............................ ....... 
A6d. How many members are you in the WUA?.............................Of these, how many are 1=male......................2=female………………………... 
A6e. What are the requirements for a new member joining your association? 1=size of land owned, 2=location of their land, 3= pay membership fees 
4=type of water use activity they undertake/sector, 5= language, 6= others (specify) 
A6f. What is the minimum and maximum number of ha required for each member? 
1=minimum………………………..2=maximum………………………….. 
A6g. Do you hold any leadership position in your group? 1=Yes…………..0=No……………… 
A6g1. If yes, which one? 1=chairperson, 2=vice chairperson, 3= secretary, 4=treasurer, 5= other (specify) 
A6h. What are the group activities? 1=manage water allocation, 2=Maintain canal infrastructure, 3=monitor the water quality, 4= conflict resolution, 
5=monitor water entitlements, 6= others (specify) 
A6i. How do you benefit from being a group/WUA member? (Circle the relevant benefits in the box below) 
1=Get water subsidy 
2=pool efforts to address water quality 
3=easier lease/trade of water rights 
4=Obtain advice and planning farm activities  
5=Get help with marketing produce 
6= Get help with access to inputs 
7=Combined management of canal/dam infrastructure 
8= Capacity building/link with institutions e.g. DWAF 
9=Credit facilities from the WUA 
10= Lobbying for better water policies 
11= It’s a channel to voice problems 
12= Others(specify) 
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A6j. Are there emerging/small scale farmers in your group? 1=Yes…………..0=No……………… 
A6k. If yes, how many by gender? 1=male......................2=female………………… 
A6l. What are the difficulties faced in including new members? 1= When they cannot afford membership fees, 2= when they cannot afford the water use 
charges, 3= language differences, 4= sector differences, 5= gender differences, 6= others (specify) 
A7. How is information pertaining to group activities communicated to members? Through, 1= radio, 2=TV, 3=phone, 4=email addresses/website, 5= 
newsletters, 6= Pamphlets, 7= meetings, 8= newspaper articles, 9= others (specify) 
A8. Observe and note race of respondent     1= white,   2= blacks 3= colored 
 
MODULE B – Demographic characteristics  
B1. How many people constantly live, eat and cook in your household?...................................... 
B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 
Respondent 
(B2 codes) 
Gender 
1=male, 
2=female 
Age(yrs) Years of 
schooling 
(total years) 
Literacy 
(B6 codes)  
Marital 
status 
 (B7 codes) 
Main 
occupation 
(B8 codes) 
Years of 
farming 
(how many 
years have 
you been in 
operation) 
Has 
working 
phone 
(1=Yes 
,0=No) 
Has email 
address 
(1=Yes 
,0=No) 
Has TV 
(1=Yes, 
0=No) 
Has radio 
(1=Yes, 
0=No) 
            
            
            
            
 
B2 Codes 
 1. household head  
2. spouse  
3. firm owner  
4. farm/firm manager 
B6 Codes 
1. cannot read or write 
2 .can sign, write name only 
3. can read only 
4. can read and write 
B7 Codes 
1. Married living with spouse 
2. Married but spouse away 
3. Divorced/separated 
4. Widow/widower 
5. Never married 
6. Other, specify 
B8 Codes 
1. commercial farmer>10 ha 
2. small scale farmer<10 ha 
3. farm/firm worker 
4. miner 
5. Others (specify) 
 
131 
 
 
MODULE C-INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION (to be answered by both water managers and users) 
Please complete the table below for ICT based means of information access (applicable to owners/users from demographic table B10-B13)  
C1 C2 C3 ( info access is 2 way) C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 
ICT tool Info accessed using tools in C1 
1=National news 
2=Entertainment 
3=communication with friends 
and relatives 
4=water management info 
5=Other work related info 
6= Other (specify) 
Specify any info accessed in  C2 that is 
related to water management activities (list) 
1=reports/issues of water quality 
2=water storage, supply &distribution 
3=water trading activities, licensing & 
payment for water  
4= water costs issues 
5=  water conflict issues 
6=water/canal infrastructure 
7= other (specify) 
Info 
reliable 
1=Yes, 
0=No 
Info 
easy to 
use 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Initial cost 
of buying 
the 
equipment 
Cost of 
getting 
information 
from this 
source 
How does the 
cost of using this 
information 
source compare 
to your usual 
source of 
information?  
 (C8 Codes) 
Radio        
TV        
Phone (call/text)        
email address         
Other(specify)        
C8 Codes: 1. Same  2. Lower   3. Higher 
 What are your major sources of information on each of the following policy options?  
 
C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 
Policy option In the past year, did 
you need 
information about[] 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Information 
Source 
(C11codes) 
Means of 
information 
access 
(C12codes) 
How timely was 
this means of 
information access 
(C13codes) 
How  were the means of 
information access (C12) 
important in your decision 
to comply to [] (C14codes) 
Number of times 
information was 
accessed using this 
means in the past year 
Cost of 
each 
access 
Compulsory licensing        
Water tariffs/use charges        
Effluent discharge permits        
Water trade        
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C11 Codes  C12 Codes  C13 Codes  C14 Codes  
1 DWAF  
2.WUA group 
3. extension Agents 
4. Private Company 
5. Other farmers 
6. Agricultural training centre 
7. Other(specify) 
1. Visit by DWAF agent 
2. Visit by WUA /group staff 
3. Newspaper/magazine 
4. Radio 
5. Television 
6. Mobile phone (SMS) 
7. Mobile phone (Voice) 
8. Internet/email 
9. Agricultural training centre 
10. neighbours 
11. others (specify) 
1.not timely 
2.timely 
3.very timely 
1.not important 
2.important 
3.very important 
 
 
 
MODULE D-LAND HOLDING 
 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D10a D10b 
What is 
your total 
farm 
size(ha) 
Area 
owned 
(ha) 
Area 
rented in 
(ha) 
Total area 
under 
cultivation/
other use 
(ha)  
 
Year 
started 
activity/cul
tivating on 
this farm 
Irrigated 
area 
(ha) 
dry land/ 
rain fed 
area 
(ha) 
Current 
purchasin
g rate of 
land 
(Rands/ha
) 
Current 
renting rate 
of land 
(Rands/ha) 
Are there any 
claims on 
your land 
1=Yes,  
0=No 
If yes, what 
kind 
(D10a codes) 
How do you 
go about the 
claims  
(D10b codes) 
            
            
 
D10a codes 
1=land claims 2=water claims 3= Other (specify) 
D10b codes 
1=go to courts 2= resolve out of courts 3= other (specify) 
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MODULE E-FARM/FIRM PROFILE AND PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES (only section E5,E6,E7,E8,E9, E17, E18, E19, E20, E21, E22 apply to 
non-agricultural industry and mining) 
Crops grown: their resource requirements, their resource costs and their respective yields and prices in the year 2013 (NB; convert T to Kgs i.e. 
1T=1000kg) 
 
E1 E2 E3 E3a E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 E13 E14 
Crop 
name 
(E1 
codes) 
Parcel 
size(ha) 
Season 
grown 
(E3 
codes) 
How 
long 
does this 
crop 
stay in 
the 
field? 
(months
) 
Irrigate
d; 
(1=Yes, 
0=No) 
Water 
source 
(E5 
codes) 
Amount of water 
used (m3)/ha/ 
/month 
How 
much did 
you pay 
for this 
water(mo
nthly 
tariff) 
R/m3 
What was the 
water quality 
type 
( E8 codes) 
How much 
would you be 
willing to pay 
for this water 
quality rather 
than what you 
actually paid 
R/m3 
Irrigation 
method used 
(E10 codes) 
Total 
Seeds 
used 
(kg, 
T/ha) 
Seed 
costs 
(Rand/ha
) 
Total 
fertilizer 
(kg,T/ha) 
Total 
fertiliz
er cost 
(Rand/
ha) 
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
 
E1 Codes 
1=Citrus,2=peas,3=grapes,4=maize,5=wheat,6=avocadoes,7=mangoes,8=vegetables,9=cashcrops,11=groundnuts , 12=potatoes, 13= onions, 14=others(specify) 
E3 codes 
1=summer 
2=winter 
3=Autumn  
4=spring  
 
E5codes 
1 = dam 
2 = river 
3 = borehole 
4= rainfall 
5 = others(specify) 
E8 codes 
1=Ideal (good): the user of the water is 
not affected in any way 
 2=acceptable (moderate): slight to 
moderate problems are encountered 
 3=tolerable (bad): moderate to severe 
problems are encountered 
 4=unacceptable (very bad): the water 
cannot be used under normal 
circumstances. 
E10 codes 
1=Drip 
2=sprinkler  
3=flood  
4=others(specify) 
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Resource table continued… E17, E18, E19, (also apply to non-agricultural industry and mining) 
  E15 E16 E17 E18 
Crop 
name 
(E1  
codes
) 
Season 
(E3 
codes) 
Total 
insecticide
s, 
herbicides/
fungicides(
l/ha) 
Insecticide
s 
herbicides 
fungicides 
costs 
(Rand/ha) 
Total Labor requirements(man days/ha/ month) 
Total Labor costs (Rand/month/worker) 
Other variable costs (Rand/[]crop/ha) if not available/crop, give total cost for all the 
crops 
E17a. 
Family 
labor 
(how 
many) 
E17b 
Permanent 
labor 
(how 
many) 
E17c 
Permanent 
labor costs 
(R/month/ 
worker) 
E17d 
Temporary 
labor 
(how many) 
E17e 
Temporary 
labor costs 
(R/month/
worker) 
E18a 
Irrigation 
equipment 
maintenance 
E18b 
Fuel 
E18c 
Machinery 
maintenance 
E18d 
Addition
al 
transport 
costs 
E18e 
Electricity 
E18f 
Total cost 
of 
Insurance 
E18g 
Others 
(specify
) 
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
 
E19. Annual Capital costs by month (monthly interests) incurred in the production process for year 2013 
Jan Feb March April May June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec 
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Resource table continued…Crops yields/output and their respective prices (per crop/ha)… E20, E21, E22 apply to nonagricultural industry and mining 
 
  E20 E21 E22 
Crop name 
(E1  codes) 
Season 
(E3 codes) 
season 1 Yields (T, kg/ha) season 2 Yields (T, kg/ha) season 3 Yields (T, kg/ha) 
E 20a.  
Qty produced 
E20b. 
 Qty sold 
E20c.  
Price/T, kg) 
E21 a.  
Qty produced 
E21b. 
 Qty sold 
E21c.  
Price/T, kg) 
E22a. 
Qty produced 
E22b. 
Qty sold 
E22c. 
Price/T, kg) 
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MODULE F-WATER MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES 
 
F1. Is your irrigation water metered or is there another possibility of measurement? 1=Yes……..0=No……. (If no provide an estimate for amounts 
used where required in previous questions of water quantity requirements) 
F2. Is your water use registered? 1=Yes…………..0=No………………  
F2a. If yes, what amount……………………………….m3 /year or how many boreholes registered?............................................  
F2b. Where registered……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
F2c. What is the tariff…………………………………Rand/m3 /month 
F2d. Do you pay this monthly tariff? 1=Yes…………..0=No…………………….. 
F2e. Do you consider the current applied water tariffs appropriate?  
1=Yes………….. 
0=No (too much)………….how much would you be willing to pay per cubic meter…………………………. 
0=No (too little)…………....how much would you be willing to pay per cubic meter………………………… 
F3. Do you pay separate fees for effluent discharge? 1=Yes…………..0=No………………. 
F3a. If yes, how much…………………………………Rand /month  
F4. Are you of the opinion that water is a public good and should be provided free? 1=Yes…………..0=No………… 
F5. Is your water licensed? 1=Yes…………..0=No……………….. 
F5a. If yes, how much/how many quotas do you currently hold?…………………………………m3 
F5b. After how long are the water licenses reviewed?.........................................years 
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F5c. Do you consider this review period adequate/sufficient? 1=Yes………….. 
0=No (too short)………………..What should it be……………………..years 
0=No (too long)………………..What should it be……………………..years 
F6. Have you in the past sold or bought your water quota 1=Yes…………..0= No………….If yes, fill in table below. If no go to  F7 
F6a F6b F6c  F6d F6e F6f F6g 
Water  transaction 
sold/bought 
1=Yes, 
0=No 
When(year) Quantity 
sold/bought 
price(rand/m
3
) Reasons for sale/buying  
Reasons for  non sale/ non buying  
1=changes in crop combination 
2= Restriction of water quotas 
3=reduce area planted 
4=Put more land under production 
5=Drought 
6= Others (specify) 
In case of 
restrictions in 
current water 
quotas, what 
would be your 
strategies  
(F6g codes) 
1=Sold Permanently       
2=Sold Temporarily       
3=Bought Permanently       
4=Bought Temporarily       
F6g codes 1=change in crop combination, 2=buy quotas, 3=reduce area planted, 4= others (specify) 
F7  F8 F9a F9b F10c 
What are the Problems/ challenges you face in your water 
use activities (Circle accordingly) 
  If yes, indicate limitations (circle 
accordingly) 
Available 
currently 
How  much 
would you 
Need 
1. High water costs  Are your production 
activities limited by 
input availability?  
1=Yes, 0=No 
1. Arable land (ha)   
2. expensive equipment 2. Labor(man days)   
3. expensive operation and maintenance costs of equipment 3. Water supply(m
3
)   
4. inadequate water supply 4. Fertilizer (kg, T)   
5. inadequate water distribution within WUA 5. Water quality(E8 codes)   
6. Poor water quality 6. Others(specify)   
7. Poor service in water supply    
8. Water restrictions in dry periods    
9. Administrative delays    
10. Water storage difficulties    
11. none     
Others (specify)    
138 
 
MODULE G-TRANSACTION COSTS (to be answered by both water managers and users)*stakeholders face low costs ** stakeholders face 
high costs  
G1 G2 G3 G4 
policy TC type Activities under each TC type (ask for 
costs, only where applicable to that policy) 
any additional activity not listed should be 
included 
Time of occurrence and costs incurred 
G4a  
early  implementation 
G4b  
full implementation 
G4c 
establishment 
Compulsory 
licensing 
*Support and 
administrarion 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
**Contracting Additional information costs 
decision cost  
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
*Monitoring/ 
detection 
outcome/compliance 
transfers  
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
*Prosecution/e
nforcement 
conflict resolution 
 
   
Water 
tariffs/use 
charges 
*Support and 
administrarion 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
**Contracting Additional information costs 
decision cost 
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
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*Monitoring/d
etection 
outcome/compliance 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
*Prosecution/e
nforcement 
conflict resolution    
Effluent 
discharge 
permits 
*Support and 
administrarion 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
**Contracting Additional information costs 
decision cost  
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
*Monitoring/d
etection 
outcome/compliance(quality) 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
*Prosecution/e
nforcement 
conflict resolution    
Water trade *Support and 
administrarion 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
**Contracting bargaining costs  
checking market prices 
identifying buyers  
Additional information costs 
decision cost 
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
*Monitoring/d outcome/compliance    
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etection transfers  
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
*Prosecution/e
nforcement 
conflict resolution    
Formation of 
water use 
groups 
*Support and 
administrarion 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
 **Contracting bargaining costs  
additional information costs 
decision cost 
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
 *Monitoring/d
etection 
outcome/compliance 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
 *Prosecution/e
nforcement 
conflict resolution    
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MODULE H-INCOME SOURCES AND ASSETS 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5  H6 H7 
Asset name 
Does the 
hhd/firm 
currently own 
[] (1=Yes, 
0=No) 
Quantity 
owned 
Year of 
purchase 
Asset value 
(If you sell [] today 
in its present 
condition, how much 
would you get for it 
 Sources of income 
 
1. Own farm 
(computed from agricultural 
yields in E20, E21, E22) 
What was the yearly income 
from this source 
1. Ox-plough     1a. Cash crops  
2. Ox-cart      1b. Food crops  
3. Chemical Sprayer/pump     1c. Fruits and vegetables  
4. Wheel barrow     1d. Livestock and products  
5. Bicycle       
6. Tractor       
7. Plough     2. Work at other farm  
8.  Harrow 
    3. Work at non farm 
enterprises 
 
9. Planter     4. Salary employment  
10. Reaper     5. Service delivery  
11. Other tractor drawn 
equipment (specify…….... 
    6. Cash transfers  
12. Store for farm produce     7. Other(specify)  
13. Livestock kraal       
15. Radio/radio cassette     8. Total yearly income  
16. Mobile phone       
17. Television (TV)       
18. Computer/Internet       
19. Water pump       
20. Generator       
21. Refrigerator/freezer       
22. Landline phone       
 23. Air Conditioner       
 24. Sofa seats/coach       
 25. Cooker       
 26. Own house       
27. Other…....................        
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WATER MANAGERS' QUESTIONNAIRE 
MODULE A: RESPONDENT AND RESPONSIBILITIES IDENTIFICATION 
A1 Name of respondent   
A2 Position held   
A3 Telephone number (with dialing code)  
A4 Email address  
A5 Gender (observe)  
 
A6. What are your responsibilities as 
a water manager? Circle accordingly 
 
A7. If not, 
who is 
responsible 
for this 
activity in 
A6? 
A8. Which 
area are you 
responsible 
for 
1=upper, 
2=middle, 
3=lower 
4= other 
A9. How 
many 
managers 
are you 
in that 
area 
A10.  What Problems/aspects of 
concern do water users face in 
irrigation or other water use activities 
(Circle accordingly) 
A11. How do you 
address/respond to each in 
A10? 
1. Visit the water user 
2. Visit the WUA /group  
3. Newspaper/magazine 
4. Radio 
5. Télévision  
6. Mobile phone (SMS) 
7. Mobile phone (Voice) 
8. Internet/email 
9. seasonal training 
10. pass info thru neighbours 
11. others(specify) 
A12. How long does it 
take to respond to the 
problems in A10? 
1=seconds (how many) 
2=minutes (how many) 
3=days (how many) 
4=months (how many) 
5=years (how many) 
1. Monitor water payments & costs    1. High water costs   
2. Monitor water trade/transfers    2. expensive equipment   
3. Monitor and review licenses    3. expensive operation and 
maintenance costs of equipment 
  
4. Monitor water supply    4. inadequate water supply   
5.Monitor and  distribute water    5. inadequate distribution within WUA   
6. Monitor water quality/permits    6. Poor water quality   
7. Monitor/provide general service    7. Poor service in water supply   
8. Restrict water in dry periods    8. Water restrictions in dry periods   
9. Office administration    9. Administrative delays   
10. Monitor Water storage    10. Water storage difficulties   
11. Others (specify)    11. Others (specify)   
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MODULE C-INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION  
Please complete the table below for ICT based means of information access  
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 
ICT tool Info accessed using tools in C1 
1=National news 
2=Entertainment 
3=communication with friends 
and relatives 
4=water management info 
5=Other work related info 
6= Other (specify) 
Specify any info accessed in  C2 
that is related to water management 
activities (list) 
1=reports/issues of water quality 
2=water storage, supply 
&distribution 
3=water trading activities, licensing 
& payment for water  
4= water costs issues 
5=  water conflict issues 
6=water/canal infrastructure 
7= others (specify) 
Is the Info 
accessed in 
C3 reliable 
(1=Yes, 
0=No) 
Info easy 
to use 
(1=Yes, 
0=No) 
Initial 
cost of 
buying 
the ICT 
tool in 
C1 
Cost of 
getting 
information 
from this 
source 
How does the 
cost of using 
this information 
source compare 
to your usual 
source of 
information?  
 (C8 Codes) 
Radio        
TV        
phone        
email address        
Other(specify)        
C8 Codes: 1. Same 2. Lower   3. Higher 
What are your major sources/channels of information on each of the following policy options? 
C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 
Policy option In the past year, 
did you need 
information 
about[] 
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
Informatio
n Source 
(C11 
codes) 
Means of 
information 
access 
 (C12 codes) 
How timely was 
this means of 
information 
access  
(C13 codes) 
How  were the means of 
information access (C12) 
important in your follow 
up activities of 
[](C14codes) 
Number of 
times info was 
accessed using 
this means in 
the past year 
Cost of 
each 
access 
Compulsory licensing        
Water tariffs/use charges        
Effluent discharge permits        
Water trade        
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C11 Codes  
1 DWAF  
2.WUA group 
3. Extension Agents 
4. Private Company 
5. Other farmers 
6. Agricultural training centre 
7. Other(specify) 
C12 Codes  
 
1. Visit by DWAF agent 
2. Visit by WUA /group staff 
3. Newspaper/magazine 
4. Radio 
5. Television 
6. Mobile phone (SMS) 
7. Mobile phone (Voice) 
8. Internet/email 
9. Agricultural training centre 
10. neighbours 
11. others(specify) 
C13 Codes  
 
1.not timely 
2.timely 
3.very timely 
C14 Codes  
 
1.not important 
2.important 
3.very important 
 
MODULE G-TRANSACTION COSTS (*stakeholders face low costs ** stakeholders face high costs) 
G1 G2 G3 G4 
policy TC type Activities under each TC type (ask for 
costs, only where applicable to that policy) 
Time of occurrence and costs incurred 
G4a  
early  implementation 
G4b  
full implementation 
G4c 
establishment 
Compulsory 
licensing 
**Support and 
administration 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
*Contracting Additional information costs 
decision cost 
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
**Monitoring/
detection 
outcome/compliance 
transfers  
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
**Prosecution/
enforcement 
conflict resolution 
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Water 
tariffs/use 
charges 
**Support and 
administration 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
*Contracting Additional information costs 
decision cost 
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
**Monitoring/
detection 
outcome/compliance 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
**Prosecution/
enforcement 
conflict resolution    
Effluent 
discharge 
permits 
**Support and 
administration 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
*Contracting Additional information costs 
decision cost  
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
**Monitoring/
detection 
outcome/compliance(quality) 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
**Prosecution/
enforcement 
conflict resolution    
Water trade **Support and 
administration 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
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travel costs 
telephone costs 
*Contracting bargaining costs  
checking market prices 
identifying buyers  
Additional information costs 
decision cost 
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
**Monitoring/
detection 
outcome/compliance 
transfers  
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
**Prosecution/
enforcement 
conflict resolution    
Formation of 
water use 
groups 
*Support and 
administrarion 
 
notices and hearings 
discussions  
meetings  
follow-ups 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
 **Contracting bargaining costs  
additional information costs 
decision cost 
arranging for finance  
negotiating 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
   
 *Monitoring/d
etection 
outcome/compliance 
travel costs 
telephone costs 
time used costs 
   
 *Prosecution/e
nforcement 
conflict resolution    
NB: Please request for proposed budgets, financial accounts, government reports to further aid the transaction costs identification 
